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Abstract

The study theorizes that a nation-state can manifest a condition similar to that of
personality commonly associated with humans. Through the identification of consistent
behaviors, a personality like condition is recognizable, and the underlining motivations
dictate national policy independent of any current social/political influence. The research
examines Russia during two historical periods examining the conflict events and
social/political transitions of the period, to identify common behavioral characteristics,
which indicate the existence of any independent personality like trait.
The study focuses on two historical periods: the Monarch Period of Peter I (The Great),
and the Post-Soviet Union period of Vladimir Putin, periods selected as historical eras in
which Russia experienced major political or social transition. Using a comparative
qualitative historical analysis with a behaviorist focus, the research examines these
periods by profiling each era’s elements of society and the events of domestic and
international conflict that Russia experienced, while evaluating the actions taken in
response to each.
The research discovers that Russia exhibits personality like traits, similar to those
associated with humans and are likewise developed from experience, and once imbedded
into Russian psychology, regardless of the current social/political elements or situational
conditions, remain prime motivators to Russian behavior. The personality like
characteristic identified was similar to inferiority, which leads to behavior characteristics
comparable to narcissism, as the definition of narcissism relates to the need for
admiration and or acceptance. The study identified the origins of the inferiority like
complex and the narcissistic like behavior pattern exhibited by Russia in both periods.
ix
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Conceptual Framework
This research is an examination of nation-states from the perspective of human
behavior, conducted to determine if constructs of society exhibit, retain, and are
motivated by personality like characteristics. The research’s theoretical foundation
hypothesizes, that by examining the behaviors of nation-states, identifiable associated
personality like characteristics, similar to those associated with humans exist, and create
an independent identity, that influence action independent of the current situations or
social/political ideology. The study postulates that nations are examinable through the
lens of behaviorism.
A nation’s personality, although not retaining all influences, will incorporate those
that are significant enough in scope, thereby creating new paradigms of behavioral
characteristics. The personality of the nation-state therefore increases in dimension as
experiences the number of significant events increase. The personality of a nation-state is
different from its culture, as “Culture is a way of life shared by a group, a system of
ideas, values, beliefs, knowledge, and customs transmitted from generation to generation
within a social group” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 50).
Through a comparative qualitative historical analysis of a nation-states behavioral
pattern, during periods of conflict and social/ political transition, associated personality
like causal mechanisms can be identified, if similar behavioral patterns are recognized in
both historical periods. The behaviors and associated personality like characteristic
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therefore attributed to the nation-state, if the nation-state is the only identified constant
element of the historical profile.

Ideology versus Motivation
This section is presented as a framing of the study’s concept of motivation versus
methodology. The researcher sees a definitive difference between motivation and
methodology, with methodology being the how and motivation being the why in
determining actions. The study is focused on the why, through the identification of the
behavioral characteristics. Although the study concedes that motivation plays a part in
determining methodology, methodology when attached to motivation is either a reflection
of ideological parameters or logistical constraints, and there is no basis in which to
believe that the options of methodology would greatly influence behavioral
characteristics.
Transitions can create new conflict potentials which were previously unrealized, and
of which the state may or may not be fully prepared. Changes in intra-state political
motivations can sever ties with former allies while forging new cooperative ties with
other nation-states with similar political structures, previously unrealized. A new
democratic nation may find its ties with other democracies stronger following a transition
to democracy, whereas that same nation who might formerly have held strong ties with
communist nations may find those relationships strained or decreased. The emergence of
these new conflict potentials may require new conflict engagement techniques previously
unutilized and possibly beyond the capability of the transitioning state. There is a
potential for previous conflicts to remain, even following transition. These previous
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conflicts may require new engagement techniques, due to changes in capability, of the
transitioning nation-state.

Significance of Topic
Currently, at the time of the writing of this dissertation, the international community
is embroiled in numerous deadly conflicts throughout the world. In the region of the
Middle East, the state of Israel and the territory controlled by the Palestinian organization
Hamas in Gaza are embroiled in a conflict that continues to kill innocent civilians. In
Syria, there remains a state of civil war, as the totalitarian government of Bashir Al Assad
fights for control of the country against a fractured opposition with a variety of political
agendas, many of which are unknown. In many other areas of the Middle East, unrest
intensifies as fundamental groups, such as ISIS, attempt to annex portions of Syria and
Iraq in an effort to create a theocratic Islamic caliphate. Egypt remains in political
turmoil, under the control of a new secular government. This new government led by the
Egyptian military recently overthrew its predecessor, a fledgling democracy dominated
by the Muslim Brotherhood. Meanwhile, Iran continues to hold the world’s attention
with fears of its nuclear ambitions. The European continent has seen recent violent
encounters, as Russia and the Ukraine remain entangled in a conflict that threatens the
sovereignty of the Ukrainian state and has seen the annexation of portions of Ukraine’s
sovereign territory. In Asia, North Korea continues to utilize threatening rhetoric against
their neighbors South Korea and Japan, while continuing to challenge the United States.
Afghanistan remains in political turmoil in their continuing war against the
fundamentalist Taliban, and internal issues created by accusations of fraud in their
democratic process. Additionally, on the African continent, many nations are dealing

4
with civil war and political instability. These are examples of only the major conflicts in
which the world is embroiled in 2014.
Each of these examples on the surface has varying causes and histories that
perpetuated the current conflicts. The root cause of the individual conflicts is not the
subject that this dissertation will address, nor will this dissertation address the resolution
of the conflicts presently existing throughout the world. These examples provided are a
foundation that illustrates the importance of undertaking the study and the selection of the
study’s subject, Russia, for in each of these examples, world-dominating nation-states
have interests and influence. The dissertation will contend that world power intervention
is as much a product of that nation’s personality which dictates behavior as any other
reason attributed in current political theory.

Purpose
This study seeks to offer a deeper profile perspective of national behavior and thereby
identify any consistent behaviors of the actors. There is no method or theories, like in
humans, that can predict 100% of the potential actions of a nation (Dunne, Kurki, &
Smith, 2010, pp. 3 - 8). Nevertheless, the greater our understanding of a nation’s
motivations, the closer we are to having the ability to predict, with a moderate level of
certainty, that nation’s potential actions. To this end, and to better address conflict
throughout the world, conflict analysis scholars must seek new epistemologies regarding
those nations with the greatest influence potential.
The purpose of this dissertation is not to create a model that implies 100% accuracy
in predicting Russian actions. Rather, the purpose is to advance current knowledge
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through the employment of a different model of inquiry. The study will explore if Russia
has exhibited historically, and continues to exhibit today, any behavioral homogony
which can be attributed to personality like characteristics. Through the examination of
the model’s data, the formulation of a more complete model of Russian motivations in
conflict. The identification of a behavioral homogony would thereby expose a different
perspective.

Problem Statement
Why do nation-states act in the manner that they do? This fundamental question has
been the focus of many a political scientist and conflict analysis and resolution scholar
with the answers postulated being diverse.
Current political and social theory ignores or downplays the potential relationship
between human behavior characteristics and the similar behaviors of nation-states, which
potentially signal the existence of personality like characteristics, normally assigned to
humans, being associated to nation-states. Also ignored is potential for cumulative
historic memory within nations and the role those memories play upon the formation of
national identities, which are analogous to the personality development through
experience seen in humans. This disconnect creates a gap in the overall epistemology,
which is not covered in current political, social, or conflict theories.
There exists a plethora of theory to apply to conflict situations. Each theory designed
to define why a nation or group acts in the manner that it does. However, applying these
theories requires that the actions of a nation or group be measured within the confines of
the theoretical model. (For example, application of liberalism requires remaining within
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the parameters of the concept of liberalism). The theoretical model of these theories is
therefore itself the bias, which determines the conclusion of whether the model fits the
subject or not. Hence, there is a need for a new, unbiased scientific inquiry not restricted
to the confines of any political or social ideology, a methodology which examines the
subject without preconceived parameters and instead examines behavior during conflict
including the elements of society engaged or indirectly influential to the conflict.

Research Questions and Hypotheses
Within this dissertation the primary hypothesis being that nation-states possess
personality like characteristics similar to those traditionally found in humans, identifiable
through the examination of behaviors, and that nation-state behavioral profiling, a model
of inquiry that examines a conflict and its elements to discover behavioral characteristics
and their associated personality traits, is valid. Discovering these traits is possible
through the utilization of similar techniques traditionally reserved for the sciences of
sociology, psychology, and criminal profiling.
Within Russia, there exists a personality like component that regardless of transitions
in political, economic, or social structures consistently exerts influence on Russian
conflict and foreign policy. This personality like component exists and is identifiable
through a comparative qualitative historical analysis of Russian behaviors, both domestic
and international.
The dissertation, in an effort to address this hypothesis, will answer the following
questions:

7
1. Does nation-state possess personality like characteristics, identifiable by
recognition of associated consistent behaviors exhibited over a period different
historical periods?
2. Is the proposed personality like component independent of the current
social/political mechanism?
3. Does the proposed personality like component define the parameters in which the
nation-state behaves?
4. Is the proposed personality component and associated behaviors independent of,
and maintained despite, experienced conflict or political/social transitions?
5. Can methods of inquiry, traditionally employed in the study of humans, be valid if
employed as a method of inquiry for nations?
6. Is nation-state behavioral profiling a valid methodology?
7. Can the identification of this behavioral homogony contribute to a more detailed
model with which to predict future Russian actions?
8. Can this new information be used to create proactive conflict mitigation?

Summary of Methodology
The methodology of this dissertation is the employment of a qualitative comparative
historical analysis, examining Russian behavior to discover an associated personality like
component consistent with the behavioral characteristics identified. The study will
conduct the examination using identified historical periods in which Russia was engaged
in conflict during periods of social/political transition. The study believes that the greatest
potential to disrupt any homogony would be evident during these transitional periods.
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The study will employ comparative qualitative historical analysis from which a
historical data set is created. This analysis will include a detailed description of the
period’s social/political transition, a brief biographical examination of the current
period’s leadership, and a brief historical account of selected conflicts which the nation
faced, both international and domestic. The transition can take the form of social reform,
political ideological shifts, and declines of empires.
The study will then apply nation-state behavioral profiling, a technique that utilizes
similar methods as those used in criminal profiling, to the data to examine behaviors and
draw conclusions from the findings by comparing the behavior consistencies to
associated personality definitions traditionally accepted by the discipline of behavioral
science.
For this study, two periods of Russian history will be examined. The two periods
selected encompass those periods in Russian history within which an identifiable
transition in the social political structure is present. The two periods will be Russia’s
Monarchal society of the late 17th and early 18th century, and the post-Soviet era of the
late 20th early 21st century.
Table 1-1
Period

Transition

Russia’s
Monarchal society
of the late 17th and
early 18th century
Post-Soviet era of
the late 20th early
21st century

Social Reform
(Europeanization of
Russian Society)
Capitalistic
Economy
(Break up of Soviet
Union)

Governance
Structure
Monarchy

Democratic
Federal
Republic

Leader

Conflicts

Czar
Peter the
Great

Strel’sty Revolt

Vladimir
Putin

The Great
Northern War
Chechen
Revolts
Democratization
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. The selection of the periods of Russian transition (see table 1-1), required that each
selected period demonstrate:
Table 1-2
Component necessary for inclusion

Further explanation

Either a social or a political transitioning
component.

A period can contain more than one
social/political transition as a variable for
the examination.
A monarchy and a dictatorship, although
with similar components, are nevertheless
differing types of political structures.
The leader in question must be the decision
maker regarding the addressing of conflict.

The governance structure in Russia during
the transition period must be different or in
transition.
There must be an identifiable head of state
with which to examine and compare. This
leader must be either a driver of the
transition or a leader who must deal with
the effects of the transition.
There must exist, within the period, a
domestic and international conflict with
which the transitioning political or social
structure was required to deal.
The conflicts must be relatable to the
conflicts in the other periods examined.

Cases of social unrest and international
conflict or war must be present from which
to compare the historical periods.

Limitations
The methodology employed in this dissertation has the same limitation as would be
experienced in any conduction of comparative historical analysis or profiling. It is within
the definition of personality and behavioral traits that the research is most limited.
Classification and identification of these traits must be conducted under the accepted
definitions commonly used in the behavioral sciences. The assignment of a personality
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like characteristic, if found using the acceptable definition, does not imply that the
subject is in fact suffering from any personality disorder which may commonly be
assigned to individuals who exhibit the same characteristics. The study recognizes that in
the theoretical framework’s infancy, the defining components are the parameters in which
it must operate. New terminology, which would define behavioral characteristics and
associated personality like components with definitions and parameters more suited and
thereby directly applicable to nation-states may be necessary to undertake. This
recognition of the need for specific terminology does not imply that the research believes
there is any real disconnect from the previous definitions used in sociology or behavioral
science, but that for the purpose of universal acceptance, new designations would remove
the traditional stigmas sometimes attached to the previous definitions.

Qualitative Comparative Historical Analysis
The common issue with any qualitative historical analysis exists within the
historiography. “How one chose from the historical record the materials that will best
help one to develop or test theory, or even simply describes a set of events, in a particular
case or small set of cases” (Thies, 2002, p. 351). It is in source material selection that the
bias cannot be eliminated, only mitigated, and that the conduction of any historical based
analysis it is the historiography which receives most of the criticism. “The most notorious
problem that persistently face qualitative historical analysis, namely, investigator bias and
unwarranted selectivity in the use of source material” (Thies, 2002, p. 352).
The researcher accepts that bias could be claimed as to the selection of the time
periods in which data will be collected. In fact, the selection of the periods was done
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intentionally to meet the set of parameters as a condition of selection (see table 1-2). It is
in this selection of periods with the condition of great transition which the study
acknowledges the use of bias in the act of selection as a necessary condition to conduct a
fair assessment of the hypothesis.
It is also accepted that the selection of a different subject, other than Russia, has the
potential to elicit a different result and therefore could be considered biased. However,
the selection of Russia was concluded to address the motivation to increase knowledge,
through a research subject who offered the greatest potential impact for conflict
understanding and engagement. Russia’s influence as not only a direct conflict
participant, but also a secondary external participant, makes its selection as a subject the
most potentially beneficial. Although other subjects may have had more direct conflict
implications, few other nations could have as extensive global implications.
The study also acknowledges that historical accounts are inherently biased by the
authors of the histories. However, any author bias is believed to be minimal, as the study
seeks to collect factual data rather than author opinion. To further limit any unintentional
bias, the historiography data will be selected “by identifying one school of historiography
that (the study) will stick with as the historical record against which (the study) test your
(its) theories” (Thies, 2002, p. 365). The researcher acknowledges that to accomplish this,
commitment to one school of historiography the researcher is required “to become
familiar with general trends in historiography, as well as developments in historical
inquiry” (Thies, 2002, p. 365; Iggers, 1997; N. Wilson, 1999).
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Lustick (1996) also envisioned a bias that is cumulative in nature, called “selection
bias”:
The first concern is the bias of the historian who may draw on some
primary sources to the exclusion of others, such that he produces distorted
account of some historical event. The second concern is the selection
effects introduced by the political scientist when he chooses to focus on a
particular historians work and consciously or unconsciously excludes
others. The worst-case scenario for Lustick, but he seems to me when he
describes “selection bias” is when these two problems are conjoined. In
this scenario a political scientist with a particular theoretical and
conceptual disposition purposefully selects certain historians who share
this bias, and whose work is already tainted as such leading to a
misleading historical account, and therefore mistaken confirmation of the
political scientist theory. (Thies, 2002, p. 359; Lustick, 1996).
Therefore the data will be from a consistent school of historiography, all attempts will
be made to collect data from multiple historical authors, albeit from the same theoretical
point of view.

Profiling
The limitations of profiling are based upon the methodology’s inherit subjectivity.
The limitations of nation-state behavioral profiling are similar to the limitations of
criminal profiling or any other social science methodology, which it is designed after.
Profiling is not an approach of research that has the ability to define a subject or conflict
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through its application alone. However, the subjectivity of the methodology can be
reduced if the criterion from which a profile is derived remains consistent. To accomplish
this, application of nation-state behavioral profiling must adhere to the set methodologies
that will be expanded upon in chapter 3.
A secondary limitation to profiling exists within the defined parameters of the
behavioral characteristics with which the subject data is coded. Although psychological
diagnosis texts such as the DSM IV define behavioral characteristics and assign the
degrees to which those characteristics influence the subject, the researcher’s perception of
the definitions presented is always an issue of bias. The researcher understands,
acknowledges, and accepts that this bias exists inherently within all social science
research that contains subjective components.

Definition of Terms and Concepts
Historiography – “The writing of history based on a selective, critical reading of
sources that synthesize particular bits of information into a narrative description or
analysis of a subject” (Thies, 2002, p. 351). For the purpose of this dissertation, the
information collected for the qualitative comparative historical analysis, including the
criteria used to select and validate the time periods, transition events, governance
structures of the periods, leader biographies, and historical accounts of the domestic and
international conflicts will conducted using standard historiography as outlined by Thies
(2002).
Qualitative comparative historical analysis – “A methodological approach that
employs qualitative instead of quantitative measurement and the use of primary historical
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documents or historians’ interpretations thereof in service of theory development and
testing” (Thies, 2002). For the researches purpose, a comparative component is included,
to accommodate the selection of two historical periods. The data used for the application
of nation-state behavioral profiling will be derived from the qualitative comparative
historical analysis through historiography.
Nation-state behavioral profiling – The application of accepted behavioral science
profiling techniques, as specifically outlined in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, to
historiography data generated from a qualitative comparative historical analysis of
specific historical periods, their conflicts, and common social/political elements, and
transitions, to examine these data points for consistent behavioral homogony.
Nomothetic Profiling – “the study of groups which results in knowledge about the
characteristics of groups, which is not only useful but necessary when trying to define
groups, solve group related problems, or generate initial theories about issues in specific
cases” (Bartol, 2013, p. 69).
Definitions regarding template categories are presented in Chapter 3, which are the
research methodologies.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction: Topics and Methods
The literature review’s intent was to conduct its inquiry from a mainstream
perspective. All the researched subjects presented in this section currently hold
acceptable concepts within the disciplines in which they reside. Literary interpretations of
the subject matter, which were outside the defined parameters of contemporary schools of
thought, are not included into the study’s literature review. The creation of a new
theoretical paradigm, as proposed by the study, limits previous writings regarding the
subject of human behavioral characteristics application to nation-states.
The literature review approached the problem first reviewing scholarship
regarding human characteristics and how the behavioral sciences conduct their inquiry
into the identification and development of human characteristics, thus allowing for the
presentation of corollary opportunities. It is within the corollary inferences that the study
derives its theoretical foundation. Presented here, is a direct reflection of the theoretical
paradigm proposed and the conceptual framework and problem statement sections
postulated in chapter 1. The bulk of the chapter is an examination of the present political
theories in use today and commentary on their correlative values to the proposed
theoretical foundation of the study, as well as a reinforcement of the problem statement
regarding current theoretical limitations.
The literature review explored the concept of behavioral characteristics,
specifically, what they are, how they develop, and how social science examines them,
with the intent to promote the concept that if we understand the subject from the
perspective of traditional use, we can therefore expand the subject concepts to other
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environments. This necessitates a need to present a short section addressing correlating
methodology and evaluate the experience by the disciplines and professions who use it
most. In this section, the development and presentation of the correlation perspective
between human behavioral characteristics and their existence in nation-states is studied.
In addition, the literature review examines the identity of society and social structure and
correlating parallels between individuals and larger social constructs. Since the
foundational concept of the study is a case study to identify behavioral characteristics in
nation-states, identification of the same correlation in the environment within which the
nation-state resides is required.
When reviewing the political theory of today, the main goals of the research is to
identify the reciprocity of political theory characteristics as they relate to the individual.
In doing so, a correlation of characteristics values is created, and as the research objective
is to do the reverse, we thereby apply human behavioral characteristic to the nation-state.
Therefore, while conducting the literature review, the study will provide commentary
regarding the existence of this reciprocity correlation, thus strengthening the argument
that reverse application of characteristics is valid. The review of current political and
social theories will also evaluate any shortcomings, therefore strengthening the position
that an examination of nation-states from a different perspective is necessary. This
section will examine and analyze the current political science theories used to explain the
actions of nations and thereby further understand their motivations. According to Smith
(2010), “The study of international relations has classically focused on the analysis of the
causes of war and the conditions of peace. Such an agenda seem politically pertinent in
the 20th century in the aftermath of two world wars” (p. 1). Within the realm of
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international relations in the social sciences, political scientists and conflict scholars have
an abundance of theoretical perspectives with which to evaluate nations. This plethora of
different theoretical perspectives is one of the prime reasons for the development of the
theoretical methodology explored in this dissertation.
When the literature turns to a subject such as profiling, the literature source is the
FBI, an accepted world authority in the field. The study employs the same criteria when
reviewing political science and behavioral science theories. Through the maintaining of
currently accepted schools of thought in the subject matter, the study presents the most
comprehensive examination of current theoretical paradigms, allowing for scholarly
critical correlation to the theoretical principles presented herein.

Critique of Scholarly Literature
As presented in the previous section, the literature to be reviewed will reflect the
current schools of thought regarding the subject matter presented. This maintains the
consistency with the historiography principle of adhering to one school of thought when
conducting a historical case study. Since there is little literature which the theoretical
concepts of the study are argued either for or against, except within the framework of the
political science theories, which argue different factors as motivators of nation-state
behavior, the critique of dissenting literature is limited. With the starting point of the
research subjects data being the late 17th and early 18th century, some of the theories
presented in this literature review were not even conceived when Peter I was Czar of
Russia, or at least not conceived in the framework of current understanding. Likewise, the
subject matter regarding human behavior also had different foundations during that
earlier period than they do now. However, it is the current accepted derivative of the
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individual theories with which the study concerns itself. Therefore, although Marxism
and critical theory in the time of Peter the Great had yet to exist, those theories are
relevant to the present day and therefore deserve the study’s consideration. The study
also believes that theories developed after certain eras are retroactively applicable.
Whenever inquiry enters into a new perspective of scholarship, in many cases
pervious literature, the concepts presented in that literature are the focus of a study’s
critique. However, in the case of human behavioral characteristic development, the
review of literature is presented less as a competing theoretical paradigm, but more a
conceptual framework to be applied to another subject. Although there might be some
discourse regarding acceptance of all the principles found in behavioral science, as they
will relate to nation-states, these areas of contention are more a product of the dynamics
inherently found in the differences between living persons and inanimate objects. Nationstates do not feel; however, it is proposed that they do learn, and that learning is
cumulative, as would be the case in the living being. Therefore, the presentation of
behavioral concepts in the individual, presented here, are not subjects of critique but
rather points of correlation from which the theoretical framework of the study is based.
However, when considering the literature of current thought as it relates to
political international theory, some critique is apparent. In reviewing the literature for the
study, a focus was placed upon international relations theoretical concepts as utilized by
the discipline of political science. On the surface, each theoretical concept presented in
this literature review has merit if you examine the subjects in question from the
perspective of the theorist. The one common theme that runs through all of the theories
presented is that they are assessments of why nations act the way they do from the
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perspective of the theorist. Another common theme is that each theorist would seem to
lump nation-states into one generic construct. The only delineation that these theorists
seem to make is the difference between powerful nations and weaker ones.
The study takes its greatest issue with each of these theory’s dismissal of the
overall effect of human nature upon the decisions of the nations in which they reside.
These theorists also seem to ignore the concept of national memory, or more simply put,
the effects of the past creating influential ideologies which interject themselves
independently of their current governmental structures in any theoretical model. Whether
a theorist sees a nation as an autonomous construct whose decisions and fate lie within or
as a component of a larger construct which must work within the boundaries of the
system in which it resides, political theory, as presented here, shows the tendency to
disconnect the nation from its people.
From this foundation, the theory that nation-states possess behavioral characteristics
and personalities not unlike those found in humans was conceived. Although the original
question will be reserved for later inquiry, the principle that proposed the existence of
national behavioral characteristics was presented. However, this theoretical model was in
direct contrast to much of the precepts of current political science thought. This presented
the first research problem. For political science, when analyzing conflict or those factors
with direct influence upon conflict, nation-states are traditionally presented as entities,
which are independent of human behavior and are reactionary to the environment in
which they reside (Mearsheimer, 2010). This political theoretical construct sounds very
close to the definition of the situational model of human personality development
presented in Spencer (1985), which is presented in the literature review section.
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Objections the study will raise in the case of human personality development are
continued in regards to nation-state personality development. The study persists in
postulating that although the current environment in which a nation-state exist in will
have some influence upon the methodology of a nations actions, other factors exist which
determine the reason for a nation’s conduct. Human behavioral characteristics are
dismissed in mainstream political science theory and therefore, vital components are
missing. The historical memory of the nation or the cumulative memories of experience
of that nation also play a factor. Furthermore, the behavioral characteristics both past and
present of those entities within the system that are main drivers of policy and ideology,
and have, through their actions, transferred those characteristics to the state’s overall
identity, also require consideration.
Ignoring these two elements creates inadequacies in our theoretical models. The
study proposes that nations, like humans, are a product of their experiences and historical
influences of previous actors within the system, and that the culmination of these
experiences and historic influences guide the actions of nations, regardless of the current
political or social environment. However, nations are not autonomous entities, which
have the ability to act on their own. Rather, the historically created personality of a
nation defines the parameters in which the leaders of the system must conduct their
actions. Going back to the case of Israel and the support of the United States, our leaders
are predisposed to support Israel, despite any personal ideology, because the personality
of the United States demands it.
The second problem is the existence of a plethora of differing international relations
theories, which although applicable to any given conflict, are insufficient due to their
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inherent limited parameters, which are a result of their generic theoretical construction.
The resulting discourse, created by the sheer number of differing theories vying for
acceptance, makes the ability to select one as all-inclusive or conflict appropriate
problematic. Although the study will not lessen the number of available theories, nor
does it propose a necessity for a reduction in the number of political science theories, the
study recognizes the limitations of political theory regarding international and domestic
relations and acknowledges the necessity for additional foundations of inquiry. The
designed methodology is independent of any one present theory of international relations
thought, but is potentially applicable in conjunction with all theories. The research
design analyzes conflict from two different perspectives, as events which potentially can
shape the personality of a nation-state, and as events in which the personality
characteristics of a nation-state which already exist, can be identified through actions and
reactions. In regards to these two perspectives, the research approaches the inquiry of
these political and conflict questions from the perspective of the
sociologist/anthropologist in regarding the former, and from the perspective similar to
that of a forensic criminal profiler in the case of the later. In the case of the
sociological/anthropological approach, the characteristics of the conflict are identified
and the effects of those characteristics are evaluated to their potential effect on a nationstates personality. From the position of a forensic profiler, the characteristics of the event
are compared to the behavioral characteristics of the nation and the elements within the
national structure, which through their design implement foreign and domestic policy, to
discover if policy overrides the proposed national personality.
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It is imperative for conflict scholars to understand the motivations of nation-states if
we are to address conflict. Political science theory offers a starting point in which to
evaluate the motivations of nations. Unfortunately, there exists an overabundance of
differing social and political science theories designed to comprehend and forecast the
actions of nation-states. One disadvantage to reliance upon political science theory exists
when we consider their quantities and diversity. Thus far, political theory alone is
insufficient to obtain the necessary direct comprehension into the motivations of nations
in the current complex world. When we consider recent events, and the overwhelming
number of conflicts in which the world engages today, we must acknowledge that there
exist gaps in our epistemology of conflict and of nations. The inadequacies of present
theoretical models that contemporary peace scholars utilize reduce the opportunities to
proactively mitigate conflict. To be fair, these theoretical inadequacies may be nothing
more than a societal perception created as an excuse for our ineffectual mitigation of
conflict.
Alternatively, cautious application of these existing theories could lead to these
misconceptions. Caution is understandable when we consider the potential devastating
ramifications that exist if these theoretical models are incorrectly applied. The fear and
scope of these ramifications may well be the impetus for cautious application. However,
the study contends that there is no actual gap in the theoretical models or the manner in
which they are applied, but rather within all conflicts, as elements exists which have so
far remained undefined or ignored. On the other hand, the study also contends that
political science theory is restrictive in the parameters of the ideology in which they
operate. Each views the world from a pre-conceived perspective, and thereby formulates
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theory within those parameters. Hence the study, although with a preconceived
hypothesis that behavioral characteristics exist within the personality of the nation state,
has no preconceived bias as to what those characteristics are to cloud the study.
Dunne, Kurki, and Smith (2010) writes that “By the 1980s it was commonplace to
speak of the three approaches (realism, liberalism, and Marxism) as constituting an intraparadigm debate” (p. 4). Each of these theories has an application; however, each view
the conflict from a different perspective. “Since international relations was defined as
being about war, the theory that would appear to be most useful in explaining it, not
surprisingly, would be the one that focuses on war” (Dunne et al., 2010, p. 4). This
imposing of a single parameter in which to examine a subject presents the bias which
political theory experiences. However, the focus on war, as mentioned by Dunne et al.
(2010), is not the only parameter which creates this bias. Each international theory also
imposes its own ideological bias. They may all look at the subject of war, but they do so
from a pre-defined ideological perspective. This ideological perspective creates a
secondary bias condition within which the subject is limited. For example, Neo-realism
looks at war from the perspective of the parameters of the ideology of the neo-realist, and
therefore, applies generalities of the facts of conflict to fit within that framework.
Still, realism, neorealism, and Marxism, are not the only theoretical divisions that
create discourse in international relations theory. The broader debate between rationalists
(neorealism and neoliberalism) and reflectivists (feminism and post structuralism) argues
the value of positivism. Robert Keohane (1989), a rationalist, argues the weakness of the
reflectivist approach:

24
Until the reflective scholars or others sympathetic to their arguments have
delineated such a research program and show in particular studies that can
illuminate important issues in world politics, they remain on the margins of the
field, largely invisible to the preponderance of empirical researchers, most of
whom explicitly or implicitly accept one or another version of rationalistic
premise (p. 173).
This discourse between the reflectivist and the rationalists, those that support
positivism and those that oppose it, is irrelevant for the purpose of this study. Rather, it is
the existence of this discourse which is the problem, and thereby creates the impetus for
examining the problem from a different approach. As Keohane (1989) presented, the
focus should be on empirical research, conducted under a scientific design free of
ideological bias. The research, designed to be a new approach, might be unacceptable to
either camp, not because of its empirical approach, but due to the focus of its theoretical
foundation. The research contained here proposes no ideological preconception other
than the existence of behavioral characteristics in nation-states. The extent and context of
those characteristics have no predefinition beyond the limitations of the currently
accepted behavioral characteristics of humans.
The study proposes no ideological parameters, but rather empirically examines the
factual accounts of conflict by applying defined behavioral characteristic parameters from
which to develop its conclusions. There currently exists ample discourse regarding the
merits of each individual political science theory, and the ideology focus from which they
derive their theory. Therefore, rather than entering into the discourse through rejecting
the validity one side or the other, this study chooses to accept the merits of all political
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theories mentioned as valid from their limited perspective. The actual cause of this
discourse is as diverse as the theories of which the discourse is about. Academic
disagreement regarding theoretical models is a fundamental component of all academic
endeavors and is nothing new. However, inquiry that is fact based and not predicated
upon any ideological bias gives empirical results, which allows for a different paradigm
discourse.
The study also acknowledges that the introduction of behavioral science can only
make the questions about nations’ actions more complex. Nonetheless, it is not the
study’s intent to avoid complexity, but rather to increase understanding. Regardless of the
issues that are taken with the political theories presented in this chapter, the study does
not believe the methodology presented is a replacement for current political theory, but
rather an epistemological adjunct from which these political theories can be explored.

Human Behavioral Characteristics and the Nation-state
Comparing the characteristics of nations and societies to those of humans is nothing
new. “The historian Oswald Spengler portrayed the life cycles of civilizations as similar
to the life cycles of people” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 533). Spengler (1926-1929) wrote that
“Civilizations are born, grow up, become senile, and finally die.” Likewise, “Herbert
Spencer also thought of evolution as a process of “growth”, comparing all societies to
organisms” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 534). H. Spencer postulated, “All societies that are at
the same stage of growth must be similar in a number of ways” (H. Spencer, 1890; H.
Spencer, 1898-1899). Although the earlier Spencer’s view was a reflection of his belief in
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“unilinear evolutionism” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 534), it shows the correlation even early
sociologists placed upon human characteristics and the characteristics of societies.
Nation-states are not independent entities, which have autonomous propensities. They
do not possess the ability to disconnect themselves from the characteristics of those who
created the system. The nation-state is a constructed system of society and not a
traditional living organism, and therefore cannot independently create personality or
behavioral characteristics. The personality of the nation-state increases in dimension as
those that control the nation-state interject their personality traits upon this social system.
It is important to note that the personality of a nation-state is different than its culture.
“Culture is a way of life shared by a group, a system of ideas, values, beliefs, knowledge,
and customs transmitted from generation to generation within a social group” (M.
Spencer, 1985, p. 50). This is an important distinction, as many might argue that the
study is mistaking cultural differences for differences in personality and behavioral traits.
Although the culture of a nation-state may in fact be a reflection or a component of a
nation’s personality, culture is a concept that resides within the nation-state, whereas
personality is expressed externally. When dealing with conflict situations, even those of
the domestic variety, personality trumps culture.
However, since the research is being conducted using qualitative comparative
historical analysis as the method of data collection, the closest theoretical discipline from
which the study draws is that of the behaviorists, which explain personality in terms of
the effects external stimuli have on behavior. The approaches used to analyze the
behavioral aspect of personality are known as behavioral theories or learningconditioning theories (Skinner, 1970). Still, the study, as covered in the theoretical
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framework section of Chapter 1, does not adhere to any behavioral model that proposes
that personality characteristics are developable from only one view of learning. The
research foundation believes that behavioral conditioning is achievable through the
repetition of action, yet it is also achievable through experiential enlightenment and
historical exposure to major influential factors.
Because the research does not adhere to any psychological model in its entirety,
the developmental frameworks addressed in Chapter 1 are sufficient for example
purposes. Definitions, model charts, and even the theoretical framework borrowed from
behavioral science presented within the framework of the study’s application to nationstates. At this early stage of theoretical development, the study acknowledges and
concedes that further development is necessary before the methodology can present
practical and reliable results. The purpose of this paper is to show correlations between
human behavior and the behavior of nation-states, present a rudimentary methodology
from which to examine the phenomenon, and create a starting point for further
development of the theoretical principles herein.
The humanistic approach to personality development would better suit the theoretical
framework of the study. Since a state is not a living organism it cannot develop a
behavioral personality through nature, one of the principle factors attributed to human
personality development. It therefore develops personality through the act of nurture, or
what the state learns and remembers from experience. This historical memory potential of
the nation should therefore lead to behavioral characteristics, as it does in human
behavior. Human personalities and behavioral characteristics are products of their
experiences, and nation-states are no different. According to Coon (1977), “Humanists
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reject the Freudian view of personality as a battleground for biological instincts and
unconscious forces” (p. 465). Humanists also have issues with the behaviorist position:
“Humanists also oppose the mechanical, “thing like”, overtones of the behaviorists’
viewpoint” (Coon, 1977, p. 465). The humanist position is quite different: “We are not,
they say, merely a bundle of moldable responses; instead, we are creative beings capable
of making responsible choices. The humanistic viewpoint leads to a greater emphasis
being placed on immediate subjective experience than on prior learning” (Coon, 1977, p.
465). The humanistic viewpoint would tend to assert that individuals are reasonable
actors, a concept not foreign to many political science theories in regards to the state.
Carl Rogers (1961) presents the best philosophical interpretation of the study’s
theoretical framework, as “Rogers’ theory of personality centers on the concept of self, a
flexible and changing perception of personal identity that emerges from the phenomenal
field” (Coon, 1977, p. 466). It is in this cumulative perception of identity that behavioral
actions and the personality of the nation-state is formed: “The phenomenal field is the
person’s total subjective experience of reality. Much human behavior can be understood
as an attempt to maintain consistency between one’s self image and actions” (Rogers,
1961; Coon, 1977, p. 466). It is this attempt to maintain consistency which compels
nations to conduct their activities under the confines of the behavioral norms within that
personality and associated behavioral characteristics, both of which, the personality traits
and behavioral characteristics, are a historical reflection of the personalities, behaviors,
and experienced events that make up society. As products of those that previously and
currently reside within it, the state will abide by the behavioral characteristics of the
individuals who influence it, if those characteristics are not in opposition to the

29
previously indoctrinated characteristics of history; the maintaining of consistency being a
prime motivator in determining a nation’s action potential.
It is the study’s position that any social construct of society that inherently exhibit a
direct replication of the personalities and behavioral characteristics of those who created
it and historically influenced it, will create a condition of identity from which consistency
of action is promoted. A condition of homogony is created, and this identity is further
strengthened by the indelible consequences of cumulative events that it has experienced.
A nation’s actions, therefore, are examinable through the lens of human behavioral
characteristics.
From the standpoint of Rogers (1961), the phenomenal field for the nation-state
would consist of the historical actions, experiences, and ideology, experienced by the
creators of the state, which then become an inherent part of a state’s identity. These
experiences create a state personality over time, which create parameters within which
national leaders must confine themselves. Therefore, since a nation exhibits the
behavioral traits of its creators and the cumulative traits of any historical leadership, the
social system known as the nation-state, like humans, is also susceptible to the memories
of these historical experiences.
However, these theoretical musings address the individual and not its position within
greater society. As is the case in human personality development, the society in which an
individual lives creates parameters of behavior and limitations upon the individual’s
personality within socially acceptable norms. The society in which the individual lives
also has a role in the development of the individual’s personality and behavioral
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characteristics, which cannot be ignored. All societal constructs or groups in which like
elements organize are relatively the same, containing the same dynamics, regardless of
scope or size. The model of greater society, or that society construct that is viewed in the
macro level in which only nation-states reside, is no different in its dynamics from other
social structures. Whether the social structure is a family, small organization, gang, or
nation-state, the group dynamics are relatively the same.
Any model for determining the actions of nation-states that does not take into
consideration the factors of behavioral characteristics and national personality will
therefore be lacking. The behavioral characteristics of a nation-state are important
dynamics to complete analytical models. These dynamics present the state with the selfimposed parameters in which its actions are conducted and thus a pattern that can be
observed and predicted. Without their inclusion, full understanding of a nation’s
motivation cannot be determined.
Any nation can be unpredictable, much like humans. However, in humans, this
unpredictability is mitigated through a conscious examination of an individual’s
behavioral characteristics and the evaluation of the individual’s personality traits which
the said individual has exhibited through their life cycle. This evaluation, although not
100% successful in eliminating human unpredictability, does present a broad picture from
which to infer potential actions. However, although there is a correlation between the
unpredictability of individuals and that same element in nation-states, in the case of
nation-states, the stakes are relatively higher. Unpredictability of a nation forces other
nations to exhibit caution when constructing responses to international conflict.
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Human Personality Trait Theories

Figure 2-1
Within the discipline of social science, there exists numerous theoretical models
which attempt to explain the development of personality traits and behavioral
characteristics in humans (see figure 2-1). Within these models also exist the defining
characteristics of human identity, from the perspective of the model’s foundation, which
lead to a categorization of human mental states from the clinical standpoint of a level of
stability. The research presented here is not interested in the level of a given personality
or behavioral characteristics in the quantifiable terms associated in the practice of
psychoanalysis. Rather, the study will focus on the parallel of human characteristics,
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which are observable from the actions of the nation-state and the potential of pattern
discovery. “Personality… refers to the pattern of thoughts, feelings, social adjustments,
and behaviors consistently exhibited over time that strongly influences one's
expectations, self-perceptions, values, and attitudes. It also predicts human reactions to
other people, problems, and stress” (Gittinger & Winnie, 1973; Krauskopf & Saunders,
1994). Although within the discipline there is no consensus as to the exact definition,
within the parameters of contemporary thought “Personality is that pattern of
characteristic thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that distinguishes one person from
another and that persists over time and situations” (Phares & Chaplin, 1997). It is under
this definition from which the research will proceed.
The traits of personality exhibited in humans, as defined by Spencer (1985), have
three potential models for development. The “developmental model which suggests that
personal traits change according to the stage one’s life is in” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 126).
In the case of assigning personality characteristics to nation-states, this model may have
some validity, if it were determined that older nation-states exhibited different behavioral
characteristics or more imbedded characteristics than of those of younger nations. The
study would agree that the chronological age of a nation-state is directly proportional to
the amounts of experiences a nation-state may encounter. Moreover, increased amounts
of experiences may in fact either diversify or intensify the behavioral characteristics of a
nation. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to correlate the stages of human
existence into a parallel of nation-state existence. Spencer’s (1985) stages of life are
dependent upon the chronological age of the individual and the changes one experiences
through the advancement of age. Nation-states, not being biological in nature, do not
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experience this same transitory process and therefore cannot experience the same
experience. This does not negate the importance of increases in experience in the
development of personalities within nation-states; it does, however, show a fundamental
difference in literally applying some concepts of individual behavioral development to
the nation-state problem. Nevertheless, it is accepted that “personal character…is a
matter of growth” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 126). The difference is that growth, as described
in the developmental model, is reliant upon different factors than growth would be in
relation to nation-state character development.
Another model of human behavioral characteristic development is “the situational
model, which suggest that most of the time our actions do not reflect our character traits
so much as the situations we face or have faced” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 126). This model
directly addresses the study’s delineation between ideology and methodology. Situations
may elicit different responses; however, the study would argue that although the situation
may require different methods from which the individual will engage, those methods are
limited by the parameters of the individual’s personality. This model also speaks to the
concept that those in power today, although influential, are restricted in action by the
parameters previously set within the national characteristics. A nation-state, which has
traditionally exhibited a behavioral trait, would find it difficult to engage in behavior that
is contrary to those traits. In fact, the society in which the nation-state resides would
react to the nation-state’s actions that were purely situational driven. Not only does the
nation-state need to conform to its historical behavioral characteristics, it must also
maintain the social norms of the society in which it resides, unless of course the national
personality historically exhibited was one of situational driven action, rather than actions
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that are character driven. Character defines the parameters in which individuals act, and
therefore our actions, contrary to the situational model, are a reflection of our personality.
However, there is a theorized cumulative effect that situations have upon personality
construction. The hypothesized theory does accept that situations experienced by the
nation-state have cumulative developmental influence, which over time helps to develop
the nation-states personality. Yet, in the case of nation-states, this developmental factor is
not as real time as proposed by Spencer (1985). How a nation-state reacts to a situation is
as much dependent upon the cumulative experience personality development of the state
as the parameters the current situation presents.
Finally, human behavioral development is expressed in the “interpretive model which
doesn’t assume character traits develop in any particular order and doesn’t think they
depend on one’s situation. A given situation may affect different people in very different
ways, depending on what it means to them” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 126). The theoretical
framework of the study does not suggest that there is a predefined order of character
development as presented in the developmental model, nor that a situation has the ability
to rewrite nation-states personality characteristics immediately, as is suggested in the
situational model. However, the interpretive model, which promotes that individuals react
to situation as they interpret them, is consistent with a portion of the theoretical
framework of the study. Still, the interpretive model is not, in the study’s opinion, a valid
model of development as much as a model of situational engagement. Nation-states do
interpret situations within the context of its own experiences. Those interpretations are
influenced by what those experiences tell the nation-state the presented situation means to
it. This concept is one of the foundations in nation-state personality development: like
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humans, the state is also susceptible to the memories of its historical experiences, and
therefore has the potential to exhibit in its policies and ideologies characteristics that are
consistent throughout a nation’s history and are a product of these experiences. It is
hypothesized that the theoretically proposed historical memory potential of a nation
should therefore lead to a behavioral homogony, or personality characteristic, as it does
in human behavior.
To this point, there has been a great deal of reference to the concepts of personality
traits and human behavior. From the standpoint of the theoretical conceptual framework
of the study, since both are “characteristics” in which the parameters of a nation’s action
can be predicted, there is no difference between the two concepts. However, the study
does recognize that there are fundamental differences from a behavioral science point of
view. “Learning theorists John Dollard and Neal Miller consider habits as the basic
structure of personality” (Coon, 1977, p. 464). Dollard and Miller (1950) believe that, as
in Spencer’s situational model, personality is learned from the situational environment:
“Habits are governed by four elements…drive, cue, response, and reward” (Donald &
Miller, 1950; Coon, 1977, p. 464). It is within their definition of drive that personality is
developed. “A drive is any stimulus strong enough to goad a person to action…Cues are
signals from the environment that guide response so they are most likely to bring about
reinforcement (reward)” (Donald & Miller, 1950; Coon, 1977, p. 464). This construct
harkens back to Pavlov’s dog and positive reinforcement of acceptable behavior.
Although this is a good model to describe the American foreign policy perspective, it
is not fully applicable to this study’s theoretical construct. The study would agree that
positive reinforcement is occasionally applicable to the development of personality traits
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in a nation-state. However, these traits created by Dollard and Miller’s (1950) model, in
the case of nation-states, would be short lived since the social environment and
situational potentials in which the nation-state resides are far more diverse and the
concept of reward changes too frequently. The environment of the nation-states society is
far too complex with too many variables for positive reinforcement techniques to enjoy
long standing success.
Dollard and Miller (1950) were not the only behaviorists to address personality
development. B.F. Skinner (1970) once said “intelligent people no longer believe that
men are possessed by demons… but human behavior is still commonly attributed to
indwelling agents” (p. 5). Coon (1977) refers to Skinner as a “radical behaviorist” with an
extreme view of personality: “For Skinner, personality is a convenient fiction we
invented to pretend we have explained behavior that is actually controlled by the
environment” (Coon, 1977, p. 464). Coon (1977) further berated Skinner’s position
when he wrote, “Skinner believes that everything a person does is ultimately based on
past and present rewards and punishments. Perhaps Skinners point of view has been
shaped by his environment” (Coon, 1977, p. 464). The study will refrain from enjoining
the Coon/Skinner debate regarding credibility, since evaluation of Skinner’s work would
require a more extensive examination than will be conducted here. It is enough to say
that for the behaviorist, the environment is the key to personality development. The
study reaffirms its belief that environment plays a key factor in this development.
However, it is the environment of the social structure in which the nation-state resides,
not the individual situational circumstances that the state experiences, that holds more
sway over development.
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Human behavior is a complex subject. However, our current understanding of the
development of human behavioral characteristics and the ramifications of those
characteristics has advanced. The main research design framework of this study is
devoted to identifying if the existence of identifiable behavioral characteristics is
applicable to nation-states. The concept of nations having identifiable personality traits,
not unlike those displayed by humans, comes from the observation of nation-state action
within the confines of the social parameters in which they reside. Nations can exhibit
characteristics similar to those of an introvert, whereas other nations might present a
personality better described as an extrovert. Nations can conduct their business and
implement their policies in a singularly organized manner, almost to the point of being
diagnosable as obsessive compulsive, while other are equally as successful with a more
disorganized or attention deficit disorderly approach. Regardless of the characteristics a
nation may display, once ingrained into the fabric of the national identity, these
characterizes, as this study will show, remain and form the foundation of any future
actions a nation might engage in.
If we accept the premise that like humans, nation-states can develop behavioral
characteristics and personality identities, and that development is a product of many of
the same dynamics as seen in humans, our understanding of nation-state actions during
periods of conflict might also increase. One of these dynamics, which can be associated
to human characteristic development, is existence and interaction within a social
structure.
Nation- states live within a social structure of like entities. According to Keynes,
“Europe was so organized socially and economically as to secure the maximum
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accumulation of wealth” (Lemert, 2010, p. 203). The organization of the world political
structure is the result of nations attempting to obtain security. The structure of human
society seeks the same goal: security. However, regardless of the underlining reasons for
the creation of the system, the nation-state is a constructed system of created society.
Social experience is a factor that forms the individual’s personality. Like Pavlov’s dog,
the individual will learn from repeated experiences, and that knowledge becomes
ingrained into the personality of the individual.
The study proposes that experience is an influencing factor to the development of
a nation-states behavioral and personality traits. The nation-state creates behavioral
characteristics through retention of event memories. The nation-state learns from
experience. The environment of the society within which the nation-state resides also
plays an influential factor on development of behaviors. The interactions of nations are
similar to the interactions of individual humans or groups. The structure of the world
society of nations is similar to the structure of society in which the individual lives. As is
the case with the individual’s society, nations too live in an environment which is
hierarchal and exhibits the same dynamics of its individualistic cousin. (See the
following section on unbalance influence). The dichotomy, which exists within the
structure of world social dynamics, is a foundation for the conflicts in which present-day
society is embroiled. The conceptual framework of the study proposes that the
community or societal structure, in which the nation-state resides, is an influencing factor
upon behavioral characteristics. Human social interaction studies have studied this
concept.
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During the late 1920’s, Thrasher (1927) examined the concepts of personality and
social group belonging. “The significance of sociological conception of personality,
namely as the role of the individual in the group, comes out clearly in the study of gangs”
(Thrasher, 1927). Thrasher concluded that the personality of the individual became a
component of the social structure of the community in which it existed: “Every boy in the
gang acquires a personality…is a person, that is plays a part and gets a place with
reference to the other members of the gang” (as cited in Lemert, 2010, p. 257). The study
extends this concept of social integration to the society of nation-states, and agrees that in
some part the expectations of the social group upon the nation-state have direct influence
upon the behavioral characteristics the state will exhibit. This concept is within the
framework that the society of nation-states is a social construct, which is analogous to
any other social construct in which humans live. The nation-state is nothing more than an
individual within that social structure, and therefore will have behavioral characteristics
influenced by the expectations of the group. This concept also goes to the proposal of the
unbalanced influence within the nation-state social structure, which will be discussed
later.
Thrasher’s gang evaluations coincide with the conceptual framework of the study as
his observations, directed at individuals within a gang social structure have obvious
parallels to the larger social construct within which nation-states reside: “The inner circle
is usually composed of a constellation of especially intimate pals, formed about a leader.
The rank and file – the less enterprising and less capable- are subordinate to the inner
circle…” (Thrasher, 1927, as cited in Lemert, 2010, p. 258). The study will argue in later
sections that this concept within a gang structure is no different from the structures of
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NATO or the United Nations. Therefore, since nation-states reside in a similar social
structure, which is no different from that of gangs, the concept of viewing nation-states in
this context strengthens the argument that nation-states can be viewed like the individual
human, with behavioral characteristics, and the process of development of those
characteristics are similar in developmental construction to that of the individual.

Social Constructs, Personage and the Law

The following are selected portions of the abstracts of the Supreme Court rulings
that highlight the concept of corporations as personages. This section is presented as an
example of the evolution of the concept that social constructs can be viewed as persons,
and therefore has the potential for development of personality and behavioral traits.
The first case presents the first record of the court signaling that corporations can,
for the purpose of legal proceedings, be considered citizens.
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charelston R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (U.S. Supreme
Court 1844).
A corporation created by and transacting business in a state is to be
deemed an inhabitant of the state, capable of being treated as a citizen for
all purposes of suing and being sued, and an averment of the facts of its
creation and the place of transacting business is sufficient to give the
circuit court’s jurisdiction. (Louisville, Cincinnati & Charelston R. Co. v.
Letson, 1844)
This concept is continued in the second case excample.
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Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 57 U.S. (16 Ho.) 314 (U.S. Supreme
Court 1853).
The constitutional privilege which a citizen of one state has to sue the
citizens of another state in the federal courts cannot be taken away by the
erection of the latter into a corporation by the laws of the state in which
they live. The corporation itself may therefore be sued as such. (Marshall
v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1853)
The following case expands the citizenship concept proposed in the first two cases
and extends the concept to corporations being considered as people that have the same
constitutional rights as any other person.
County of Santa Slara v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (U.S.
Supreme Court May 10, 1886).
The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United.
States, which forbids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. (County of Santa Slara v. Southern
Pacific Railroad, 1886)
The concept of personage and the extension of right usually reserved for people is
continued in Smyth.
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 1898 (U.S. Supreme Court March 7, 1898)
A railroad corporation is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment declaring that no state shall deprive any person of property
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without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. (Smyth v. Ames, 1898)
This continued in Hale and Russian Volunteer Fleet.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (U.S. Supreme Court March 12, 1906).
The benefits of the Fifth Amendment are exclusively for a witness
compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case, and he cannot set
them up on behalf of any other person or individual, or of a corporation of
which he is an officer or employee. (Hale v. Henkel, 1906)
Property rights are extended:
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (U.S. Supreme Court
February 24, 1931).
Aliens who are citizens or subjects of any government which accords to
citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against such
government in its courts shall have the privilege of prosecuting claims
against the United States in the Court of Claims, whereof such court, by
reason of their subject matter and character, might take jurisdiction. So
held in the case of a Russian corporation where the property was taken
under the 1917 Act after the recognition by the United, states of the
Provisional Government of Russia. (Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United
States, 1931)
Double jeopardy is extended to corporations:
United States v. Martin Linen Suppl, 430 U.S. 564 (U.S. Supreme Court April 4,
1977).
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to a court of appeals from a . . . judgment . . . of a district court dismissing
an indictment . . . except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy
clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
(United States v. Martin Linen Suppl, 1977)
First amendment right also extended to corporations:
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 588 U.S. ____ (U.S. Supreme
Court January 21, 2010).
“The Court has recognized that the First Amendment applies to corporations”
(Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 2010).
Burnwell v. Hobby Lobby, 13 U.S. 354 (U.S. Supreme Court June 30, 2014).
HHS’s concession that a nonprofit corporation can be a “person” under
RFRA effectively dispatches any argument that the term does not reach
for-profit corporations; no conceivable definition of “person” includes
natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corporations.
(Burnwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014)
Each of the presented cases extends the legal concept which assigns personage to
a social construct, corporations. In the case of Hobby Lobby, the court recognizes that a
corporation can exhibit a moral conscience from which its actions can be dictated. The
merits of all these case are not the focus of the study, yet they do illustrate the potential to
assign human characteristics and rights to social constructs.

Profiling
A methodology in which behavioral characteristic and personality traits play an
important role is in the science of profiling. When the study addresses profiling, it is done
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in the context of the scientific examination of events and the behavioral characteristics,
which can be deciphered from an event, rather than the social practice of racial profiling
so prominently reported in the news media. The study recognizes the stark differences
between these two definitions of profiling, and herein rejects the later practice as socially
unacceptable behavior. Yet, however incendiary the term profiling may be, the scientific
practice employed by law enforcement in the capture of serial killers is well documented
and proven valid in identifying behavioral characteristic and the patterns of actions
exhibited by those with the defined personalities.
“In late 20th century and into the 21st, criminal profiling became ubiquitous” (Bartol,
2013, p. 1). Law enforcement and behavioral science collaborated to create profiling
techniques to identify such heinous criminals as serial murderers. “Profiling can be
broadly defined as a technique that identifies behavioral, cognitive, emotional, and
demographic characteristics of known and unknown individuals, based on clues gleaned
from a wide range of information” (Bartol, 2013, p. viii). In this context, profiling is the
behavioral identification of homogenous traits, created from the factual historic actions of
the person sought, which gives identifiers that in turn are translated into criminals traits.
These traits allow for comparison to potential suspects and lend insight to future actions.
Profiling works under the auspice that a profiled individual will act in a consistent
manner, or display a homogony of actions, with minor deviation, and has proven a
successful tool for the capture and conviction of numerous perpetrators (Bartol, 2013).
The concept of using behavioral profiling in the case of a nation-state, from which to
better understand and predict the actions of those states, was conceived through the
unlikely and seemingly unrelated evolution of corporations to personage status. The
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United States Supreme Court, as outlined in the previous section, has evolved
corporations through decisions, whose concepts have assigned personage status, and
citizenship rights and responsibilities to corporations (Bartol, 2013) (Burnwell v. Hobby
Lobby, 2014) (Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 2010) (County of Santa
Slara v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 1886) (Hale v. Henkel, 1906) (Louisville, Cincinnati
& Charelston R. Co. v. Letson, 1844) (Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1853)
(Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 1931) (Smyth v. Ames, 1898) (United States v.
Martin Linen Suppl, 1977). The concept evolving from these rulings, whether we agree
or not, proposes that corporations possess characteristics which are parallel to
individuals, and because of these characteristics, deserve legal consideration for
protection of civil rights. These ideological components are a fundamental protected
right of the corporation and is therefore immune from hindrances.
This study extended the development of this concept to consider the theory that if
corporations could be viewed as persons, then why not nation-states? Many of the
theories of nation-state action, international relations theory, liberalism, conservatism,
neo-realism, and conflict theory, all contain concepts that are as relevant and applicable
to behavior in persons as they are to their intended subjects, nations. Therefore, why not
utilize elements of the behavioral science process of profiling and the foundation of
anthropological and behavioral characteristics, commonly used for individuals and
groups of individuals, to a larger assemblage, such as nation-states? If corporations, as
suggested by the United States Supreme Court, have the same ideological characteristics
as individuals and this concept is valid in large entities such as nation-states, then
utilizing the techniques to find homogony in individuals should be applicable and a valid
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concept when applied to nation-states. The concept of conflict profiling is nothing new.
Conflict scholars “profile” existing conflict to discern the causes of conflict all the time.
However, the application of nation-state behavioral profiling, as well as the application of
similar profiling techniques commonly used in behavioral science to historical conflicts
in the effort to discover a behavioral homogony, is a new approach.
This theory gains credence when we consider that the framework contained within
political science theories. Many characteristics assigned to the nation-state, would also be
applicable if related to an individual or group of individuals. As an example the fourth
and fifth tenants of the political science theory of neo-realism is that: the state’s primary
motivation is to survive and that nation-states are rational actors (Mearsheimer, 2010, p.
80). Both of these concepts are arguably also true when considering the psychological
motivations of individuals and their groups. It is from the theoretical interchangeability of
these concepts embraced by political science and behavioral science that the theory of
nation-state Historical Conflict Behavioral Profiling was developed. Since profiling of an
individual seeks to identify homogony in the individuals actions with which to identify
and predict future activities, then profiling the nation-state under the same basic concept
should also produce a similar result.
As indicated earlier, the purpose of this dissertation is not to discount previous
international and/or conflict theory, but rather to create an adjunct methodology which
provides a different approach to insight into Russian motivations. Nor is the purpose to
argue against any specific theories presented by current international experts or media
pundits. Rather, this dissertation will offer a behavioral profile perspective, similar to
profiles used in present day criminal investigative techniques, to identify consistent
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actions. This profile will be compiled utilizing historical case studies that will examine
Russia during periods that exhibit social, economic, and political, transitions as a focal
point of case selection.
Focusing on periods of transition garners its foundation from the theory that Russia’s
transition following the fall of the Soviet Union and rejection of communism is a
transition of such magnitude that if there would be a change in Russian international
policy, it would occur as such a time. I will note here that the dissertation does not
propose that all nations will necessarily follow the Russian model. The focus of the
dissertation is the application of Historical Conflict Behavioral Profiling to a single
subject during periods of transition. These transitions will include differing social and
political factors traditionally seen as disruptions to homogony and drivers of ideological
change in other nations. The general hypothesis is that a homogony exists in Russia and
Historical Conflict Behavioral Profiling can identify it.
For the purpose of reviewing the literature regarding profiling, the study will
utilize the sources and definitions as they pertain to the current accepted function of the
methodology. The terms used in this section of the literature review are not a reflection of
the study’s belief that the subjects examined in this research are in any way representative
of a criminal element. Similarly, any references to psychological terms used in the
literature do not infer that the study is using the methodology for the purpose of
compiling a psychological profile of the subject. It is common in the literature of criminal
profiling to describe events as crime scenes and the elements of the profile’s attention as
offenders. Again, the language of the literature available that outlines profiling and its use
has a deep history within the profession of law enforcement. Therefore, this disclaimer is
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being presented at the beginning of the literature being reviewed, to inform the reader
that it is the methodology of profiling that is being examined, not the specific application,
as proposed in the literature. Nor are the potential diagnostic results traditionally assigned
to the personalities of those criminal elements normally the focus of the methodology
when used by criminologists.
It is also important to note that the literature review of profiling is done so in a
very generic manner. Although some elements of the methodology of criminal profiling
are employed within the research design, it is the principal of understanding the subject
through the development of the behavioral profile from which the study actually draws.
For this reason, this section on profiling will not delve into the intricacies of criminal
profiling methodology, but rather will examine the principles of the application. In many
ways, the theoretical construct of the methodology might also fall under the science of
political anthropology, as the information presents a picture of the evolution of a nation’s
personality. However, the exact scientific classification of the methodology is a subject to
be explored after the simple design presented here is further developed and refined.
“The FBI defines criminal investigative analysis as an investigative process that
identifies the major personality and behavioral characteristics of the offender based on
the crimes he or she has committed” (Burgess, Burgess, Douglas, & Ressler, 1992, p.
310; Turvey, 2008, p. 79). The study does not claim that any crime has been committed.
Nor does it classify the subjects of the study as offenders. Rather, the study attempts
through the methodology of profiling to discover the behavioral characteristics of the
participants of a nation’s international relations processes, which include the
governmental structure and the leadership, through their actions and reactions to domestic
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and international events. If, as the study postulates, there is a parallel between the human
behavioral characteristics of the people that have created the nation in the behavioral
characteristics of the nation itself, then if the process of profiling is applied, a pattern of
homogeny regarding actions may be discovered. “Offender profiling is the process of
inferring the characteristics of an offender from the way that offender acted when
committing the crime” (Turvey, 2008, p. 80; Canter, 1995). For the purpose of the
methodology to be employed in conflict analysis, the offender as described by Canter
(1995) is made up of three separate yet equal elements: the nation itself, the structure of
government the nation employs, and the head of state at the time of the event. Through
the act of profiling each of these elements, it may be possible to determine if a correlation
exists between any and all. However, it is the nation and its behavioral characteristics
with which the study and the methodology is primarily concerned. The characteristics of
the head of state, and the government, are secondary, yet are included because of the
potential influence that they may have upon the state. In the act of criminal profiling, the
identity of the offender is an unknown. For the purpose of historic behavioral, conflict
profiling all elements regarding the participants and the events are pre-described. It is the
function of the methodology to create a deeper understanding from a behavioral
standpoint of these elements.
The criminal profile is a report that describes the investigatively relevant
and/or probative characteristics of the offender responsible for a particular
crime, or series of related crimes… Offender characteristics include any
attributes that the examiner describes specifically to the unknown person
or persons responsible for the commission of particular criminal acts,
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including those that are physical, psychological, social, geographical, or
relational (Baeza, Chisum, Chamberlin, McGrath, & Turvey, 2000).
The quote previous could be edited by removing the terms criminal and crime to
create a comprehensive description of the proposed methodology’s intentions. A conflict
profile is therefore a report that describes the historically relevant and/or probative
characteristics of the elements of society as they apply to a particular conflict or series of
conflicts. Societal element characteristics include any behavioral attributes that the
researcher hypothesizes is relevant to the known elements responsible through
participation in the relevant conflict, including those that are physical in action,
behavioral, social, geographical, or relational.
“As with all nomothetic and inductive profiling methods, the problems come
when broad theories are applied to actual cases and to certain a fashion” (Turvey, 2008,
p. 99). This was the case in the study of geographic profiling, which was dismissed as
applying too broad a theory, a theory that had exhibited no scientific validity, and a
theory that attempted to identify offenders through the narrow lens of geography. “This
method breaks the tenant of behavioral evidence analysis… it takes a single manifestation
of offender behavior and attempts to infer its meaning out of the overall behavioral and
emotional context that it was produced in” (Turvey, 2008, p. 99). To avoid the pitfalls
encountered by the proponents of geographic profiling, the model created for the purpose
of conflict profiling, although centered on behavioral characteristics, is not limited by
them. In conflict profiling, the methodology looks to discover common behavioral
characteristics, through the use of closed ended templates, which focus upon a broad
range of potential possibilities. There exists no inference as to what these characteristics
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might be, nor is there any bias as to what homogony the research might find. The
discoveries are grounded into the template design theme, and are only limited in scope to
the applying researcher’s area of inquiry.
Within the literature of profiling, there is an extensive amount of technical data
which is irrelevant to the study’s purpose. The common theme of which the study wishes
to derive from profiling literature is that if the correct questions are asked and the focus is
not limited to one aspect of behavior, commonality can be found.

Normative International Relations Theory
Normative international relations theory exists under a plethora of alternate
names: those that call it “normative IR theory” (Erskine, 2007) (Brown, 1992) (Frost,
1996) (Frost, 1986) (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007). Others label it “international political
theory” (Beitz, 1979/1999) (Linklater, 1990) (Hutchings, 1999). There are those that
simply refer to it as the more descriptive “international ethics” (Nardin & Maple, 1992).
“This array of labels does not indicate a case of multiple confused identities on the part of
the community of scholars who contribute to the field” (Erskine, 2010, p. 38). However,
is Erskine right? Each naming of the theoretical concept seems to focus upon a different
aspect of the whole. If in fact the focus is different, and then therefore would there not
exist confusion in the identity? Ethics coupled with anything labeled as political offer
their own conundrum. Nevertheless, levity aside, the array of labels to this one theoretical
model would suggest there is some question as to the focus of the theory, and that focus
is dependent upon who you ask.
“While normative international relations theory is deeply influenced by
philosophical sources, work within the field is characterized by an acute awareness of
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practical issues in international politics” (Erskine, 2010, p. 37). The use of philosophical
sources is the correlating concept between normative IR theory and historical behavioral
conflict profiling. It is not the fact that the study’s methodology utilizes philosophical
sources, but rather that the application of morality, which is a very human concept to the
inanimate objects of nation-states, presents an acknowledgement of conceptual crossover
potentials. Since Normative International Relations Theory uses philosophical references
and application of moral codes as a vehicle with which to explain the actions of nations,
this humanizing of nation-states is directly in line with the research’s contention that
nations can be examined through the lens of human behavior.
The concept of morality and of a moral responsibility should not exist within the
repertoire of inanimate social constructs, such as nations. Morality is rather a principle,
which defines whether human behavior is right or wrong. Morality is the yardstick from
which humanity justifies its actions. However, for the normative international relations
scholar, the same is true of nations. When an individual of society acts immorally,
society will demand that the individual be held accountable and society takes remedial
action. So too does the international community hold its member states to a moral code of
action of which the state is judged. The morality of the individuals within the nation-state
transfers their moral code upon the construct, from which we judge future actions. This is
the basis of normative international relations theory, and a prime example correlation of
the parallel between nation-states and the transfer of characteristics of personality. It is
also a correlating factor, which demonstrates that even within political science theory
there exists an understanding of social dynamics and the concept that the social dynamics
of the individual in fact has parallels to the social dynamics of nation-states.
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From its philosophical position, “normative theorizing about international
relations appear not only against a backdrop of committed behaviorism within the
discipline, but following a long period in which moral philosophers have been more
concerned with abstract analytical questions than with real-world moral dilemmas”
(Erskine, 2010, p. 39; Brown, 1992). Of course, political scientists who reject the concept
of nation-state having the potential to develop personalities that contain aspects which are
independent of current governance structures of leadership influence, might argue that the
philosophical musings and moral applications are meant not for the nation-state as an
entity but those factors within the structure of the nation-state which influence its actions.
One of the main issues the study has with the concepts of normative international
relations theory is with the concept of what is just and unjust. Like morality, the concept
of justice is subjective, and in the study’s opinion, an imitating factor to normative IR
Theory. Morality is a vehicle for which actions can either be justified or denounced. In
the realm of international relations theory, violent actions such as war can be classified as
either just or unjust. Throughout history, the victors of conflict have engaged in the
practice of justifying their actions as moral or just in an attempt to minimize the actual
devastation that their actions created or to give credence to their actions. To the
international relations theorist, the verdict of the justice of the act and the maintaining of
the arbitrary moral responsibility of a nation engaged in the act is the main grounds for
determining if an act is right or wrong. It is within the subjective propensity of normative
IR theory that the study also takes issue. There is a paradox created by the premise that if
one life is lost unjustly then this loss is morally reprehensible, whereas in cases in which
10,000 are lost under the perception of just conditions, the loss is morally acceptable.
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This paradox is further complicated by the necessity of the question; who is responsible
for determining whether something is just or unjust? To whose set of values are the
definitions of justice used? When we consider these questions, we realize the problems
that ensue when philosophy and the philosophical definitions of right and wrong become
benchmarks from which history is judged and political theory is developed. Regardless of
international relations theory’s claims of being acutely aware of the practical issues of
politics, the social questions of morality should never enter into the discussion when
conflict between nations leads to human death or suffering.
This study conceded, however, that international relations theory attempts to bring
order to a world which if left to its own devices, could perpetrate reprehensible acts
beyond the imagination. Articles such as the Geneva Convention outline rules for the
conducting of war. The Geneva Convention Articles exist regardless of the fact that the
concepts of wars with acceptable rules is an ironically acceptable premise. Yet articles
such as these are an unfortunate necessity as a mechanism to reign in the full potential of
human depravity. However, it is not the study’s intent to question the value of using
moral judgments as a basis for theoretical concepts regarding the actions of nations.
Rather, the fact that normative international relations theory uses morality, which has
traditionally defined acceptable human behavior, and is an acceptable model for a
theoretical perspective in international relations, presents us with an acknowledgement
of the crossover potential of these concepts.
It is not the research’s intent to become a moral compass regarding the actions of
nations. Nor does the study wish to employ philosophical constructs to increase the
epistemology of international interactions. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that as historical
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behavioral conflict profiling develops, and the behavioral profile of a nation becomes
clearer, that profile could create discourse regarding the morality of a nation’s intention.
The study accepts this premise is a potential result of obtaining a better understanding
through the definition of the behavioral characteristics a nation possesses. Yet the
argument of morality is beyond the scope of this study or the methodology, which the
study proposes to introduce into the field. The methodology strives to discover facts. If in
the future the methodology effects our assessment of nation-states moral judgments,
conclusions will be left to the normative international relations theorists.

Classical Realism
“Classical realists have holistic understandings of politics the stress the
similarities, not differences, between domestic and international politics, and the role of
ethics and community in promoting stability in both domains” (Lebow, 2010, p. 59). The
principal proponents of classical realism include Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz,
and Morgenthau (Lebow, 2010). The theoretical concepts of classical realism conjure the
stage full of Greek tragedy. “In keeping with their tragic orientation, they recognize the
communal bonds are fragile and easily undermined by the unrestrained pursuit of
unilateral advantage by individuals, factions, and states” (Lebow, 2010, p. 59). The
concept is that within society, actors exist who believe they are above the law and have
eclipsed, through their self-perceived power, the constraints of civil society, which no
longer apply to them. Because these actors exist, “time honored mechanisms of conflict
management like alliances and the balance of power may not only fail to preserve the
peace but may make domestic international violence more likely” (Lebow, 2010, p. 59).
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Morgenthau and Thucydides’ conceptual framework based upon Greek tragedies
is a powerful correlating factor that helped develop the conceptual framework of this
study. Traditional Greek tragedies framed around the actions of individual and the
human faults in which they base their decisions are key. Morgenthau and Thucydides
saw nation-states and their decision process much in the same light as nations having
faults which affected their judgment and lead to poor decisions. Realism understands that
nation-states will take advantage of each other. Realists also acknowledge that the goal
of every nation is to survive. These realistic attitudes are at the heart of the many conflict
issues. Let us take the Korean peninsula as an example. Both Koreas want to dominate
the other, one through militarily means, and the other through economic coercion. Both
Koreas understand that their neighbor could be the greatest threat to their continued
survival. However, both are aware that the key to dominating the other ultimately
remains beyond their control and in the hands of others. For North Korea, there is China,
for the South Koreans there is the support of the United States. This realist Balance of
Power has maintained each nation’s security. This balance failed when the North
Koreans attacked the South in the 1950’s, but following the successful defense of South
Korea, the present Balance of Power has maintained stability. This would be a very
Morgenthau concept, as he believed that “the success of the balance of power… was less
a function of the distribution of capabilities than it was an existence and strength of
international society that bound together the most important actors in the system”
(Lebow, 2010, p. 63). We therefore see that the success and security of the Koreas is
influenced as much by outside forces as internal ones.
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Realism’s correlation with human behavioral characteristics is based upon the
conceptual framework that nations seek security and power. This concept is equally true
when we consider basic human needs. However, security and power, in the case of
humans, does not always go as planned. “People seek dominance but most often end up
subordinate to others” (Lebow, 2010, p. 65) (Morgenthau, 1947, p. 145). “They try to
repress this unpleasant truth, and those who exercise power effectively employ
justifications and ideologies to facilitate this process” (Lebow, 2010, p. 65) (Morgenthau,
1958, p. 59). This concept of manipulation is as much an example of a human behavioral
characteristic as it is when applied to nation-states. “Whenever possible they attempt to
convince those who must submit to their will that they are acting in their interests or
those of the wider community” (Lebow, 2010, p. 65) (Morgenthau, 1958, p. 59). Again,
it is easy to see the correlation of a classic human personality trait being attributed to the
nation-states actions.
This presents us with the concept that within a society exists certain individuals
who will gain power and thereby control others. The security of the masses in a society
from which these individuals gain power is as much in the hands of the powerful as it is
in the hands of the individual. This is a direct parallel to the examples previously cited
regarding the Korean Peninsula. In that scenario, the two nation-states have some
potential for individual power. However, the overall security and the greatest proportion
of the power are in the hands of more powerful nations. This is an important concept that
formed the theoretical principles of the study and speaks to correlation of personality
development, which is influenced by the social structure in which the entity resides, even
if that entity is a nation-state. Not only does the study contend that nation-states exhibit
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personality traits, which are a product of their history, and in direct correlation with the
behavioral characteristics of the nation’s human population, the study furthermore
acknowledges that the interaction between nation-states is also a direct parallel to the
interactions of human beings and their development within their social structures.
International relations are fundamentally the same as the relationship with human beings
within society.
Classical realism paints us with a very dark picture regarding the motivations of
nations when they deal with the rest of the international community. Within classical
realism, there exist nations with greater power that in turn have greater influence over the
course of international interactions. Weaker nations that seek security align themselves
with these great powers, and through this alignment, to some degree or another, forfeit
some of their individual power for the sake of security. It is better to experience a little
subjugation by an ally who provides security than to experience total subjugation by a
conqueror. This too is a common personality trait amongst the human population.
The use of classical realism as a tool to determine how nations will act is, like all
other political theoretical models, limited by the parameters of which it accepts as the
norm for national entities, and vague in its evaluation of the deeper reasons why nations
choose these courses of action. It is fully comprehensible that within society there exists
individuals who seek greater power and dominion. It is also understandable that within
society there are those who would prefer security to the attainment of personal influence.
These two conditions are characteristics that have been part of human society since the
beginning of time. There have always been leaders and followers. What classical realism,
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and many other proposed political science theoretical models, fail to explain is the deep
reason why nations with these characteristics choose one path or the other.
Classical realism also addresses domestic politics. “For the classical realists,
transformation is a broader concept, and when associated with processes that we have
come to describe as modernization, it brings about shifts and identities and discourses
and, with them, changing concepts of security” (Lebow, 2010, p. 66). This concept does
not only mean to describe the transformations of technology that affect the ability of
nations to defend themselves against aggressors. Domestic modernizations, such as the
internet, also precipitate shifts and discourses, changes in the perception of personal
identities, and new frontiers of security. Nevertheless, even within its broadest concept,
transformation, or for the purpose of this study transition, although responsible for
changes in our conceptualization of the world around us, does not change the basic need
for maintaining an identity in achieving security. Modernization may offer new and
different paths to the achievement of our goals, yet it does nothing to change the basic
desire to realize our goals. “Hegel warned of the dangers of a homogenization of society
arising from equality and universal participation in society. It would sunder traditional
communities and individual ties to them without providing an alternative source of
identity” (Lebow, 2010, p. 67) (Hegel, 1977). This thesis by Hegel (1977) would have us
believe that the identity of the individual directly relates to the community in which
he/she resides and that homogenization is the byproduct of equality within society and
the ability of all members of that society to participate equally. It is, however, a
fundamental conception of this study that the community, or in this case the greater
nation, receives its identity from the people from within it, not the reverse. It is the
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community which derives its identity intrinsically from the individual or group of
individuals. The community will take upon itself the behavioral characteristics of those
that reside within it, as much as the reverse being true. Contrary to the belief of the
classical realists, transformations and transitions that may in fact affect our
methodologies or how we go about our daily business, have little effect upon the overall
ideology of the community, which is a byproduct of historical experience, societal
structure, and all other factors that shape human identity.
Yet within the ranks of the classical realists, Morgenthau (1947) presented one of
the most direct statements which launched the theoretical methodology presented in this
study when he “repeatedly invoked tragedy and its understanding of human beings as the
framework for understanding contemporary international relations” (Lebow, 2010, p. 74).
(Morgenthau, 1947). In a small way, Morgenthau acknowledged the intrinsic importance
and direct influence of human behavior upon the constructs of society. And, in his
acknowledgment of his correlation between understanding humans as a precursor for
understanding international relations, he quite possibly inadvertently proposed the
potential for studying nations from the perspective of human behavior.

Structural Realism
Structural Realism, like classical realism, is another school of political theory that
was instrumental in facilitating the creation of historical behavioral conflict analysis. Few
political theory models allow for such direct application of its principles to human
behavior. Although for the structural realist or neorealist this correlation potentially flies
in the face of everything they believe, to the neorealist, “human nature has little to do
with why states want power” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 78). Instead, a neorealist would
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contend, “It is the structure which forces states to pursue power. Great powers are trapped
in an iron cage… and have little choice but to compete” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 78).
However, regardless of the potential objections of the structural realists, this conceptual
framework was one of the first inspirational connections from which historical behavioral
conflict profiling emerged. If a political theory created to reject human behaviors
influence upon events could regardless be applied to individuals and still provide
practical explanations for their behavior, then it stood to reason that those characteristics
traditionally reserved for individual human behavior might be applicable to the behavior
of nations. It is in this idea of reciprocity that the study acknowledges the neorealists.
Historical behavioral conflict profiling, or the use of human characteristic traits to
code a nation’s actions and thereby create a profile of that nation for the purpose to
understanding actions, was a direct extension of Hans Morgenthau’s concept that nations
want power because of human nature (Morgenthau, 1948). The study agreed with
Morgenthau’s concept “that everyone is born with a will to power hardwired into them,
which effectively means that great powers are led by individuals who are bent on having
their state dominate their rivals” (Morgenthau, 1948) (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 78). Hence,
nations take on the personalities of their people and leaders.
The study’s concept was born when Neorealism’s five assumptions were examined
from a behavioral perspective rather than a structural one, and the theoretical possibility
of reciprocity of the assumptions to corresponding human characteristics. For the
structural realist, “power is the currency of international politics” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p.
78). Formally introduced by John Worrall in 1989, structural realism is a compromise of
different political theories. Poincare’s structuralism and Kantian liberalism are two
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ideologies that helped solidify structural realism. There is a strong argument that
regardless of structural realism’s dismissal of human behavior as an influential factor in
nation-states, if examined, a case could be made that there exists a closer correlation to
that of human behavior than the neorealist would like to admit, and that the general
construct of structural realism possesses some very human behavioral traits. Structural
realism has five main assumptions, which when examined closely correlate to human
behavioral traits. Structural realism, regardless of its suspected objections, is one of the
primary political theories that offers one of the best demonstrations of the application
reciprocity of human characteristics to nation-states.
The first assumption of the structural realist is that “great powers are the main actors
in world politics” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 79). The definition of “world power” is not
dependent only upon military capabilities, as was once the case in the feudal periods of
human history. Power today translates to influence, which can manifest itself in a number
of ways. The economics and the power of a nation’s economy, which exhibits a global
influence upon other nation’s economies, is a significant measure of power in a
globalized world. This economic influence can directly translate to political influence, as
the richest countries dominate the poorer ones. Yet the same could be said of economics
in relation to human behavior. Money also directly translates to social influence and
perceptions of status for the individual. The economic disparity in today’s society is
evident, as the wealthy control the economies and thereby the politics of entire nationstates. To understand this concept of “great powers as main actors in world politics” in
human rather than nation-state terms, one has only to examine wealth inequality:
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“Economists define wealth in terms of marketable assets, such as real estate, stocks,
and bonds, leaving aside consumer durables like cars and household items because they
are not as readily converted into cash” (Domhoff, 2013). These marketable assets, minus
debt, in human terms translate to wealth. Domhoff (2013) contends that there are four
identifiable tenants in the relationship between wealth and power:
1. “Wealth can be seen as a "resource" that is very useful in exercising power. That's
obvious when we think of donations to political parties, payments to lobbyists,
and grants to experts who are employed to think up new policies beneficial to the
wealthy.”
2.

“Certain kinds of wealth, such as stock ownership, can be used to control
corporations, which of course have a major impact on how the society functions.”

3. “Just as wealth can lead to power, so too can power lead to wealth. Those who
control a government can use their position to feather their own nests, whether
that means a favorable land deal for relatives at the local level or a huge federal
government contract for a new corporation run by friends who will hire you when
you leave government.”
4. “There's a fourth way that wealth and power relate. For research purposes, the
wealth distribution can be seen as the main "value distribution" within the general
power indicator I call "who benefits.””
Although Domhoff’s (2013) assessment of wealth as it relates to power is
conceptually obvious, the assessment does show a direct correlation between power
gained through the accumulation of wealth, allowing a person to become an actor, and
wealth being one avenue to obtain that goal. Of course, there are other considerations
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whenever we think humans and power. Other avenues exist for humans to become
influential actors, such as education, political capital, and notoriety, yet the overriding
concept remains. Nations, like humans, compete for power and there exists a very human
characteristic of envy in every nation-state. Therefore, a characteristic like envy or
competitiveness should be identifiable in historical accounts of a nation. How a nation
becomes a great actor is no different from how a human becomes a great actor in society.
The second assumption is that “each state possesses some military capability”
(Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 79). The concept is that each state could do harm to another
through military force. Within international relations, there exist numerous examples of
nation-states with military capabilities to one degree or another. This concept of military
capability is not limited to the nation’s internal capabilities but also extends to its external
assets or allies. For example, although it is true that North Korea possesses a larger army
than their Southern counterpart, the position of the South Korean improves via the
support and alliance with the United States. Few would argue that the North’s superiority
in numbers translates to superiority over the South, as the North’s conventional military
would offer little match for the technological and nuclear capabilities of the U.S.
Humans also possess the capability to do harm to one another. Throughout human
history, there exist many examples of individual alliances, no different in reason or
complexity than any nation-state alliance, for the purpose to mitigate this characteristic of
human behavior. Again, a correlation from a political science theory exists when
compared to human behavior. There exists the potential in both, and both employ much
of the same strategies to address the concept.
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The third assumption of Structural realism is that “a state can never be certain about
the intentions of other states” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 79). No conditions in international
relation or human behavior allow for 100% certainty regarding potential actions. Like
humans, nation-states are unpredictable. However, the inability to obtain a perfect record
of insight should not be a deterrent to increasing understanding and thereby improving
models for predicting possibilities. This third assumption of structural realism is a
fundamental statement of homogony for everything which humans have dominion over.
States are unpredictable because humans are, and the behavior of the state is a direct
reflection of the humans that control it. This third assumption is a primary basis for the
hypothesis that nations are measurable through the lens of human behavior
characteristics.
The fourth assumption may answer the questions created by the third, and is that “the
main goal of states is to survive. States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the
autonomy of their domestic political order” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 80). This desire for
survival is measurable in the nation-state, as historical accounts bear out actions of
nations attempting to survive. The main goal of humans is also survival. Only in special
cases, usually due to mental impairments or disease, is this primal behavioral
characteristic masked in humans. Everything wants to survive. A social systems survival
is not a product of that system’s structure, as would be the case of building a structure to
withstand natural disasters; in the case of a social system, survival is the goal whenever a
civilization creates a social system. No one actually creates social systems with the intent
to fail.
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This leads us to the final assumption of structural realism: “states are rational actors,
which… are capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for
survival” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 80). Of all the assumptions of structural realism, this is
the most subjective. It is upon the definition of “rational” which hinges the validity of
this statement. What is rational? Mearsheimer contends, “Great powers fear each other
“and that “the level of fear varies from case to case… and can never be reduced to an
inconsequential level” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 80). Of all the human behavioral
characteristics the structural realist would reject, assignment of fear as a motivating factor
is the one undeniable human characteristic that cannot be based upon structure. Fear is a
product of the insecurities exhibited by humans, not inanimate structures.
The issue with using structural realism as a basis for explaining why nations act in
the manner in which they do is the simple fact that structural realism does not specifically
answer the why. The five fundamental assumptions of structural realism are in and of
themselves generalities, albeit rational ones. It is one thing to claim that all nations
primary goal is survival; few would argue against this statement because it is
fundamentally obvious. What structural realism does not do is define what survival
means to each individual state. Structural realism also fundamentally limits itself to
addressing what it defines as world powers. Not every nation aspires to world
domination. Not every nation works toward dominating world politics. Many nations
have pressing domestic concerns that need addressing. Structural realism offers little
insight into these domestic conflicts. This is not to say that there is not a place for
structural realism in formulating understanding of national actions. However, it is clear
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that the theory of structural realism, although relatively obvious, does have its limitations
that the utilization of understanding nations from a behavioral perspective could address.

Liberalism and Neoliberalism
Liberalism is a theoretical model that examines pathways to peace from the
foundation that people control nations and people will generally do the right thing.
Liberalism has many proponents, such as John Locke, Hugo Grotius, and Immanuel Kant
(Russett, 2010). Immanuel Kant “believed that the natural process of self-interest could
impel rational individuals to act as agents to bring a just peace” (Russett, 2010, p. 96).
Whereas to the neorealist human nature has nothing to do with the motivations of nations,
Kant’s framework was based on the belief “in the rational qualities of individuals, faith in
the feasibility of progress in social life, and the conviction that humans, despite their selfinterest, are able to cooperate and construct a more peaceful and harmonious society”
(Russett, 2010, p. 96). It is through this concept of the power of human influence from
which the hypothesis that examining nations through the lens of human behavior was
conceived. If, as liberals believe, human nature plays such an important part in the
decision making of nation-states, why then would the cumulative influence of those
individuals leave a personality fingerprint that would remain after the individual was
gone? Kant’s ideology indirectly promoted the concept of human behavioral
characteristics being transferable to the identity of the nation-state. The theory of
liberalism proposed a concept of a historically perpetual condition of human self-interest.
In addition, that same self-interest was in fact the controlling factor of nations. Therefore,
would it not be feasible that the nation itself, over time, would develop its own perpetual
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homogeny of ideology that would be a reflection of the human self-interest that has
controlled it?
If theoretical liberalism was correct, a case therefore exists that the behavioral
characteristics and personality traits of humans are transferable to their social constructs,
namely nation-states, and would therefore be interchangeable. Historical conflict
behavioral profiling accepts this premise and proceeds according to the assumption that if
it is human self-interest that is the driving factor of the nation-state, then examining the
nation-state from the perspective of human behavior must then also be valid. In essence,
if we treat the nation-state not as a social construct but rather as an organism with the
potential to learn, possessing a potential to exhibit all of the behavioral characteristics of
human beings, behavioral profiling, as would be done with humans, presents a new
avenue to gain insight into the actions of that nation-state. Examining a nation-state from
a behavioral standpoint is the key. Within Kant’s theoretical liberalist society, there
existed theoretical constraints which are applicable to nations. Realist constraints include
power ratio, where the argument by most deterrent theorists is that “conflict is best
prevented by great predominance of power for one side and when that powers unbalanced
in the outcome of conflict is predictable the weaker side generally will not fight”
(Russett, 2010, p. 101). This concept of deterrence is as equally appropriate to human
behavior as it is to the behavior of nations. Few humans would readily engage in a one on
one physical confrontation with an obviously superior opponent. Although the realist
would contend that this common sense application of self-preservation was a construct of
the nation, the liberalist might argue that this application of self-preservation is a
reflection of the natural behavioral self-interest of the humans in charge.
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As was presented earlier, one issue with realism is the theory’s propensity to
attempt to separate national motivation from the people who run the nation. However,
recent events may call into question the liberalist self-preservation model, as intra-state
organizations, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, blatantly challenge the great powers to
intervene in their areas of operation. Nevertheless, this study proposes that these terrorist
organizations are in and of themselves constructs of society, and therefore would have the
same behavioral characteristic potential as nation-states, the theory being that the size of
the construct is not as important as the purpose of the construct. Therefore, if the theory is
proven out in the research data, and nation-states as constructs of society do inherit
personality traits over time from which they are conditioned to remain within the
parameters those traits impose, looking at the terrorist organization from the same
perspective might also be possible. This concept is also reserved for further research.
Another realist constraint that enters into liberalism is the concept of allies.
“Allies share important strategic security interests. If they have military disputes among
themselves they risk weakening their common front against a country each perceives as
an enemy” (Russett, 2010, p. 102). Again, the concept of allies maintains a parallel
reciprocity to the human concept of friends. As is the case with nations who share
interests, common human behavior creates bonds between individuals who also have
shared interests. Therefore, it makes sense that when examining a concept of analysis as
it pertains to the nation, it is appropriate to apply behavioral characteristics normally
found in human beings as it pertains to the human interaction between friends. National
allies and human friends not only have a direct correlation in their behavioral interaction,
but are fundamentally the same in their dynamic. With this in mind, if we were to
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examine the concept and dynamic of allied states from the perspective of the interaction
between human friends, a deeper understanding would be possible.
The final realist consideration in the liberalism constraints is that of distance and
size. “Distance makes it harder and more expensive to exert military power. Neighbors
can readily fight, and are more likely to have competing interest for territory, control of
natural resources, or common ethnic groups that may provoke conflict” (Russett, 2010, p.
102). In today’s world, linear distance is less a factor than it was in the 1950s, as
technology now allows for easier traversing of greater distances more economically.
However, the theory that proximity leads to potential competition is a very real
consideration. Borders are arbitrary things. In addition, the shared border can lead to
tensions, as has been exhibited between the United States and Mexico and the influx of
illegal aliens. However, even this concept is not foreign to human behavior, as the
argument has been made that “Good fences make good neighbors”. The overriding
concept of land and resource rights has been a common theme in many human conflicts.
Russett (2010) makes an argument against realist constraints when he points out
that “Liberal institutionalist, however, insisted the realist perspective does not exhaust the
list of constraints on war over which states can and do exercise some control” (Russett,
2010, p. 102). Kantian theorist believed that other constraints also exist, the first of
which is democracy. Kantian influence suggests “That democracies will rarely fight or
even threaten each other. Democracies may also be more peaceful than all other kinds of
states” (Russett, 2010, p. 102). Although this concept may be essentially true, the issue
with this constraint flies in the definition of democracy. In today’s world, numerous
governments claim to be democratic. If we define democracy as a governmental structure
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that allows its constituency to elect representatives to a parliamentary or congressional
legislature that carries out the will of the populace, then there exists quite a number of
democracies.
The problem with defining democracy from the liberalist point of view is
embracing a definition which encompasses the range of democratic values employed by
the different democratic structures that exist today. The structure of the Russian Dumas
and the Iranian parliament, and the way in which those bodies select representatives, bear
a striking resemblance to the United States Congress and the British Parliament.
However, the level at which the Russian Dumas and Iranian parliament legislate free of
hindrance from other governmental bodies could be argued as an example of shadow or
paper democracies. However, the two-party system utilized in the United States might
create as great a hindrance through the gridlock it creates. Accurately defining democracy
is a subjective exercise in attempting to define individual freedom. Within the context of
both concepts, there exists a wide range of interpretations. For this reason, the Kantian
constraint of democracies being generally peaceful toward each other may be a concept
that requires more defined parameters and appropriate revision.
Whereas Domhoff’s (2013) examples used in the structural realism section are
catalysts for potential conflict, from the liberalist point of view, economics and trade
“may result in greater mutual understanding, empathy, and mutual identity across
boundaries” (Russett, 2010, p. 103). In addition, “Sustained commercial interaction
becomes a medium of communication whereby information about needs and preferences
are exchanged, across the broad range of matters ranging well beyond the specific
commercial exchange” (Russett, 2010, p. 103). The concept that violence is bad for
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business and has the potential to disrupt mutually profitable and beneficial commercial
exchanges is a valid point. However, as Domhoff (2013) pointed out in his evaluation of
the disparity of wealth distribution, potential disparities also have a destabilizing effect
upon nations. Positive economic relations are reliant upon both parties believing that the
relationship promotes parity. Once the concept of parity is breached, as has occasionally
been the case between China and the United States, tariff wars, trade sanctions, and
reduced cooperation can lead to strained relationships. Fair play is equally as relevant to
human behavioral as it is in Kant’s worldview. Although everyone wants to be dealt with
in a fair manner, be they individual or nation-state, the definition of fair is the personality
trait that is theorized as transferable in the study’s model. Both Russia and the United
States want to be treated fair; however, their individual concept of the definition of fair is
reliant upon the historic definitions transferred from their histories, and not some
universal definition as Kant would like us to believe.
The final Kantian constraint is that of international organizations. Although
organizations such as the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund are designed
to be mutually beneficial and accessible to all nations, they too are constructs of society,
which in turn is a construct of human behavior. The constraint of international
organizations has little correlation with the research study. It is presented here only for
the purpose of completeness when listing the Kantian constraints. However, if the
theoretical model is proven, successful organizations, like the United Nations, might be
examinable from the prospective of the study. As in the case of Al Qaeda and ISIS, that
examination would be for a later research study.
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As stated earlier, liberalism attempts to define a pathway from which nations may
coexist peacefully. Unlike realism and structural realism, which attempt to explain why
nations act the way they act, liberalism attempts to define how nations should act.
However, liberalism and its concepts have the same correlation to human behavior
characteristics as does realism and structural realism. In fact, liberalism would probably
embrace the parallel far more enthusiastically than proponents of the other two theories
would. Liberalism promotes community, cooperation, mutual interests, and the
recognition of the benefits of peaceful existence, all valid constructs in the ideology of
human behavior. Liberalism looks at potential rather than explanation or predictions.
Still, the concept of liberalism is still important to understand when in conjunction with
the research being presented here. Historical behavioral conflict profiling is more about
understanding, with understanding utilized to both explain and potentially predict.
Nevertheless, the study seeks to offer an opportunity to realize the liberalism view of the
potential through that understanding for peace.
There might be those who would argue that the study is nothing more than an
extension of liberalist views, that the study is based upon liberal idealism and the belief in
human nature and that natures influence upon international events. The study would
counter argue that although the theory of human behavioral characteristics being an
influencing factor is based on liberal ideology, the research does not accept the definition
parameters liberalism sets upon those characteristics. As framed earlier, the bias of the
study exists within the definition of the behavioral characteristics being searched for.
The characteristics are a reflection of the researcher’s definition of the characteristics
identified. For this reason, the research limits itself to identification of behavioral traits
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that are not broadly defined, such as goodness, which has the potential to be broadly
defined, depending upon whom you ask. Rather, the characteristic of organized, which
has a more definitive value, would be a characteristics focus. Therefore, although the
research may have underpinnings that exist within liberalism, such as the belief that
human behavioral characteristics have influence in the international arena, the study is
not limited to the liberal definitions or ideologies regarding those characteristics.
Although neoliberalism is almost the diametric opposite of structural liberalism,
neoliberalism also looks to structure and international institutions as the driving forces of
international relations. “The central concern of neoliberalism involves how to achieve
cooperation among states and other actors in the international system” (Folker, 2010, p.
117). Within the concept of international institutions, neoliberalism embraces broad
themes in which to explain how these institutions are capable of influencing international
relations (Folker, 2010). Bargaining, deflection, and autonomy are areas in which the
design of institutions forms their ability to work within the international arena.
Once again, we are presented with a political theory which seems destined to
ignore the fact that these international institutions, like nations, are constructs of society
and thereby a construct of human beings. The neoliberal would seem to believe that once
an international institution is created, it develops a life of its own removed from its
creators. Also, as is the case with other political theory, neoliberalism is concerned with
how these international institutions function rather than why. It is not enough to simply
identify bargaining or deflection as tools for the international organization to navigate
international relations, nor is it enough to embrace the overall concept of cooperation as a
fundamentally basic characteristic in which the world of the neoliberal is realized. It must
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be accepted that international institutions, like nations, do not act independent of those
the control them. And, although cooperation is an honorable methodology for achieving
goals, the ability to obtain cooperation must take into account the behavioral
characteristics of those seeking cooperation and those of which cooperation is sought.

Marxism and Critical Theory
Within the theory of Marxism there exist a number of tenants which acknowledge
the importance of the human behavioral characteristics when examining society.
According to Rupert (2010), “Marx posited a relational and process oriented view of
human beings. On this view, humans are what they are not because it is hardwired into
them to be self-interested individuals, but by virtue of relations from which they live their
lives” (p. 159). The study rejects this stringent view of the individual condition. Instead,
the study believes that humans are hardwired to be self-interested individuals but are also
products of their lived experiences. It is this combination of nurture and nature which
makes human beings what they are. The thesis of this study postulates that nations are
self-interested because the individuals that created them are self-interested, yet nations
also exhibit characteristics that are a product of that nation’s experience and therefore
embedded constructs into the nation’s identity. From the Marxist point of view, because
these characteristics are not hardwired into the individual or the nation, there exists the
possibilities for both to organize themselves differently into a utopian model.
For the purpose of this study, Marxism and critical theory’s preoccupation with
capitalism offers little more insight than the perception of the human condition mentioned
above. However, Marxism, unlike other theoretical constructs within political theory,
acknowledges at some level the participation level of human behavior with regards to the
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political forces in which they are encased. Marxism and critical theory exist as significant
critiques of the social systems in which modern society is presently designed. The
purpose of this study is not to criticize the social system, but rather to understand in the
behavioral level of the workings of that social system in which we live.
However, Marxism may have relevance to the study, not in the venue of human
behavior, but rather in its critique of social structures in which individuals live. If we
transfer Marxist ideology from the individual and the class struggle in which the Marxist
theory attributes all ills of society, “The history of all hitherto existing society is the
history of class struggle” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 225), and apply them to nation-states and
the social structure in which nations exist, then the struggles of the differing classes
within the nation-state community might present a valuable component to the
development of behavioral characteristics and personality traits the state might exhibit as
a result of its experiences. The study concedes that the position a nation-state occupies
within the community of nations is a potentially influential factor for identity
development.

Constructivism and Rationalism
One of the fundamental concepts of the study is that the nation state is itself a
construct. “The idea that international relations is a social construction can be thought
about in quite simple terms. To construct something is an act which brings into being a
subject or object that otherwise would not exist” (Fierke, 2010, p. 179). Without human
beings to construct it, the nation-state would not exist. Where constructivism diverges
from the theoretical basis of the study is the value of the individual to its context, as
“Once constructed, each of these objects has a particular meaning in use within the
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context. They are social constructs in so far as their shape and form is imbued with social
values, norms, and assumptions rather than being the product of purely individual thought
or meaning” (Fierke, 2010, p. 179). The study would contend that social values, norms,
and assumptions are the products of individual thought, the thought of the individuals
who construct them. The definition of meaning is understood by the construct and is
parallel to the definition of the meaning of the entities that construct it.
“Constructivists have highlighted several themes. First, the idea of social
construction suggests difference across context rather than a single object reality.
Constructivists have sought to explain and understand change at the international level”
(Fierke, 2010, p. 179). However, from the constructivist point of view, the explanation
and understanding of change lies within the construct itself rather than the society from
which it was designed. “Constructivists have emphasized the social dimensions of
international relations, and have demonstrated the importance of norms, rules, and
language at this level” (Fierke, 2010, p. 179). The concept that constructivists
acknowledge social dimensions in international relations and the importance of facets of
norms, rules and language bring into question where constructivists believe these facets
emanate from, if not from individual thought and perceived meaning.
For the purpose of this study, the general hypothesis is that the ontology of the
state cannot be separated from the ontology of the human being and therefore the state
will exhibit the behavioral characteristics of the humans which constructed it. “Ontology
is a word originating with metaphysics, which refers to the nature of being in focuses on
the types of objects the world is composed of. Rationalists theories of international
relations have an individual ontology insofar as the basic unit of analysis is the individual
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(whether human or state)” (Fierke, 2010, p. 180). This rationalist view is partially in line
with the study’s thesis. However, the rationalist would seem to make the delineation
between the human and the state. “Constructivists have questioned the individual
ontology of rationalism and emphasized instead a social ontology. As fundamentally
social beings, individuals or states cannot be separated from the context of normative
meaning which shapes who they are and the possibilities available to them” (Fierke,
2010, p. 181). Again, in some ways, the constructivist’s ideology is in line with the
study’s ideology. The diversion comes from a constructivist’s attitude that there is a
difference between social ontology and an individual ontology.
The study does not deny the importance of interests, but rather believes that
interests help shape the behavioral characteristics of the individual and thereby the state.
“Rationalists assume a static world of asocial egotists who are primarily concerned with
material interests” (Fierke, 2010, p. 182). “While constructivists would not deny the
importance of interests, they would tie them more directly to the identity of the subject.
Neither identity nor interest can be detached from a world of social meaning” (Fierke,
2010, p. 182). Therefore, these interests can be discovered through the examination of the
behavioral characteristics of the subject. To clarify, the study makes no delineation
between the individual, the state, or the subject. Thus when reference is made to the
subject in regards to behavior characteristics, there is no separation between the
individual and the state.
“Many constructivists… Refer to the hermeneutic theme that action must always
be understood from within, and thus, that social meaning is a function of what is in
people’s heads” (Fierke, 2010, p. 183) (Adler, 1997, p. 326). Again, constructivists seem
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to muddy the waters as to where they believe meaning actually comes from. On one
hand, they claim that meaning is a product of social identity and therefore within the
purview of society. On the other hand, they claim that social meaning is a function of
what people think. It is important for us to understand where social theory makes these
delineations. If in fact as the study postulates no delineation can be made, then it is
logical to assume that the characteristics of human beings can be used as a basis from
which to define the characteristics of the state. The study seeks understanding at the
behavioral level. This concept exists within the German term verstehen. “The emphasis
on verstehen (understanding) highlights a similarity and difference between the
rationalists and constructivists. The difference is the former emphasize the individual of
the letter emphasizes the social” (Fierke, 2010, p. 183). Within this delineation, it would
be appropriate to assume the study follows more the rationalist point of view than that of
the constructivist. However, in reality, the study’s point of view makes no separation
between the individual, the social, and the state.

Post Structuralism
Post-structuralism provides little constructive discourse to the debate between the
validity of political theory as a vehicle for better understanding of international relations
where the potential of new models designed to highlight behaviorism is a foundation for
studying national motivations. “Every way of understanding international politics
depends upon abstraction, representation, and interpretation” (Campbell, 2010, p. 214).
The application of historical conflict behavioral profiling is an exercise in utilizing the
abstract to a social construct represented by the state and the interpretation and
understanding of that construct through the eyes of the previously abstract. “Political
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leaders, social activists, scholars, and students are all involved in the interpretation of the
world whether they engage in the practice, theory, or study of international relations”
(Campbell, 2010, p. 214). The study proposes a new methodology and new perspective
from which those who are attempting to interpret the world may make new
epistemological models of understanding. “The dominant interpretations of the world
have been established by the discipline of international relations, which traditionally talks
of states and their policymakers pursuing interest in providing security, of economic
relations and the material effects, of the rights of those were being badly treated”
(Campbell, 2010, p. 214).
“International relations as discipline map the world. However, it is only the
critical perspectives and post structuralism in particular which make the issues of
interpretation and representation, power knowledge, and the politics of identity central”
(Campbell, 2010, pp. 215 - 216). Somewhat in line with this structuralism perspective,
the methodology of the study seeks to present the identity of the state is central, the
difference being that the employment of the theoretical principles of the study believes
that the identity of the state can be discovered, and that identity exists within the
identities of the people who created it.

Russia within the Structure of International Society and Unbalanced
Influence
The structure of civil society has changed little over the past millennium. Arbitrary
nation-states exist with a neo-realistic desire for survival (Mearsheimer, 2010, pp. 77 92). The type of geopolitical structure in which society resides lends credence to a world
that experiences conflict, as nations compete for resources, influence, and power. Within
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this system of nation-states with their arbitrary borders that are the sole creation of
society, there exists a group of influential actors, otherwise known as world powers or
superpowers. These powerful nation-states command significant and arguably
disproportional influence upon international affairs. Today’s world is one in which there
exists those nations that have and those that don’t. Disproportionality of influence is an
unfortunate yet present factor in international relations. The disproportional amount of
influence that perceived world powers have, and their ability to exert it in cases of
international conflict, is a factor that drives our need to understand their motivations.
Even in political systems designed to give voice to all nations, such the United Nations,
the permanent members of United Nations Security Council by charter receive
disproportional influence. “The Security Council, while formally equal to other principal
organs of the UN, bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security” (Malone, 2007, p. 117).
The five permanent members, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
and Russia, are the key representatives with the power to each unilaterally determine the
course of the world diplomatic body’s responses, or lack thereof, in any of these
conflicts. Any one of these five nations within the United Nations can unilaterally
influence the actions of the entire U.N. Through their assent and cooperation, within this
group exists the ability to effectively tackle almost any conflict situation. However, using
their unchallengeable veto prerogative, these same nations can become a roadblock to
any effective United Nations response (Malone, 2007). Some would argue that it is this
unbalanced system employed by the United Nations negates its abilities, thereby reducing
its importance. Few would argue against the claim that the current system of governance
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within the United Nations grants a minority of nations or a single nation the power to
decide policy, and control actions in a unilateral manner, which at times has caused a
contentious relationship with the General Assembly (Malone, 2007, p. 117). Because of
the power of the veto, a power that extends above the desire of the majority, the United
Nations is a body with a limited ability to deal effectively with the pressing issues of
international conflict.
The purpose of this dissertation is not to argue the merits of the United Nations
system, but rather to accept the precept as a given undisputable fact of current society
within which conflict scholars must work. Disproportionality exists. The study accepts
the principle as fact that within the international community there exist certain nations
with unbalanced influence over world events. Since the premise of unbalanced influence
exists within international relations, potential proactive and reactive engagement of
conflict resolution requires scholars to gain greater understanding of the motivations of
those nations with the most influence. The example of the United Nations presented here
exists to both identify Russia’s position in the international community and provide an
international body in which Russian responses to international conflict is measurable.
Russia, the nation-state of which the study shall focus, is one of the permanent members
of the Security Council. It is also presented as an example of the structure of the
international society in which we live, a structure with a dynamic not unlike many social
dynamics existent in individual interactions. It is these factors that the study believes are
influencing factors contributing to the behavioral profile of a nation-state.
It is Russian international relevance and its position of a counterbalance to western
ideologies that are the primary factors making understanding Russian foreign policy an
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important topic for conflict scholars. There is no evidence to suggest that either of these
conditions will change in the near future. Therefore, entering into a study which could
potentially give new insight to Russian foreign policy motivations, is a worthwhile
endeavor. By utilizing that information, it may become possible to predict the potential
obstacles to peace in a world facing a plethora of international conflicts.
Those that measure influence in military terms might point to the Russian military’s
loss of many of the resources controlled by the old Soviet Union, including a portion of
their nuclear arsenal, forfeited in the disbanding of the Union, as a signal in a reduction of
influence. This reduction in military power has led many to signal a decline in regards to
Russian international influence and power (Bennett, 2012). The perception that the
current Russian Federation’s military ability is inferior to the old Soviet Union, and
therefore no match for the remaining superpower, the United States, is also a subjective
opinion. Facts are that Russia maintains a formidable military presence, and although
reduced in numbers, a potentially devastating nuclear arsenal (Bennett, 2012). Measuring
world influence through the lens of a nation’s military capability does not always
translate proportionally to political influence.
Like military strength, economic strength is not a good unit of measurement for the
argument that proportionally equates to influence. To determine a nation’s influence, we
must examine their ability to affect world events. The extent to which other nations react
is proportional to the amount of influence a nation-state has. The loss of a subjective
classification, such as the perceived vulnerability of the current Russian economy or the
reduction of nuclear capability, cannot diminish Russian importance in world politics.
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union there have been acknowledged difficulties in
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Russia’s transition to a more democratic and capitalistic social structure. However,
Russia continues to evolve. This evolution process possibly contributed to Russia losing
the classification of world superpower. Nevertheless, this is a subjective classification
from the Cold War, and its subjectivity is dependent upon the criteria of the discipline
making the classification.
The presentation of Russia as an influential player in the social structure of world
politics is presented here as further clarification of the hierarchal structure of world
society. A nation’s position within that structure as higher or lower is hypothesized as
having a direct influence upon a nations behavioral characteristics. Therefore, if the
world is to maintain any hope of experiencing any resemblance of long lasting peace,
conflict scholars must understand the major players in world politics. It is not enough to
focus and understand the region or the direct parties involved in the conflict; the greater
society of nations must be factored in. Scholars and practitioners must also be cognizant
of those outside forces that have sway over international politics. The current structure of
society necessarily directs the efforts of conflict analysis scholars interested in mitigating
world and intra-state conflict on a macro scale to examine the source of the conflict.
However, to be fully successful, conflict scholars must also concentrate their efforts
beyond the actors directly involved in conflict and dedicate efforts to understanding
external actors and their motivations. The motivations of external influences are an
important secondary concern regarding the overall conflict, yet it is a necessary
component if we are to reach full resolution. Increasing our understanding of those
nation-states with the most influence on potential conflict creates new pathways to
resolution. Increasing our understanding of all factors with the potential for influence
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upon a conflict further assists conflict analysis scholars and resolution practitioners
through a more global perspective. From the proactive conflict mitigation perspective,
taking a more global approach lends to the recognition of areas where the potential
preambles of conflict exist.
Throughout history, political scientist, sociologists, conflict and peace study experts,
and a myriad of scholars from other disciplines from within the social sciences have
offered theories to explain socio/political behavior (Dunne et al., 2010). Some have
utilized history as a basis for their hypothesis; this dissertation is a continuation of that
endeavor. Russia and her continued prominence on the world stage make it vital for
conflict scholars to study and understand Russian motivations and historical homogeny, if
this homogeny exists. Russian foreign policy, not unlike the foreign policies of other
nations, is a product of these motivations and this study will examine and postulate a
theorized national political homogeny of ideology, which Russia consistently employs.
Russia has historically provided an ideological counterbalance to the western areas of
Europe and the United States throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. From the overthrow
of the Czarist monarchy and the beginnings of the communist system in the beginning of
the 20th century (McCollum, 2010), to the uneasy alliance with the west against the Nazis
during World War II, to the propagation of the Cold War following World War II, Russia
has proved an enigma for foreign policy experts to decipher. Today, a new Russian
Federation has emerged from the ashes of the old Soviet Union, begging the question if
the new Russia will be different from the old.
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Russian foreign policy can be an enigma to observers looking in from outside the
halls of Russian power. Correctly determining Russian motivations for their actions in
world events has been an ever tantalizing, and more often than not, occasional source of
frustration for western nations and policy makers, as is evident with the current Ukrainian
conflict. To understand current Russian foreign policy, the study postulates that rather
than rely upon speculation based upon subjective opinions of diplomatic experts and
pundits, it would be advantageous to examine Russia’s motivations from the past.
Examination of the past in an effort to determine if a consistent theme exists may offer a
motivational pattern and thereby a clearer picture to the events of today. This
examination looks to offer the advantage of potential insight into Russian actions in the
future.
However, it is necessary to frame the concept of unbalanced influence as a matter of
example. Russia is one of a few select nations that continue to maintain a prominent
position in world affairs. Russia’s ability to influence world politics has cemented her
position of importance on the world stage. Russia’s influence extends to all aspects of
international relations, including the ability to sway, negate, or create international
conflict. Understanding Russian foreign policy and identifying those dynamics that
influence the decisions of the current Russian government is a vital component for
developing proactive and reactive strategies to address world conflict. Conflict scholars,
political scientists, and diplomats must accept that today’s Russian Federation is as
equally relevant to present day world events as was the Soviet Union prior to its break-up
in the 1980’s.
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Political importance is arguably a matter of perception. How opponents in
international relations perceive each other determines a nation’s status and potential
influence upon world affairs. The exercise of collaborating and partnering with other
nations is, in many cases, a sign of mutual respect and a perceived potential for mutual
benefits. Therefore, an example wherein an elite group of nations extends the hand of
cooperation to another nation whose current condition would almost seem to disqualify
its inclusion in the elite groups ranks, speaks volumes as to the respect that elite group
holds the invitee and the influence the nation has. The Russian inclusion in the former
G8 speaks to that power and respect.
In the discipline of economics, some economists might contend that following the
breakup of the Soviet Union, the lackluster performance of the new capitalistic Russian
economy has reduced Russian influence (Shaolie, 2014). Although current Russian
exports and the development of sustainable industry lag behind expectations, during the
Soviet period the demand for the export of Russian goods never rivaled the industrial
powers. Russian economic influence continues today, not because of what it offers the
world in exports, but because of what it requires of the world in imports. This importexport imbalance retains Russian influence to the rest of the world’s economies.
It is arguable that the lackluster Russian economy may not have warranted its
inclusion into the former G7, which would later become the G8; however, respect for
Russian impact and standing in the world did. This influence allowed for Russian defacto inclusion in the elite club, and the expansion of the G7 to the G8. Only recently did
the G8 revoke Russia’s honorary membership into the working group of the largest
economies. Russia’s removal from the elite G8 took an international crisis. Following
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the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the violation of that nation’s sovereignty, the other
members of the G8 still required careful consideration and a united front before deciding
on Russia’s ouster. In 2014, the other members of the G8, the United States, Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Canada, and Italy, unanimously revoked Russia’s
membership, in protest of Russian involvement in the destabilization of the Ukraine
(Cohen, 2014). This expulsion does not negate that Russia, whose economy might not
have warranted inclusion into this elite club, was still invited. During Russia’s period of
inclusion, she was an influential member, regardless of a struggling economy. The
importance of this section will become clear following the conclusions of chapter 5.

Inferences for Forthcoming Study
The political theories which have been examined in this chapter are presented as
examples of the parallels of many of the concepts that exist within these theories to the
concepts of behavioral science as is utilized in the methodology of profiling. The study
embraces the premise that if political theories, which are designed to explain, predict, and
in some cases promote the actions of nations, have a correlation with the characteristics
of human behavior, the methodology of profiling is therefore appropriate for its
application to increase the epistemology of international politics. Many of the theories
presented in this chapter make an explicit distinction between the nation and its people.
The study contends that this delineation is far less defined than political theorists
would have us believe. A nation is a human construct. It is created by human beings for
the purpose of stabilizing the current definition of social order. As a human construct, it
therefore also possesses many of the characteristics of the humans that created it,
administer it, and live within it. There can be no full understanding of a nation’s action
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without the acceptance of this fundamental principle. Therefore, is we accept the nation
as an outgrowth of the human condition; it consequently stands to reason that the nation
can be evaluated under the guidelines of the characteristics of human beings. Nations as a
structure do not have the ability to act unilaterally without the directions of the people
who control them. The study further infers that a nation, like a human being, is a product
of his/her historic experiences, and that those experiences can create homogeny, deeply
embedded within the nation’s culture, that is resistant to the effects of transition or the
current governance structure. If we thus examine the nation from the perspective of
human behavior, creating homogeny, we can obtain greater epistemology. Only through
the utilization of behavioral characteristics normally assigned to the human being can this
deep understanding be obtained.
Although the theorists of political science might argue that the theories they
present are a reflection of the greater complexity of the nation and are therefore too
diverse to allow for simple human behavioral characteristics to be applicable, when we
examine almost every portion of their theory, the reciprocity of application becomes
obvious. It is subsequently the researcher’s intention to treat the nation-state as an
individual, consider transitions and conflicts as individual life events experienced by that
individual, and create a behavioral profile that, if used in conjunction with current
political theory, offers the potential for a deeper understanding of our global society.

Theoretical/Conceptual Framework for Forthcoming Study
This research will focus upon the nation-state of Russia as the general subject, in an
effort to discover if the designed methodology can identify behavioral characteristics.
The study’s application of the proposed methodology on the subject of Russia is
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deliberate, as Russia is primarily influential in international conflict. Russia also has a
diverse history, which presents a plethora of data extractable through historical accounts.
This diverse history, through close examination, permits for the application of national
behavioral profiling. The methodology will focus upon a historiography case study of
Russian foreign and domestic policy in times of conflict. The study design looks at those
elements of Russian political and social society which influences it, in the hope that the
approach can identify behavioral characteristics, previously unknown, and that correlate
to actions taken during conflict situations.
The proposed qualitative research methodology of nation-state behavioral profiling is
designed to discover these characteristics from a perspective not traditionally employed
by international conflict analysis scholars or political scientists. The perspective is one of
identifying those behavioral and personality characteristics traditionally associated to
human behavior existent within the nation-state. The methodology examines the subjects
from the lens of traditional human behavioral and personality characteristics. Finally, the
sum of the data findings presents a behavioral characteristic profile of the subject. It is
therefore this study’s approach to engage in this different scientific methodology. The
study will measure the theory’s validity through conclusions derived from historical
evidence and comparison to human behavioral and personality characteristics.
First, a subject nation needed selection. For the purpose of this study, Russia is the
selected subject nation. Secondly, parameters of history in which a comparative study
could be conducted required selection. Foreign and domestic conflict situations, under a
consistent set of parameters which included a period of significant historic transition,
were selected. Finally, a separate set of hypothetical questions from which the

91
methodology could focus its inquiry and that were directly relatable to the subject nation
required creation. These secondary hypotheses will be labeled as benchmark hypotheses,
which exist to provide the research inquiry with direction. These secondary research
questions are not the main focus of the study; they do, however, set the parameters of the
line of inquiry from which the research is conducted.
1. Major social/political transitions should disrupt, in a measurable way, existing
homogenies. During periods of conflict, social and political transitions have
historically exhibited influences upon other nation’s ideologies undergoing the
same relative transitions.
2. Unlike other nations that have experienced disruption of their ideological
homogenies during transitional periods, within Russia, transitions historically
exhibit no lasting influence on this ideological homogeny. Russia has exhibited no
parallel impact upon the proposed Russian homogony, and conflict has not altered
this homogeny.
These benchmark hypotheses are based upon the fact that despite the political
transition following the Soviet Union collapse, Russia continues to show considerable
influence upon world events, and a consistent utilization of this ideological homogeny.
To identify the existence of any ideological homogeny that influences Russian policy
and actions, we must identify and study any social and political phenomenon that might
disrupt this homogeny. This study postulates that periods of political and social transition
traditionally exhibit the greatest potential to influence and change a nation’s ideology.
Transitions therefore should have the greatest potential to affect the ideology or disrupt
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homogony of national policies utilized when dealing with the international community.
The effect of transitions should be most evident on a national foreign policy ideology,
specifically during periods of conflict. This dissertation will study cases from historical
periods that exhibited specific transitions in social and political events in Russia. The
transitions examined have historical parallels and have resulted in policy shifts when
similar transitions occurred in other nations. Therefore, if a homogony exists and the
methodology can identify it, even during periods of transition which should potentially
disrupt the homogony, then the existence of the homogony is valid and the methodology
is likewise valid.
1. Nation-states possess behavioral characteristics. These characteristics exist and
are discoverable through a comprehensive profile examination of the elements of
the nation-state and its consequential actions.
Unlike the claim proposed by many of the political theorists, there is no
conceptual division between a nation and human beings. Nations act the way they do
because human beings tell them how to act. Because this condition exists, nations
possess personalities in the same manner as human beings do. and over time, those
personalities become an integral part of the nation’s identity, which it is difficult for
the nation to diverge from. The personalities of nations will exhibit behavioral
characteristics that are measurable through profile examination in the same manner as
human behavioral characteristics.
2. Transitions to a nation-states political, social, and/or economic system directly
affect that nation’s foreign policy ideology. Major political, social, or economic
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structure transitions make nation-states vulnerable, or susceptible to ideological
shifts.
The theoretical premise is that when a nation-state undergoes a major shift in
domestic, political, and or economic structure, the nation’s foreign policy should shift
ideologically facilitate this transition. Therefore, theoretically, a nation that shifts from a
dictatorship to a democracy should exhibit an ideological change in foreign and/or
domestic policy. The theory garners its basis from the perception that the ideology of a
dictatorship is inherently different from the ideology of a monarchy or democracy, and
that these differences in ideology directly correspond to policy dissimilarities. Although
the study will concede that shifts in political, social or economic ideology might
influence the methodology of a nation’s approach to foreign or domestic policy or
conflict situations, these transitions do not necessarily have a universal effect upon the
ideology of conflict engagement. The dissertation proposes that transitions can, in some
cases, exhibit no effect upon the overall ideology of the state’s international motivations
or approach to conflict. Transitions in politics, society, and economics may or may not
influence how a nation-state engages internationally. Therefore, what influences that
nation to action, the core ideology of the state, in some historic cases is immune to
transition and thus can remain the same, even in cases of dramatic social, political, and
economic transition.
3. International and domestic involvement and the motivational drivers that
influence those actions directly relate to the system of governance the nation-state
employs.
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The type of government employed by a nation-state is directly relatable to the state’s
foreign policy and domestic actions. The foreign policy ideology of a democracy,
therefore, would be different from that of a dictatorship. How a state engages conflict is
directly relatable to these ideologies, thus conflict resolution and foreign policy is directly
influenced by the system of governance the state employs.
The study rejects this premise, as a democracy and a dictatorship could both engage
in colonialism as a foreign policy. The needs of the state are a more accurate indicator of
foreign policy ideology than the governance system a state uses, and even as the state
changes governing systems, the overall needs of the state remain generally constant. A
state lacking access to a port, for example, still lacks that access, regardless of the system
of government employed. The availability and need for resources will not necessarily
directly affect the government structure. Although changes in economic priorities
engaged by a new governing system could directly influence the level of need for
different resources and thereby foreign policy concerns, economic needs rather than
government structure hold direct influence over this.
Domestically, both the democracy and dictatorship might engage a similar ideology
of governance. Both the democracy and the dictatorship might be based upon a
theocratic system of governance. In domestic matters, the prevailing issue is the
conceptual theory that in democracies, citizens are afforded inherently more freedoms.
The issue with this theory is in the concept of freedom and the definition of what
constitutes that freedom. This study challenges the opinion that the inherent freedoms
that exist in a democracy are greater than those in a monarchy or dictatorship. All forms
of government can engage in repressive behavior against its populace to equal degrees.
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Voting rights of the constituency are not parallel to the level of repression exercised by a
government.
All governments use force to address conflict, either domestic or foreign. The level
of force, and the concept of proportionality of force, is subjective, and thus a poor litmus
test for identifying a governing structures ideology. However, the concept of
proportionality in dealing with conflict is not the issue; what is at issue is the
methodology of conflict engagement.
4. The leader of a nation –state, monarch, dictator, or president can independently
change the domestic and foreign policy ideology of the state.
The personality of the person in charge of a nation-states government can override the
historic ideology of a state. Who is in charge does matter. However, the study proposes
that when there exists an embedded personality and associated behavioral traits within a
nation-state, these traits limit the extent to which the head of state can influence policy, if
that policy is in direct opposition to the national personality.
A profile will be complied utilizing similarities to the common profiling techniques
accepted by behavioral science and law enforcement. These techniques, when applied to
historical case studies, examined the behavioral aspects of a nation exhibited during
specific periods that contain social, economic, and political, transitions. The transitional
periods were the focal point of case selection, studying the behavioral reactions to these
events. Focusing on periods of transition garnered its foundation from the theory that
Russia’s transition following the fall of the Soviet Union and rejection of communism is
a transition of such magnitude that if there would be a change in Russian international
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and domestic policy, that would have been the time it occurred. The selection of
transitional periods was also based upon the theory that, as is the case in human
behavioral characteristics, transitional events have the greatest potential to elicit change,
as those events potentially have the greatest influence. However, this does not suggest
that discovery of personality or behavioral characteristics require a major transitional
period in the life cycle of a nation. In fact, the hypothesis of the study firmly believes
that in this case, these transitional periods, selected as major historical events from the
subject nation’s history, will have little or no effect upon the characteristics of the nation.
Fundamentally, personality characteristics born from experience will overcome
transitional events effects.
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Chapter 3 : Research Design and Methodology
Methodology
The research methodology that will be used in this study is qualitative comparison
historical analysis. Qualitative data will be gathered through an examination of historical
accounts, otherwise known as a historiography. The data collected will then be applied to
profile templates, similar to templates used in criminal profiling, each specific to the
subject group being examined. For the purpose of this study, templates are designed to
determine if a correlation of behavioral characteristics exist, and if so, measure them
against traditional behavioral science criteria that are normally reserved for an individual.
The research templates are designed to be subject appropriate to each individual group.
When examining for characteristic traits of historical figures, the templates are
appropriate for human beings.
The overall structure of the research is to apply and measure characteristics
generally reserved as human traits. Therefore, all characteristic templates will utilize a
behavioral science design traditionally reserved for human subjects. Case study will be
the qualitative method used, as
“Qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates exploration
of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This
ensures that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of
lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and
understood” (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 544).
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In the case of this research, the study will deviate from this multi-dimensional
approach, as the focus of the study is primarily personality and behavioral characteristics.
Whenever engaging in a historiography, the research must accept and embrace one
school of historiography (Thies, 2002). Although this approach is counter to the approach
proposed by Baxter and Jack, we must remember that the qualitative comparative
historical research methodology is only one facet of the overall research. The research
design also has element similar to other qualitative research methodologies, including
case study. The conducting of a historiography using the separate historical events and
participants as “cases” requires a modification from the traditional case study
methodology. According to Yin (2003), a case study design should be considered when:
(a) the focus of the study is to answer “how” and “why” questions; (b) you cannot
manipulate the behavior of those involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual
conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d)
the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context (Baxter & Jack, 2008,
p. 545). This study is conducted under all four of these pretexts. The study is looking
into “how” and “why” Russia reacts to conflict. Because it is based on historical data, it
cannot be manipulated by the researcher, beyond the selection of the historical school of
thought. The study looks to discover contextual conditions and measure their relevance to
the phenomenon. Do nation-state personalities exist, and if so, to what extent are they
obvious to the events? The boundaries between context and phenomenon are unclear, as
there is no reference to the amount of influence the trait might have upon the actions. It
could be argued that deliberate selection of periods of history, in which significant social
and or political transition is being experienced, is in fact a manipulation of the study.
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However, the study would counter-argue that the selection of these periods of transition is
instead a component which is designed to potentially disprove the study’s hypothesis
through its historical effects upon other nations undergoing the same transitions.
The application of a case study as defined by Creswell (2007) and Stake (1995) is
not the reasoning behind the model being employed in this study. Creswell and Stake
qualify that the decision for the employment of the case study methodology “is a good
approach when the inquirer has clearly definable cases with boundaries and seeks to
provide an in-depth understanding of the cases or comparison of several cases”
(Creswell, 2007, p. 74; Stake, 1995). Although this is a secondary goal of the research,
the use of a case study qualitative approach is designed more as a means to an end, with
the end of testing for the existence of the theoretical characteristics. Any resulting
epistemology or hypothesis conformation beyond the hypothesis relating to the
application of the methodology is only a secondary, yet positive consequence.
The analysis of the cases does fall under Stake’s (1995) definition. “Through data
collection, a detailed description of the case emerges in which the researcher details such
aspects of the history of the case, the chronology of the events, or a day-to-day rendering
of the activities of the case” (Creswell, 2007, p. 75; Stake, 1995). For the purpose of data
collection in which to validate the methodology, the study will follow a structure for the
collection of data to be utilized. “In the final interpretive phase, the research reports the
meaning of the case, whether that meaning comes from learning about the issue of the
case (and instrumental case) or learning about an unusual situation (an intrinsic case)”
(Creswell, 2007, p. 75; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In the final phase, the application of the
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case studies will be measured against the secondary and tertiary hypothesis in any
resulting epistemology will be noted.
Merriam (1988) contends that “there is no standard format for reporting case
study research” (Creswell, 2007, p. 195; Merriam, 1988, p. 193). This is one of the
primary reasons that case study was selected as the methodology for the study. Creswell
(2007), on pages 195 and 196, presents a general rhetorical structure for the case study
methodology. Creswell (2007) further credits Stake (1995) for the general outline he
presents. Of that presented rhetorical structure, the study will follow a more holistic
design rather than the alternative of an embedded one. However, different the design the
study uses for its case, evaluation of the primary tenants of case study methodology
remains.
The conducting of this case study is intrinsically different than the traditional case
study methodology documented by other qualitative researchers. Although the secondary
goals of the study do have roots in the traditional application of case studies, including
data collection and analysis, the application of the methodology of case study for the
purpose of validating the existence of a theoretical principle which can be used in
conjunction with other qualitative and quantitative methodologies access application is
unique.
The study also implies elements of the qualitative model of phenomenology. The
case is defined by Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 25) as “a phenomenon of some sort
occurring in a bounded context. The case is, “in effect, your unit of analysis” (Baxter &
Jack, 2008, p. 545). Both sets of authors go on to suggest questioning what it is you wish
to analyze, such as an individual, program, process, or differences between organizations
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(Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 546). In this study, the methodology looks at not only one of
these analytical perspectives, but a number of them in conjunction. Analyzing the
individual, group of individuals, the government structures, transitional events, and the
relationship each has their affects upon the potential phenomenological homogony
hypothesized.
A historical account, or case, will be used to supply data to the characteristic
templates available for each subject. The data evaluation of this information will be
evaluated to determine if any phenomenological condition exists. If the findings are
positive, then the phenomenon will be compared to the other subjects of the same group
to determine if a common group phenomenological condition exists. Once a decision is
made upon the existence or nonexistence of commonality of the group subjects, each
subject’s reaction to events shall be measured in a separate characteristic template to
determine if the homogeny or lack thereof is an influential factor to the event or decisions
made regarding the event.
The sheer number of differing historical accounts, and the plethora of bias which
could be injected into the study from the differing schools of historiography, must
therefore be minimized. However, not discounting any other historiography school of
thought, or claiming that the adherence to one school or even multiple schools would
invalidate the results, conforming to a single school of thought is an exercise in
bracketing the study’s approach through the confinement of the foundational lens of case
selection.
The study contends that there is also a benefit to restricting the historiography to
one school of thought. If the theoretical foundation is confirmed, and nation-states do
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exhibit personality traits which are independent of current ideologies and situational
events, then the methodology could be applied using a different, yet consistent,
historiographical school, from which the results from the two different schools of thought
could be compared. This comparative examination of data from two different schools of
historical thought could produce new information or confirm the original evaluation of
the data, which would be valuable to the overall epistemology of the subject.
Creswell (2007) contends that when researchers select the qualitative
methodology, they are also making certain philosophical assumptions which consists of
stances in the nature of reality (ontology), how the researcher knows what he knows
(epistemology), what role values play in the research (axiology), the language of the
research (redbrick), and the methods in the process of research (methodology) (Creswell,
2007, p. 16; Creswell, 2003). In regards to the study being conducted, the methodological
philosophical assumption and its implications would be most appropriate. As presented
by Creswell (2007), in the methodological approach “research use inductive logic, studies
the topic within its context, and uses emerging design” (Creswell, 2007, p. 17 Table 2.1).

Research Procedures
The research procedure utilizes four separate elements from which conclusions are
drawn. The general data collection will be conducted using the first element, qualitative
comparative historical analysis, with the foundation of the qualitative historical analysis
design being guided by Cameron Thies (2002). Thies addresses a main issue in which
the research design must be aware, source material bias or the proper conducting of the
designs historiography. “Researchers using qualitative methods, including case studies
and comparative case studies, are becoming more self-conscious in enhancing the rigor of
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their research designs so as to maximize their explanatory leverage with a small number
of cases” (Thies, 2002). The common issue with any qualitative historical analysis exists
within the historiography. “How one chose from the historical record the materials that
will best help one to develop or test theory, or even simply describes a set of events, in a
particular case or small set of cases” (Thies, 2002, p. 351). It is in source material
selection that the bias cannot be eliminated, only mitigated, and that the conduction of
any historical based analysis it is the historiography which receives most of the criticism.
“The most notorious problem that persistently face qualitative historical analysis, namely,
investigator bias and unwarranted selectivity in the use of source material” (Thies, 2002,
p. 352). Historical accounts are inherently biased by the authors of the histories.
However, in this study’s case any author bias is believed to be minimal, as the study
seeks to collect factual data regarding elements of history rather than author opinion on
the causes of the historical event. The questions posed for the conclusions being drawn
for the secondary methodology used in this research, behavioral profiling, are specific to
confirmable events.
To further limit any unintentional bias, the historiography data will be selected “by
identifying one school of historiography that (the study) will stick with as the historical
record against which (the study) test your (its) theories” (Thies, 2002, p. 365). The
researcher acknowledges that to accomplish this, commitment to one school of
historiography the researcher is required “to become familiar with general trends in
historiography, as well as developments in historical inquiry” (Thies, 2002, p. 365;
Iggers, 1997; N. Wilson, 1999).
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Lustick (1996) also envisioned a bias that is cumulative in nature, called “selection
bias”:
The first concern is the bias of the historian who may draw on some
primary sources to the exclusion of others, such that he produces distorted
account of some historical event. The second concern is the selection
effects introduced by the political scientist when he chooses to focus on a
particular historians work and consciously or unconsciously excludes
others. The worst-case scenario for Lustick, but he seems to me when he
describes “selection bias” is when these two problems are conjoined. In
this scenario a political scientist with a particular theoretical and
conceptual disposition purposefully selects certain historians who share
this bias, and whose work is already tainted as such leading to a
misleading historical account, and therefore mistaken confirmation of the
political scientist theory. (Thies, 2002, p. 359; Lustick, 1996).
Although the potential for bias in the historiography is a concern in which the
research must acknowledge and address, the data being extracted from the historical
accounts is of general and limited scope. As an example, if one record indicates that Peter
I was six feet five inches tall and another records his height as six feet seven, the
discrepancy is of little concern if the conclusion, being made from the data, is to decide if
he was tall for the period. There will always be minor factual inconsistencies that exist
within historical accounts. The studies response to this issue is to create a series of
questions which seek general answers in which the facts being applied are general in
nature.
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For the purpose of this study, the historiography school of thought to be utilized
will be political history. This school of thought analyzes political events, ideas,
movements, and leaders. It is usually structured around the nation-state. It is distinct
from, but related to, other fields of history such as social history, economic history, and
military history. Generally, political history focuses on events relating to nation-states
and the formal political process. According to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the late
18th and early 19th century historian and political philosopher, political history “is an idea
of the state with a moral and spiritual force beyond the material interests of its subjects: it
followed the state was the main agent of historical change” (Morris, 1892; O'Brien,
1975).
From the identified characteristics, the study is designed to create a characteristic
tree of variables which can be compared and from which a common homogony can be
either confirmed or rejected. Utilizing basic behavioral coding methods common in
behavioral science personality tests, the historical data will be examined for indication of
behavioral traits in each secondary element, head of state and governance structure.
Those traits shall then be evaluated against the event traits of the transitional and
conflict events to determine any variations. Common event behavioral characteristics,
which are found common both periods, despite the differences which time period and
social/political differences present, and are a factor designed into the research to mitigate
homogony, will be evaluated as an ingrained personality characteristic of the nation-state
(see figure 3-1).

106

Theorized
Homogony
Characteristic
Shared
Phenomenon

Characteristics
of Study Period
1

Characteristics
of Study Period
2

Figure 3-1

As illustrated in the example, the determination of a behavioral characteristic is
dependent upon its existence in both study periods. Those characteristics which only
exist in one period will be identified but not classified as a homogony element.
The qualitative comparative historical analysis is not directly about the heads of
state identified as title elements in the research design. Referencing the examination
period by directly acknowledging the head of state during the period gives the study its
period reference. Although the study will examine the head of state for characteristics,
which the research contends attributes to the nation-states cumulative personality, the
focus is upon the transitions and conflicts from the period and how the secondary
elements, such as governance structure and head of state, addressed these events (see
figure 3-2).
The structure of the research’s qualitative comparative historical analysis will be
the same for each time period examined:
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1. A brief synopsis of the period and the research subjects place within the
timeline.
2. A brief historical biography focused upon the head of state during the period.
The study will pay special attention to the leader’s behavioral characteristics
and personality.
3. A brief synopsis of the governance structure and any pertinent behavioral
characteristics generally attributed to them at the time.
4. A brief history and description of the transitions that affected the state and
occurred during the period
5. A brief description and history of the domestic conflict in which the state
engaged during the period
6. A brief description and history of the international conflict in which the state
engaged during the period
7. An examination of how the secondary elements (Head of State and
Government) engaged the conflicts and transitions.
8. A chart identifying discovered personality or behavioral traits found in the
engagement by the secondary elements.
The brief history outlined as the first step of the research design is presented in
the research as a reference point into the different social environments that were present
at the time. It is not meant to be an all-inclusive historical account, but rather brief
examples of society during the time being researched. The procedures show that the
research will be conducted in a step-by-step methodology that promotes consistent data
collection and coding across all components of the research. None of the elements
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explored in the qualitative comparative historical analysis are designed to be all inclusive
historical accounts, but rather a search of historical records for a consensus, within the
historiography parameters, which answers the specific questions designed into the
research.
The first step in the research, general historical background data collection,
although extremely limited in its scope, will be examined for any characteristics factors
of the general society which continued throughout the study’s historical perspective. For
instance, is the society as a whole xenophobic, repressed, submissive, aggressive, or
rebellious? Is the society prosperous, educated, or technologically proficient? This data
will present the research with a framework in which the behavioral characteristics, if
existent, were influenced by general society (see table 3-1).
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Table 3-1
Subject Element

Characteristic Option 1

Characteristic Option 2

Leadership Biography

Organized/Deliberate

Disorganized/Impulsive

Governance Structure

Organized/Deliberate

Disorganized/Impulsive

Transition

Organized/Deliberate

Disorganized/Spontaneous

Leadership Response
to Transition
Government Response
to Transition
Conflict Domestic

Organized/Deliberate

Disorganized/Spontaneous

Organized/Deliberate

Disorganized/Spontaneous

Organized/Deliberate

Disorganized/Spontaneous

Leadership Response
to Domestic Conflict
Government Response
to Domestic Conflict
Conflict International

Organized/Deliberate

Disorganized/Spontaneous

Organized/Deliberate

Disorganized/Spontaneous

Organized/Deliberate

Disorganized/Spontaneous

Leadership Response
to International
Conflict
Government Response
to International
Conflict

Organized/Deliberate

Disorganized/Spontaneous

Organized/Deliberate

Disorganized/Spontaneous

The second and third data collection points will address the head of state and the
governance structure during the period of the study. Both of these sections are brief in
scope but specific in the characteristics sought. The study seeks to determine if the
leadership and the governance structure exhibited habitual personality characteristics.
Are they organized or disorganized in their approach to governing? Do they act on
impulse, or are their actions calculated? Are they rigid in their thinking, or do they
display flexibility? In the case of the biographical data of step two, the focus will be
upon the personality of the head of state being examined to determine any potential
characteristics which may have attributed to the cumulative identity of the state as
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theorized, and to compare that personality to the methodology employed during
transitions and conflicts. The same is true of the synopsis of the governance structure.
What the research is looking for is the personality of the government, including its
motivations and ideologies, as a benchmark to determine if during periods of transition
and conflict those ideologies presented any influence upon the events as they unfolded.
The following template (see table 3-2) is representative of the study’s designed
template. This specific template will be used to determine the overall characteristics of
the government and the leadership characteristics as well as situations not dealing with
this specific transitions or conflict. Each subject period will contain two of these
templates, one template specifically evaluating the government and one evaluating the
head the state. The template is designed to elicit the stability and organizational
coefficient of both the government and its head of state. The study understands that in
some government structures, it is difficult to differentiate between a strong head of state
and the government that the head of state controls. However, the study contends that
although a state may exhibit a strong single leader, this does not automatically translate
into an organized or structured governmental system. It is for this reason that the
government and head of state have been separated by two separate templates asking the
same questions. As stated earlier in the summary of methodology, these templates are
only designed to elicit the most rudimentary of findings.
The data of the qualitative historical analysis will next be applied to the second
stage of the research design, profiling templates. As exampled in the following table (see
table 3-2), the data will be code through the application to a series of questions which
will allow for conclusions addressing each element of the profile. Once completed the
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final determination, in the case of the template design will be if the element being coded
was organized or disorganized. Conclusions regarding the final organizational structure
will require a seventy percent score. A template that exhibits neither column presenting
with the seventy percent threshold will be deemed mixed.
Table 3-2
Organized
Existent and Adhered to hierarchy

Disorganized
Rejected Hierarchy

Planned economic policy

Obscure economic policy

Planned foreign policy

Obscure foreign policy

Planned social policy

Obscure social policy

Adherence to economic policy

Abandoned economic policy

Adherence to foreign policy

Abandoned foreign policy

Adherence to social policy

Abandoned social policy

Internal harmony

Internal Conflict

Positive Diplomatic Relations

Negative Diplomatic Relations

Positive constituency opinion

Negative constituency opinion

As can be seen by the template, presented answers to the affirmative signal an
organized structure, while those to the negative suggest disorganization. To better
understand the rationale of why these questions were selected, let us examine each one
individually.


Existent and Adhered to hierarchy – Did the study period exhibit an
accepted political structure, which was accepted by the governance
structure, head of state, and the constituency. Although hierarchies may be
accepted and exist within the government structure, this question seeks to
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determine if elements in fact adhered to the expectations of that structure,
or exhibited resistance.


Planned economic policy - each timeframe being examined exhibits
different economic factors the state must accept and adhere to. This
question seeks to determine if such a policy existed and was in fact is
practical.



Planned foreign policy - as in the case of the economic policy, each
timeframe also exhibits different political factors to which the state must
accept and adhere. This question seeks to determine if such a policy
existed and in fact is practical.



Planned social policy - this question seeks to determine if the government
or the head of state actually exhibited a planned social policy with regards
to the constituency. This question is not to evaluate the social policy or its
merits, but rather to determine if in fact a consistent social ideology was in
place.



Adherence to economic policy - having an economic policy is not the
same as implementing one. The study acknowledges that certain economic
changes can occur during the tenure of a government, and those changes
must be addressed, which may require adjustment of an original economic
policy. However, any adjustment in response to economic factors would
be considered part of an organized economic structure. The question seeks
to determine if an economic policy existed, and did the government and/or
the leadership adhere to this policy?
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Adherence to foreign policy - same rationale as adherence to economic
policy.



Adherence to social policy - same rationale is adherence to economic
policy.



Internal harmony - the internal harmony between government agencies
and structures and the head of state is inherently proportional to the
stability of the organization of the government. Although there will always
be disagreements between heads of state and elected or appointed
legislative branches of government, these disagreements do not signal
disharmony. The answer to this question will be determined by historically
evaluating the internal cooperation between the divisions of government.



Positive Diplomatic Relations – the study acknowledges that to expect
the nation has good diplomatic relations with all neighboring states is
unrealistic. However, in cases where states may be in disagreement, even
to the extent that there is a potential for open conflict, the answer to this
question will be determined by the open dialogue that was maintained
with those states that were allies as well as those states in which there was
a conflict potential. The study contends that states with poor diplomatic
relations, those that do not engage diplomatic dialogue, are inherently
disorganized.



Positive constituency opinion - although the opinion of the government
by the constituency will undergo significant peaks and valleys throughout
the tenure of the government or a head of state, the opinion of the nation’s
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largest population not only signals the stability and organizational power
of the government, but is also a good precursor to determine the potential
of internal domestic conflict. The question seeks to examine an overall
opinion of both the head of state and the government separately.
Following identification of the characteristics of the government structure and the
leadership, the same process is used in the period’s transition dynamic, and the selected
international and domestic conflict experienced during that time period. The study seeks
to determine if the transition and international and domestic conflicts were conducted in
an organized or disorganized manner. Were these conditions deliberate, planned, and
executed with a systematic approach, or is it the case that these events were spontaneous
outcrops, with no deliberate preplanning and exhibiting no systematic forethought? It is
theorized that in the case of deliberate and planned events, these events progress over
time, and through their deliberate systematic approach develop more slowly. In the case
of the spontaneous event, where there exists no preplanning identifiable systematic
approach, these events are theorized to exhibit impacts more quickly than if deliberate.
The next template (see table 3-3) will be used in determining the organized
coefficient of the transition, government reactions, head of state reactions, and the
structure of the identified domestic international conflicts from each period. It is noted
here that the study recognizes the questions being asked and the level of organized
homogeny being explored is of the most rudimentary of levels. There can be no doubt
that increasing the number of questions would further strengthen the existence of any
political ideological homogeny. The study recognizes its limitations and is not in any way
claiming to be an all-inclusive examination of any of the subjects in which the templates
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are applied. However, as we shall see in chapter 6 in the section regarding future research
potentials, there will be an acknowledgment that this rudimentary study is but the first
building block to a comprehensive future epistemology. The data trees created in this
study could potentially be added upon by future researchers, examining either the overall
subject of the research or individual components used to structure the study. Future
research could also develop more questions to continue the research presented here. The
overall success of the methodology model is dependent upon the ability of future
researchers employing the same methodology utilizing more specific questions to the
templates that would create greater statistically accurate findings with each subsequent
study employed. Although there is a possibility of epistemology saturation at some point,
regarding a specific research topic, that eventuality is not a consideration here.
It should be noted that not all element of the template will be applicable to all
conflicts and transitions. Elements which are not relevant to the event being research will
remain blank. However the criteria for conclusion will remain at seventy percent, of the
categories determined applicable for the research to determine the event exhibits the
organizational classification concluded.
Table 3-3
Organized
Reaction/Event Planned
Reaction/Event Measured
Reaction/Event Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Reaction/Event: Peaceful
Reaction/Event: Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Reaction/Event Goal Orientated

Disorganized
Reaction/Event Spontaneous
Reaction/Event Disproportional
Reaction/Event Coordinated No
Offense Reactionary
Defense Reactionary
Reaction/Event: Aggressive
Reaction/Event: General Response
Lost Ideological Perspective
Reaction/Event Lack of Goal
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The template above (see table 3-3) represents the evaluation of events, such as
transitions and domestic and international conflicts, for their consistency of structure.
From the reaction standpoint, the template is designed to determine if the response to the
event was conducted in an organized systematic fashion, or if there was a spontaneous,
disorganized response to a crisis.


Reaction/Event Planned
o Reaction – Was the response to the event by the government or
head of state pre-planned? Or was response to the event by the
government or head of state was reactionary and therefore driven
by the event?
o Event – Was the event pre-planned? In regards to the event, this is
actually questioning whether or not the event was a creation of a
situation that existed for an extended period of time, or in fact was
in response to conditions that were relatively recent.



Reaction/Event Measured
o Reaction – this question seeks to determine if the government or
head of state response to the event was proportional to the
conditions created by the event.
o Event – the concept of measured for the event is with regards to
the transition or the conflicts appropriate level of application
regarding the event or conflicts goal in a consideration necessary
regarding the potential responses from the government or head of
state.
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Reaction/Event Coordinated
o Reaction – did someone control the response, and if so whom?
o Event – did the event or conflict have an established leader, and
did that leader in fact coordinate the conducting of the event?



Offense Planned
o Reaction -was any offensive action taken by the government or a
head of state was that action preplanned?
o Event -was any offensive action taken by the event participants and
its leadership was that offensive action preplanned?



Defense Planned
o Reaction – was any defensive action taken by the government or a
head of state was that defensive action preplanned?
o Event –was any defensive action taken by the event participants
and its leadership was that defensive action preplanned?



Reaction/Event: Aggression
o Reaction – did the government or head of state address the event in
aggressive or otherwise violent manner?
o Event -was the conducting of the event by the participants or the
leadership of the event conducted in an aggressive or otherwise
violent manner?



Reaction/Event: Targeted
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o Reaction – was the reaction by the government or head of state a
focused and targeted response to specific elements participants of
the event?
o Event – was the conducting of the event or conflict specifically
targeted at any direct element of the social or political mechanism
within the state?


Maintained Ideological Perspective
o Reaction – did the government or head of state maintain the
political ideology in its response to the event?
o Event -considering that most events have a political or social
ideology, did the event participants in its leadership maintain that
ideology through the conducting of the event?



Reaction/Event Specific
o Reaction – was there a specific goal in the reaction to the event or
transition in the conducting of the response by the government or
the head of state?
o Event -did the event, conflict, or transition have a specific social,
political, or ideological goal that the event participants and/or its
leadership wished to promote?

It would be reasonable to expect the response to these events by the leadership or
government would exhibit the same characteristic consistent with each. Therefore, the
next set of data examination points examines the responses to the events and evaluates
the government and leadership response to these events to search for a homogony
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consistent with their discovered characteristic trait. Does the characteristic of the event
change the characteristic of the respondent? Or is it the case that regardless of the event
characteristic, the respondent’s response is consistent with their behavioral traits?
The study first examines the characteristics of the leadership in the government to
determine if it is the general propensity of each to be either organized or disorganized.
The question is, do the government and its leaders have the tendency to act in a deliberate
and organized manner, or in a more prone disorganized and spontaneous action? Some
might argue that it is potentially possible to be organized and spontaneous or
disorganized and deliberate. It is also arguable that both the government and
government’s leader can exhibit both organized and disorganized traits which are solely
dependent upon the issues in which they are presented.
The study acknowledges that this possibility is not only valid, but completely
consistent with normal human behavior. The application of the characteristic template to
the government structure and the leadership is designed to make a general impression
from which comparisons to the other elements can be made. If the data presents the study
with a condition in which the leadership exhibits disorganized or spontaneous
propensities, yet the government system is found to exhibit organized or a deliberate
approach, a disassociation between the two has been found. Identifying this
disassociation, we can look to the responses to the transition and international and
domestic conflicts, and see if the responses to those incidents were either organized or
disorganized, thereby potentially identifying which factor, government or leadership, was
most influential.
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It must be understood that the questions presented in these two templates are only
a sample of potential questions which may be asked in the final templates that are created
for the study. The actual questions that will be asked will be determined following the
research gathering of the first study time period, the monarchy period of Peter the Great,
as these historic cases will form the benchmark control for the remainder of the study.
Following the gathering of the historical data for all the anticipatory elements that the
study shall use for that era, the actual questions will be created and applied to the control
to determine the benchmark conditions for which the other eras shall be measured. The
study does expect that the questions being presented in this chapter are in fact a
reasonable representation of the questions that will be actually used in the conducting of
the study. However, the study does reserve the right to alter questions to better facilitate
formulating practical and appropriate questions which are in line with a historiography
school of thought, which will be the source of the data. Since research cannot be
conducted until after proposal defense and IRB approval, the ability of this study to
solidly formulate any questions that would be appropriate to the chosen school of
historical thought cannot be accomplished, as it may be considered data collection prior
to approval.
In this study, each characteristic template is designed to discover only one
overriding characteristics of the subjects in question, which is organization. The
application of the data in an orderly and systematic manner to the template presents the
study with results that exhibit either a positive or negative finding. For the purpose of this
study, each template is designed to elicit a rudimentary characteristic phenomenon,
organized or disorganized, response from each specific element of the overall study. This
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theoretical model is designed under the dichotomy of behavioral science profiling,
because “If a crime scene has organized characteristics (determined by a group study of
shared scene traits), it is reasoned that the offender must also be organized and share the
characteristics of other organized offenders (determined by group study examining shared
offenders)” (Turvey, 2008, p. 85). Relating this theory to the study’s components, if the
conflict (crime scene), either domestic or international, is deliberate and or organized,
then either the leadership or governance (offenders) or both should be organized.
The collective historical data will then be applied to individual templates which
are specific to the group elements being evaluated. The overall structure of the templates
and general design was taken from Turvey’s (2008) criminal profile manual (p.85), and
subsequently credited to Ressler and Burgess (1985). A copy of these templates (see table
3-5) is represented below (Turvey, 2008, pp. 84 – 85; Ressler & Burgess, 1985):

Table 3-4
Psychopathic (Organized) Crime Scene
Characteristics
Offense planned

Psychotic (Disorganized) Crime Scene
Characteristics
Offense Spontaneous

Victim is a targeted stranger

Victim or location known

Personalizes victim
Control conversation
Crime scene reflects overall control
Demand submissive victim
Restraints used
Aggressive acts before death
Body hidden
Weapon/evidence absent
Transports Victim

Depersonalizes victim
minimal conversation
crime scene random and sloppy
sudden violence to victim
minimal restraints used
sexual acts after death
body left in plain view
evidence/weapon often present
Body Left at the Scene

The study will clarify here that findings which support either organized or
disorganized are not intended to infer that the subject is either psychopathic or psychotic.
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These psychological terms are used in criminal profiling and are of no consequence to the
research being conducted in this study. Instead, the study will focus upon the
classifications of organized versus disorganized as the rudimentary behavioral
characteristic that is being explored. No inference should be made regarding any subject
component of the study to the criminal profiling technique of combining organized
offenders or crime scenes with psychopathic offender characteristics, or that a finding of
disorganized in any way refers to the subject matter as psychotic. The template presented
here is done so in its original form, without alteration, as an example of the design, not as
a contention that the study will attempt to make any psychological evaluations or
comparisons of the subject of the study.
It should be noted here that Turvey (2008) does not agree with the
inductive/nomothetic profiling approach: “The author does not agree with or advocate the
use of the organized and disorganized dichotomy. That is because it is a false dichotomy,
arising from mistaken ideas about the developmental nature of criminal behavior and the
role of crime construction” (Turvey, 2008, p. 85). For the purpose of criminal profiling,
the study agrees with this statement. The organized and disorganized dichotomy for the
purpose of being an all-inclusive identification of a person’s psychic makeup is too
rudimentary to provide valid results. In this context, behavioral science, organized versus
disorganized characteristics, are divided into the more clinical psychopathic versus
psychotic categories. However, as it is used in the study, the determination of whether or
not the government or a leader of a nation can be characterized by actions as organized
and disorganized is not an attempt to elicit or propose an overall psychiatric profile. As
presented in the study, the delineation between organized and disorganized speaks more
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to the methodology of the subject, in the broadest overall context, in which the study is
able to measure, gauge the actions of the subject in response to events.
The study continues with the templates being individually evaluated for
homogony, through the evaluation of the template findings for a preponderance of
characteristic responses will point to a specific characteristic in each individual case.
This homogony, if existent, will be evaluated across the common subject groups,
leadership, governance, and social/political transition events, to evaluate and discover if
any group homogony that may exist. The specific groups will be assigned a statistical
representation of characteristic homogony, or lack thereof, through a comparison of
template data and the evaluation of correlating responses. A quantified percentage value
will be assigned to any discovered homogony as reflected in the data from both
individual subject data and common group data. The higher the percentage of
homogenous data found, the higher the homogony value, or the characteristic strength,
within the subject or subject group. This methodology is being employed to discover one
specific characteristic trait of each of the study’s individual components as a
methodology to employ behavioral science characteristics to governance structures and
transition events, with the leadership group as a control. The data from the individual and
group evaluations will then be measured for correlation against the second data sets,
which will evaluate the response by the individual subjects and subject groups, to
determine if homogony of responses exist and if there is any correlating characteristic
which may have an effect upon the response to the events presented.
The study also recognizes that the theoretical culmination of behavioral traits did
not begin with the Monarchal reign of Peter I, the point at which the data collection
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begins. For the purpose of the study, this period selection as a starting point offered a
period with transitional, conflict, and structural conditions from which to observe
behavioral characteristics and compare them to the other periods of the study. The study
does not contend that behavioral characteristics or the culmination of event experiences
theorized as cumulative began in this period. Nor does the study, through its exclusion,
propose that periods in between the eras selected possessed no influencing factors from
which the Russian identity evolved. The period selection was deliberate and conditioned
upon certain elements of the period which met the criteria of the study’s design.
The study continues with the third element of the research design, comparative
historical analysis. Templates from both periods will be compared to the templates of
like elements. Head of State v Head of State, Transition v Transition, etc. The
comparison of templates designed to determine any similar characteristics that are
exhibited in both periods. This side by side comparison seeks to also evaluate causal
mechanisms that may have been identified in the historical data collection. The
predominant basis for the conclusions will be garnered from this step of the research
design. The cumulating of data found in all previous steps of the research will be
evaluated for homogony, personality characteristics consistently seen in both periods and
behavioral characteristics also exhibited in both periods.
To better illustrate characteristic relationships between elements of each study
era, the research will also employ a modified version of the big five personality trait
model (see table 3-4). In the 1980s Lewis Goldberg reintroduced the big five personality
trait model (Goldburg, 1981). Although the big five model does not address the factors
that cause personality traits in humans, for the purpose of the study, the modified version
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that will be employed simply looks to identify characteristics which could be considered
consistent throughout each era. The study recognizes that when the big five personality
trait model is employed with regards to human beings, different factors such as age,
gender, and education, to name a few factors, will have influence upon the model’s final
results. However, since the modified model being used by the study is being employed to
simply show relational values to generalized traits exhibited by the elements examined,
the study finds the use of the modified model is a helpful tool to illustrate similarities
during the studies historical periods.
Table 2-5
Trait
Char.

Openness to
experience
Inventive
curious vs.
consistent
cautious

Conscientiousness Extraversion
Efficient
organized vs.
easy-going
careless

Outgoing
energetic vs.
solitary
reserved

Agreeableness
Friendly
Compassionate
vs.
analytical
detached

Neuroticism
Sensitive
nervous vs.
secure
confident

The methodology in this study follows the progression of different research
questions framed in chapter 1 and is based upon the research hypotheses. However, the
success of the research is not dependent upon the validation or rejection of any proposed
hypothesis. Validation or rejection of the study’s hypotheses is considered only a
byproduct, although a potentially beneficial byproduct, of the methodology validity
process. The success of the research is based upon the study’s ability to progress through
the research questions and evaluate the effectiveness of the methodology of nation-state
behavioral profiling. Therefore, the process under which the conducting of the research
is designed was created in such a manner that the research only moved forward to the
next research question following the successful answering of the previous question.
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In this study, validating the application of the methodology’s appropriateness as a
tool for identifying new information regarding the subject is the first goal. As indicated
in the first research question, is historical behavioral profiling a valid methodology that,
when employed, creates deeper understanding of the conflict? In basic terms, is the
method valid and does it actually work? In the context of the question, although the
application of almost any methodology is theoretically possible to any problem, in a
qualitative case study the goal is to elicit answers that are practically useful. Algebra as a
methodology could be theoretically applied to making a ham sandwich; however, the
application of algebra to the construction of the sandwich would probably not create any
useful or practical information. The key to the first research question is if the application
of forensic analytical conflict profiling creates a deeper understanding of conflict with
practical application value.
The determination of success or failure of the methodology’s application validity
to elicit practical useful data, in this case and with this specific subject, is therefore first
gauged by the second research question; is the application of historical behavioral
conflict profiling valid in determining national homogony in conflict? The study
hypothesizes that such a homogony exists; however, the validity of the application of the
methodology is not contingent upon the existence of this hypothesized homogony, but
rather if the methodology has the ability to reasonably confirm or deny the homogeny’s
existence. The hypothesis is only a benchmark in determining the methodology’s
validity. The positive finding of a homogony is necessary for the study to consider
research questions 2-4, as these questions are created to further explore the phenomenon
if a positive finding of homogony is found.
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If in the event homogony is discovered, questions 2-4 are intended to elicit deeper
understand of the phenomenon and its effect on the subject. Question 3 looks to
determine if the methodology is capable of defining characteristics of phenomenon. If
Russia, over the course of its history, has maintained a historically observable ideological
homogony, thereby exhibiting a consistent national ideology toward international and
domestic relations and conflict engagement, even during times of social/political
transitions, then what characteristics does this homogony exhibit? Designed into the
methodology are behavioral measures tailored and redefined to be appropriate to large
groups rather than the individual, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter. It is
believed that if this specific phenomenon’s traits can be determined through the
methodology’s exploratory techniques, the other phenomena’s traits could also be
susceptible to the methodology.
Question 4 looks to measure the methodology’s ability to gauge the discovered
homogeny’s relationship to a separate hypothesized theory, which is that major
social/political transitions should disrupt existing homogenies, during periods of conflict
that historically social and political transitions. The question asks if periods of transition
affect a nation’s homogony toward conflict. Do periods of transition affect a nation’s
homogony toward conflict, if such a homogony exists? In this case, the study utilizes the
primary template findings and measures them against the secondary template related to
transition to discover if a correlation exists. This is the first application of two template
findings in a comparative function to determine if the existence of a homogeny is affected
by the transition. With a diverse set of transitions being studied over the time periods of
the study, this comparative dynamic could determine mathematically if a specific type of
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transition has more influence upon the discovered homogony, or if all transitions exhibit
the same level effect on the homogony.
Question 2 looks to determine if the social political structure of the Russian
government or historic era the study is examining exhibits any effect upon any existing
homogeny that has been discovered. The study recognizes that each of the participants in
the research maintain different social and political structures within Russia and its
government. Do these factors have any influence over the hypothesized homogeny, or do
in fact the homogeny continue to maintain its ideology regardless of these factors?
Another research question queries the same response in regards to the social transition to
determine its effects on Russia’s conducting of international and domestic affairs. Does
social transition exhibit any influence over these two separate policy areas, or is no
influence found?
The final four questions, can the identification of this homogony contribute to a
more detailed model with which to predict future Russian actions and can this new
information be used to create proactive conflict mitigation, will be a subjective
assessment of the studies ability to produce practical information regarding the subject.

Ethics Precautions
The ethical considerations and precautions in the study are fairly straightforward.
Since this is a historical case study in which we utilize accepted historical accounts of
events and the subjects that participated in those events, and considering that of the two
human subjects the study examines, one is a historical figure long since deceased, so
there is no fear of an ethical violation regarding this human subjects. In the case of the
second human subject, Vladimir Putin, the current president Russia, biographical data
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and responses to events will be gathered from published biographical text and current
immediate reports. From the standpoint, the only remaining living human subject also has
little or no potential to create an ethical dilemma for the study. Nevertheless, as with all
new theoretical models of data analysis, there is a consideration of the unethical use of
the methodology. This consideration, however, is not proprietary to this or any other
study which attempts to elicit new data regarding subjects. It is therefore the researcher’s
opinion that the conducting and methodology of the study presented offers little or no
ethical dilemmas which must be guarded against.
There is, however, one area of concern regarding ethics and the conducting of the
study. Since the study’s primary goal is to determine the validity of the methodology and
if it is an acceptable procedure for garnering new information, the study must guard
against finding validity where no validity exists. It is the researcher’s responsibility to
gauge and objectively subject the methodology’s validity to a rigorous litmus test before
validity can be acknowledged. The study must remain conscious and vigilant of claiming
relationships. Therefore, with regards to determining the validity of the methodology, the
study will engage in what is commonly considered in legal proceedings as the reasonable
man test. Res ipsa loquitur, or the concept of “the thing speaks for itself,” will be the
guiding principle for the analysis of the methodology’s validity.
The study believes that it has already addressed the potential of bias being
introduced into the research to the writings of this historians from which the case studies
will be conducted. By embracing one school of historical thought, and ensuring that the
historical data from which the study will conduct its examination presents the most
unbiased and factual account of the events and subjects within the inquiry, this presents
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the best method for the research to eliminate any ethical dilemmas in regards to the data
collection and subsequent analysis.
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Chapter 4: Research Data
Introduction
The first historical period the study will begin its case study with is the monarchal
period during the reign of Peter I, otherwise known as Peter the Great. The
historiography is not directly about Czar Peter I, nor the other heads of state identified in
the research design. As is the case with the other periods examined, referencing the
examination period by directly acknowledging the head of state during the period gives
the study its period reference. Although the study will examine the head of state for
characteristics that attributed to the nation-states cumulative personality, the focus is
upon the transitions and conflicts from the time period and how the secondary elements,
such as governance structure and head of state, addressed these events.
The structure of the research historiography will be the same for each time period
examined:
1. A brief synopsis of the period and the research subjects place within the
timeline.
2. A brief historical biography focused upon the head of state during the time
period. The study will pay special attention to the leader’s behavioral
characteristics and personality.
3. A brief synopsis of the governance structure and any pertinent behavioral
characteristics generally attributed to them at the time.
4. A detailed history and description of the transitions that affected the state and
occurred during the period
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5. A detailed description and history of the domestic conflict in which the state
was engaged during the period
6. A detailed description and history of the international conflict in which the
was state engaged during the period
7. A detailed examination of how the secondary elements (Head of State and
Government) engaged the conflicts and transitions.
8. A chart identifying discovered personality or behavioral traits found in the
engagement by the secondary elements.
The brief biography and synopsis outlined in 1-3 are presented in the research as a
reference point into the different social environments that were present at the time. They
are not meant to be all inclusive historical accounts, but rather brief examples of society
during the time being researched. In the case of the biographical data, the focus will be
upon the personality of the head of state being examined to determine any potential
characteristics which may have attributed to the cumulative identity of the state as
theorized, and to compare that personality to the methodology employed during
transitions and conflicts. The same is true of the synopsis of the governance structure.
What the research is looking for is the personality of the government, including its
motivations and ideologies, as a benchmark to determine if during periods of transition
and conflict those ideologies presented any influence upon the events as they unfolded.
The study also recognizes that the theoretical culmination of behavioral traits did
not begin with the Monarchal reign of Peter I. For the purpose of the study, this period
selection as a starting point offered an era with transitional, conflict, and structural
conditions from which to observe behavioral characteristics and compare them to the
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other periods of the study. The study does not contend that behavioral characteristics or
the culmination of event experiences theorized as cumulative began in this period. Nor
does the study, through its exclusion, propose that periods in between the eras selected
possessed no influencing factors from which the Russian identity evolved. As outlined in
chapter 3, the period selection was deliberate and conditioned upon certain elements of
the epoch which met the criteria of the study’s design.
It should be further understood that the historical data is examined for the purpose
of forming a conclusion that can be applied to the study’s templates. The research data
section of the study is not designed to be an all-inclusive historical account of any subject
contained herein. Rather, the study looks to specifically answer personality questions as
presented in the study’s templates for which a conclusion is sought to be drawn. All
attempts have been made to mitigate the historical author’s personal opinions from the
data being considered.

The Monarchal Period (Peter I: 1696 – 1725)
Profile of the Period
Prior to the reign of Peter I, Russia presented to the rest of the world the land
which the renaissance had forgotten. Despite its vast land mass, innumerable natural
resources and indomitable terrain, Russia, in the eyes of the powers of Western Europe at
the time, presented a poor backward nation with little influence in world affairs and even
less potential for change. As Voltaire wrote, speaking of the Russians pre- Peter I, “They
were in possession of the most extensive dominions in the universe, and yet everything
was wanted against them. At length Peter was born, and Russia became a civilized state.”
(Voltaire, 1845, p. 48). Russia lagged behind the rest of “civilized” Europe in technology,
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trade, education, and the accepted social fashions of the times. With consideration to
Russia’s great land mass and geographic location, cultural and societal comparisons to
China and India, the ancient and established societies of Asia, were the norm.
Comparisons to Europe were less common, as the cultural differences between Russia
and Europe were believed too dramatic. This notion dominated provincial thinking and
was as much a product of the xenophobic isolation Russia maintained as it was European
arrogance. To its contemporaries, Russia was more a mystery of Asia than a European
cousin.
Russian xenophobia was evident as “most Muscovites, from the conservative
boyars who rubbed shoulders with them to the peasants who rarely encountered one,
regarded foreigners as dangerous heretics, and viewed four novelties and fashions with
intense suspicion even terror.” (Hughes, 1998, p. 4). This xenophobic attitude would
become an important factor when we consider the major transition experienced during
this era of Russian history. Much of this backwardness attributed to an almost prejudiced
attitude toward the outside world. “During the reign of Peter’s immediate predecessors,
foreigners were still in Russia on sufferance, tolerated as a necessary evil.” (Hughes,
1998, p. 4). Russia remained steeped within its tradition, wary of new concepts and
ideas. So influential was this intolerant ideology that the Russian government enacted
laws to prevent contact by its people through travel. “Russian culture was prevented from
falling further under foreign influence by strict controls. For example, publishing and
printing remain firmly in the hands of the church.” (Hughes, 1998, pp. 4-5). The
propagation of the xenophobic attitude that the Russian people adopted toward foreigners
was as much a product of the Russian Orthodox Church as it was the government
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hierarchy. The church was so dominant in internal Russian affairs during this era that “it
is a striking statistic that in the whole of the 17th century fewer than 10 secular titles came
off Muscovite presses, which were devoted mainly to the production of liturgical and
devotional text.” (Hughes, 1998, p. 5).
“The more civilized a country is, the better it is peopled. Thus China and India
are more populous than any other empires, because, after a multitude of revolutions …,
these two nations made the earliest establishment of civil society…” (Voltaire, 1845, p.
33). Voltaire’s evaluation of the Russian people and their society reflects the dismissive
attitude regarding Russia that prevailed in the courts of Europe. “The most valuable
service that Peter performed for his country was to transform it from a maligned nation…
engaged in mainly fending off the attacks of its neighbors, to a world power with a proactive role in international politics.” (Hughes, 1998, p. 21). The Russia prior to the
period studied, in the contemporary world’s view, was in many ways very different from
the Russia that would follow.
This is the nation-state of Russia as it was prior to the conflicts and transitions
which the study will examine. Russia presented a technologically backward, socially
inept, relatively poor nation in comparison to the rest of the world. All the advantages
offered in the arts and sciences of the renaissance period, including technological,
economical, and social, were relatively ignored within the Russian nation-state. “There
were no Russian printed new sheets, journals or almanacs; no plays, poetry or philosophy
in print, although this lack was partially compensated by popular literature in manuscript,
a flourishing oral tradition.” (Hughes, 1998, p. 5). Russia was so averse to foreign ideas
and influence that in 1675, Czar Alexis decreed “courtiers are forbidden to adapt foreign
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German and other customs, to cut the hair on their heads and to wear robes, tunics and
hats of foreign design, and they are to their bid their servants to do so.” (Hughes, 1998, p.
5).
However, this picture of Russia would evolve during the study period. It is for
this reason that the study begins during this period. Although resistance to modernization
and Europeanism within the upper echelon of Russian society, and across all levels of
Russian society, would remain long after Peter’s death, it is arguable that the foundations
of modern Russia emerged during this period. During the short time frame examined,
Russia underwent a transitional period that saw an enlightenment of society. “The
Russians came very late, but the arts having been introduced amongst them in their full
perfection, it has happened, that they have made more progress in fifty years, than any
other nation had done before them in five hundred.” (Voltaire, 1845, p. 33). Voltaire’s
evaluation not only speaks of the arts, but also the society as a whole, as Russia embraced
European ideas and customs.
Demographically, Russia during this period was based upon a class system not
unlike the feudal system of Europe. Voltaire’s evaluation of the population of Russia
showed a culture steeped in feudal servitude. Voltaire calculated Russia’s population
from tax records of the time, showing a population of 6.6 million inhabitants. Of these,
nearly 6 million were bondsmen (slaves) to the crown or noble land owners. (Voltaire,
1845, pp. 34-35). “To this number we may add the military list, which amounts to three
hundred and fifty thousand men: besides, neither the nobility nor clergy, who are
computed at two hundred thousand, are subject to this capitation.” (Voltaire, 1845, p. 35).
The class breakdown of Russian society is important to understanding the magnitude of
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the transitions that will be examined in the conflicts that were experienced by Russia
during this era. Also of importance is understanding the sheer size and scope of the vast
Russian Empire. With much of its land considered almost uninhabitable, the borders of
the Russian nation-state touched a wide range of differing cultural areas. From the Nordic
states, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, the ancient influences of other cultures was
evident and could quite well be the determining factor to the xenophobic attitudes so
evident during Peter’s reign. “The customs, diets, and manners of the Russians, ever bore
a greater affinity to those of Asia than to those of Europe.” (Voltaire, 1845, p. 39).
As presented here in this brief overview of Russian society, the characteristics of
that society will assist with putting the transitions and conflicts of the era into
perspective. From a behavioral standpoint, general Russian society presents us with an
interesting profile. The late 17th and early 18th century societal profile shows a religiously
devout people firmly under the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. This devotion
to church and cultural traditions led to a state of almost obsessive xenophobic attitudes.
The Russian people, along with the secular and religious hierarchies, present as
distrustful isolationists with a tendency toward rigidity. The class structure, as exhibited
during the era, presents a majority of the population that is submissive to both church and
state, while possessing no documented examples of inquisitiveness. The population is
largely uneducated and agrarian. For the common man, concerns regarding international
affairs were furthest from the mind. The majority of the Russian population was trapped
in a feudal system, beholden to an aristocracy, more concerned with survival than
reformation. Whereas the new Czar was interested in promoting the international
influence of the Russian state, and reforming the social structure of the nation to more
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contemporary conditions, the aristocracy and church were more supportive of
maintaining the status quo. The following chart represents the conclusions regarding the
majority of the Russian people. The Czar, aristocracy, and church will be evaluated later.

Table 3-1
Trait

Char.

Period
Evaluation

Openness
to
experience
Inventive
curious vs.
consistent
cautious

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Neuroticism

Efficient
organized vs.
easy-going
careless

Outgoing
energetic vs.
solitary
reserved

Sensitive
nervous vs.
secure
confident

Cautious

N/A

Solitary
Reserved

Friendly
compassionate
vs.
analytical
detached
Detached

Nervous

As shown in the Big 5 model of behavioral characteristics, Russia depicts a
society adverse to new experiences and cautious of outside influences. Their general
tendency to xenophobia signifies a solitary and reserved society, which strengthens the
conclusion regarding the societal openness. The society is not analytical and the
aforementioned xenophobia makes them detached from the outside world. The class
structure exhibited by Russian society in this era also signals the detachment of the
majority of the population through their servitude. No documentation would indicate
from the society as a whole a feeling of security or confidence. In regards to
conscientiousness, no classification was rendered, as none of the characteristics could be
justified through the historical records of the examined era.
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Bio of Peter the Great
The era is understandably known for the charismatic leader who originated the
transitions of the period. The biographical data regarding Peter I is extremely consistent
throughout the historical records and perspectives. The consensus of the historical data is
almost unanimous in its conclusion that Peter I was not only the father of modern Russia,
but that his actions also transformed Europe from that point forward (Anisimov, 1993;
Bushkovitch, 2001; Hughes, 1998; Oliva, 1970; Voltaire, 1845). The accomplishments of
Peter I created the resulting transitions and conflicts which will be addressed in later
sections. For the purpose of this section, the examination will focus upon the man himself
and the personality and behavioral traits historically agreed upon as dominant factors.
Peter I, although uneducated, was nevertheless inventive and curious, (Voltaire,
1845) supporting the openness to new experiences conclusions in the big 5 model. The
extent of his unbounded energy is unanimously agreed upon by current historians and by
Peter’s contemporaries. Much of the big five conclusions made by the study are based
upon the accounts not only regarding his physical features, but also the manner in which
he fully engaged himself to subjects not traditionally considered worthy of a monarch.
“Peter the Great, this figure who drew such contradictory responses, was a man of
gigantic physical size and a ruler of enormous energy and ambition. He stood almost 7
feet tall and possessed immense physical strength and vigor” (Critchlow, 2001).
However, beyond Peter’s physically dominating appearance, the manner in which
he engaged himself in not only affairs of state, but also the trades of technology, were
from which knowledge and his policies of Europeanism would spring. “In his 36 year
reign, he involved himself personally and all affairs of state, diplomacy, administration,
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justice, finance, industry, and education (Critchlow, 2001). Peter’s involvement in these
aspects of national interest garnered mixed reviews from his contemporaries.
However, the czar’s thirst for knowledge beyond the borders of the Russian
Empire is undeniable. “As a self-taught man he learned to speak Dutch and German
while becoming familiar with several other languages. In addition, he learned some 20
different trades from shoemaking to shipbuilding” (Critchlow, 2001). Regardless of
Princess Dashkova’s scathing opinion of Peter’s temperament, by all historic counts the
czar understood the importance of hands-on training. “He was an accomplished military
and naval commander. In this capacity, he studied the art of military and naval science,
serving first in the ranks and learning the use of each weapon before promoting himself
as an officer” (Critchlow, 2001; Bushkovitch, 2001).
From these historical accounts, the study makes its conclusions regarding Peter in
the big five model. The study determines that the historical records confirm that Peter the
Great was inventive and curious, outgoing and energetic, secure and confident. His
confidence and security was as much a product of his physical size as his understanding
of his position in Russian society (Bushkovitch, 2001) (Critchlow, 2001) (Hughes, 1998).
Peter’s commitment to learning 20 different trades and involving himself in all aspects of
Russian governance is one of the factors, from which the study makes the conclusion that
the czar, was analytical. In regards to the czar’s conscientiousness, the research considers
the aforementioned evaluation of Princess Dashkova. It must be remembered that Peter
was a product of the monarchal society. Peter was born into a family of wealth, position,
and the inherent free time to explore whims and passions that those two advantages
provide. His position in society and the inherent vices that go with it may be attributing
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factors to Dashkova’s evaluation of Peter’s ignorance. They might also attribute to the
accounts of Peter’s advancement of his policies without consideration of consequences
(Critchlow, 2001; Hughes, 1998; D. Wilson, 2009). This disregard for consequences, for
which Peter showed a propensity, was the factor that led to the conclusion by the study
that the czar exhibited a personality trait of recklessness.

Table 4-2
Trait

Openness to
experience

Char.

Inventive
curious vs.
consistent
cautious

Peter I

Inventive
Curious



Conscientiousness Extraversion

Agreeableness

Efficient
organized vs.
easy-going
careless

Outgoing
energetic vs.
solitary
reserved

Friendly
compassionate
vs.
analytical
detached

Careless

Outgoing
Energetic

Analytical

Neuroticism
Sensitive
nervous vs.
secure
confident

Secure
Confident

Existent and Adhered to hierarchy
o Within Russia during this era, the power of the czar rested in the hands
of the aristocracy.
o At the beginning of his reign, power was shared with his half-brother
Ivan (D. Wilson, 2009; Bushkovitch, 2001).
o During this period, the monarchy underwent power struggles
emanating from Peter’s half-sister Sofia (Bushkovitch, 2001). Shifts in
power and influence were common to Russian politics of the time.
o The strength and influence of the position of czar was only increased
during the reign of Peter the Great as the influence of the aristocracy
declined in favor of a more centralized power structure.
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o

Peter’s understanding of this hierarchy and his adherence to it were
critical factors in the creation of a governance structure with the czar
as undisputed head (Bushkovitch, 2001).

o Peter understood the hierarchy of his governance structure and adhered
to it.


Planned economic policy, planned foreign policy, planned social policy
o Peter I involved himself in all aspects of state politics.
o His social policy of Europeanism for the Russian state was as much an
economic and foreign policy as it was an internal social policy.



Adherence to economic policy, adherence to foreign policy, adherence to
social policy
o Peter’s policy of Europeanism for the Russian state guided not only his
social policy but also the policies of economics and foreign relations.
o His commitment to these policies is confirmed by his adherence to
advancement of Russian throughout his reign (Bushkovitch, 2001;
Oliva, 1970; Hughes, 1998; Voltaire, 1845).



Internal harmony, positive constituency opinion
o Most of the aristocracy did not enthusiastically embrace Peter’s desire
for Europeanism. Many of the aristocracy feared the more monarch
centric governance structures of the European powers.
o This fear was flamed by the knowledge that a more powerful central
monarch led to declines in the influence of the aristocracy.
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o The mixed reaction to Peter’s policies by those below the status of the
social elite was as much a product of the Russian Orthodox Church’s
opposition to allowing the heretical ideas of Catholicism within
Russian borders as it was with the specific policies themselves
(Hughes, 1998; Voltaire, 1845).
The Russian writer Michael Kheraskov “captures the heroic, Christ like
redeeming qualities of Peter the reformer” (Critchlow, 2001), whereas Princess Catherine
Dashkova (1744 – 1810), express a less flattering view of the czar as “quick-tempered,
brutal, despotic, he treated all without this distinction like slaves who had to bear
everything; his ignorance prevented him from seeing that some innovations that he had
introduced by force would have introduced themselves peacefully given time”
(Critchlow, 2001). Many historians attribute this difference of opinion as a result of
partisanship.


Positive Diplomatic Relations
o It is difficult to quantify the characteristics of the majority of
diplomatic relations during this era.
o The ongoing conflict with Sweden, a major power at the time, and her
allies separates much of the European world into two almost equal
factions, one of which saw Russian relations as good, (her allies), and
the other were those who saw Russian relations as bad, (her enemies).

However, only in the category of diplomatic relations is the characteristic chart
divided in its conclusion. In this category, as indicated, the opinion was mixed.
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The categories that are classified in the chart as disorganized are the relationships
internally and with other branches of the government’s structure, in this case with the
aristocracy, whose motivations were to maintain their power, which the new policies
placed in jeopardy. The majority of the chart, however, shows that in the context of the
study, as a head of state, Peter showed a propensity to be organized (see table 4-3).

Table 4-3
Organized

Disorganized

Existent and Adhered to hierarchy
Planned economic policy
Planned foreign policy
Planned social policy
Adherence to economic policy
Adherence to foreign policy
Adherence to social policy
Internal Conflict
Positive Diplomatic Relations

Negative Diplomatic Relations

Positive constituency opinion

From the behavioral chart (see table 4-3), the study concludes that Peter the Great
exhibited characteristics that would classify him as organized.
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Governance
The governance structure of this era presents a stark contrast to the nation’s new
czar. Much of this contrast is due to the shift in power experienced during the reign of
Peter the Great. “It is said that the sovereign from the beginning wielded his monarchal
power more absolutely than his predecessors” (Strahlenberg, 1985). This transition to a
more absolute monarchy and the decline of the influence of the aristocracy continued in
military and naval statutes. “His Majesty is a sovereign monarch, who is not answerable
to anyone in the world in his affairs, but holds the power and authority to rule his
realms… as a Christian monarch by his own will and good opinion” (Hughes, 1998, p.
92). This shifting, and the caution exhibited by the remaining governing structures of the
Duma and Senate, are the foundation of the big 5 conclusions of personality presented
below. The hierarchy of the government was committed to retaining the “old ways” by
opposing the European influences proposed by the Czar. As their power declined, the
former “legislative” bodies became more detached from governance, although not
entirely by their choice. This detachment and decline, attributed to a reserved position in
their ability to impose their ideas, also was a condition not entirely of their choice, both
of which created an understandably nervous lack of confidence regarding their future
position. However, it is in their cautious or more specifically their adverse approach to
the new social policies of the Czar, as well as their adherence to their consistency in their
opposition, from which the study draws its conclusion that the governance structure was
reckless, and thereby contributed to their own decline and the continued loss of influence
(Hughes, 1998).
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Contrary to the claims of the Princess Dashkova, who resided within the legions of
the aristocracy, which stood to lose much of their power and influence, Peter did show by
all historic accounts an understanding and sensitivity to the concept of despotism
(Hughes, 1998, p. 93). “Yet in some respects Peter was an autocrat by default, in that he
tried to make others take decisions and act independently, to the extent of resorting to
mock delegation and pretending on occasion that he was not czar at all” (Hughes, 1998,
p. 93). “Although rejecting representative institutions, Peter developed bodies from the
Magistrates Chamber of 1699 to the Senate in 1711. Each with a semblance of
independent authority in so far as they were not immediately reliant on the presence of
the czar as was for example, the old-style boyar Duma” (Hughes, 1998).
The big 5 model of the governance structure shows the behavioral traits, as compared
to the rising Czar, as stark opposites, with one chart illustrating the behavior of a rising
power and the other charting the traits of a power in decline.
Table 4-4
Trait

Openness to Conscientiousness Extraversion
experience

Char.

Inventive
curious vs.
consistent
cautious

Governance Consistent

Agreeableness

Efficient
organized vs.
easy-going
careless

Outgoing
energetic vs.
solitary
reserved

Friendly
compassionate
vs.
analytical
detached

Careless

Reserved

Detached

Neuroticism
Sensitive
nervous vs.
secure
confident

Nervous

In regards to the secondary trait model presented in the study, the governance
structure during the reign of Peter the Great presents great inconsistencies with which to
draw conclusions.


Existent and Adhered to hierarchy
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o Historical records are clear that the structure of the time accepted and
adhered to the hierarchal structure even as its structure itself was in
transition.
o Adherence means in so far as the aristocracy continued to accept the
authority of the monarchy, even though the extension of power by
Peter infringed beyond the normal limits of the historical position and
power of past Czars.
o There was, however, considerable opposition to the reformation
policies, most strongly from the Orthodox Church and the reigning
Patriarch.
o Nevertheless, with only portions of the aristocracy willing to oppose
the Czar, and that opposition being ill coordinated and without much
substance, the social reform continued unabated.


Planned economic, foreign, social policy
o The government accepted that a planned foreign and economic policy
existed, which was directly tied into the Czar’s social policy of
Europeanism.
o However, the government’s position, mainly that of the church and the
aristocracy, was in opposition to the modernization and move toward a
more European social order.
o The preferred social, economic, and foreign policy of the aristocracy
and Orthodox Church was predominantly to continue with the methods
and policies of the past that were less challenging to their authority.
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Adherence to economic, foreign, and social policy
o Through their rejection of the social policy, they also in principle
rejected the economic policies.
o Regarding the foreign policy, the government was supportive of the
alliances and war effort during the Great Northern War, taking a more
nationalist approach.
o The conclusion of being disorganized in two of these three areas is
based upon the inability of the legislative bodies of Russia’s
government to present any noticeable opposition to promote the
policies they would support and thereby halt the modernization of
Russian society.



Internal harmony
o This disorganization and the resulting fight by the aristocracy to
maintain power lead to a decline in internal harmony and the general
harmony within the government.
o During this time of transition within the early 18th century, Russian
government cooperation was not a commodity often used.
o As the reformation continued, purging of the “old guard” endured, and
as the aristocrats formerly in positions of power were replaced by
those more favorable to the Czars policies, harmony improved.



Positive Diplomatic Relations
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o During the time of Peter the Great, diplomatic relations, beyond the
relations between the separate factions within Russia, were the
purview of the Czar.


Positive constituency opinion
o The cumulative effect of this internal disarray did not promote positive
opinion by the lower classes within society, who historically had
enough reasons to distrust and despise the aristocracy.
o Once the populace began to understand the reformation’s goals,
support for the modernization increased, while the aristocracy’s
support by the people, already low, continued to dissolve.

Table 4-5
Organized
Existent and Adhered to hierarchy

Disorganized
Rejected Hierarchy
Obscure economic policy

Planned foreign policy
Planned social policy
Abandoned economic policy
Planned foreign policy
Abandoned social policy
Internal Conflict
Positive Diplomatic Relations

Negative Diplomatic Relations
Positive constituency opinion No

From the behavioral chart the study concludes that the governance structure of
Russia during the period of evaluation was predominantly disorganized.
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Transition the Reformation a Russian society

The transition experienced during the reign of Peter the Great was the planned
modernization of Russian society through the introduction of Europeanism. The reforms
proposed were widespread and affected all aspects of Russian society. For the purpose of
this study, the exact specifics of the reforms enacted by Peter the Great are of less
significance than for us to understand the methodology in which the reforms took place.
When we consider the chart below, the questions being answered are a response to the
event itself rather than the elements which precipitated or resisted the event. It is in this
context that we consider the behavioral characteristics chart likened to that of a crime
scene evaluation we would find in criminal profiling. As outlined in chapter 3, the
methodology, when we refer to the charts regarding the transition, international and
domestic conflicts, the response conclusions are an attempt to get a feel for the
progression of the scene with conclusions that might affect the elements of head of state,
and governance is reaction to the unfolding events.


Event Planned
o The event was meticulously planned by the czar and not some
spontaneous outcropping.
o Industrialization and the reform of the serf economy were cornerstones to
Peter’s new Imperial Russia.
o “Building a new state structure was only part of the grandiose task that the
great reformer Russia had set out to accomplish. His field of vision
encompassed not only the administrative structure, economic policy, and
military affairs, but society itself” (Anisimov, 1993, p. 184).
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Event Measured
o The introduction and conduction of the event was well coordinated by the
czar and his supporters and their actions were deliberate and with the full
understanding of the reactions of the potential opponents.



Event Coordinated
o The event was controlled as a transformation of Russia to a more
European style monarchy, and the social structure was conducted over a
period of time and in a very systematic manner.
o They included the overhaul of the economic system traditionally
employed, and even the clerical ranks of the Russian Orthodox Church,
which maintained significant influence over the aristocracy, the czar, and
thereby the state, would not be immune to the Reformation and under the
new Imperial system saw a decline in their power.


“In his opinion the patriarchal system of administering the church
had become ineffective” (Anisimov, 1993, p. 203).



In the eyes of the Reformation, the Russian church could become a
princely system and enjoyed too much autonomy, which was in
contradiction to the autocratic regime in which Peter desire to
create (Anisimov, 1993, p. 204).



Offense/defense Planned
o None applicable.



Event: Aggression
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o Although it is true that in some cases aggressive tactics were used in the
face of opposition, such as the execution of Peter’s son Alexi who was
seen as a potential rallying point for those aristocrats who might harbor
ideas of resistance (Anisimov, 1993) (Bushkovitch, 2001) (Hughes, 1998)
(Voltaire, 1845), the study concludes that this aggression is more
attributable to domestic conflict, which will be examined later.


Event: Targeted
o Each specific aspect of Russian society was targeted, and the ideals of
Reformation were specifically tailored, as in the case of the Reformation
of the Russian church, to transform the institution or societal element into
a social body more desirable to an autocratic system.



Maintained Ideological Perspective
o The Russian transformation owes much of its success to the maintaining
of the ideological perspective from which it began.
o The ideology of the Reformation was to create an all-Russian subject
people much in the design of the European powers.


“Substantial changes came to the nobility’s position” (Anisimov,
1993, p. 184).

o Prior to the great Reformation, the Czar was an elected head of state
selected from the ruling family by the aristocracy.


Members of the aristocracy maintain control over a Russia divided
into separate provinces they governed.
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However, the reforms would change all that: “indeed, the noblest
date of the 18th and 19th centuries, in the form that has come down
to us from literature, was formed or, better, organized by Peter”
(Anisimov, 1993, p. 184).



Event Specific
o There is a significant number of elements to the Russian Reformation of
the late 17th and early 18th centuries.


However, examining each element individually does not promote a
better understanding of the overall characteristics of the event.



For example, the fact that at some point in time during the
Reformation a tax was levied on all males who insisted on
maintaining a beard (Anisimov, 1993; Hughes, 1998; Voltaire,
1845),
o Although an interesting historical fact, does little to
increase our understanding of the general characteristics
which shaped the Great Russian Reformation.

For the Russian Reformation, the progression of the event is historically agreed
upon concerning most of its elements. As exhibited in the chart below, the process of the
Russian Reformation was an extremely organized undertaking.
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Table 4-6
Organized
Planned
Measured
Coordinated

Disorganized

Generally Peaceful
Targeted
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Goal Orientated
The study concludes that from a scene profile standpoint, the transition event
examined is classified as 100% organized.

Domestic Conflict Strel’sty Revolt
In 1698, Russia was embroiled in two separate domestic conflicts conducted
during the absence of the Czar and piloted by regiments of musketeers, or Strel’sty
(Hughes, 1998). Although both revolts were believed to be instigated by the Czar’s halfsister, no evidence was found beyond the Strel’sty position that following the overthrow
of Peter, Sofia would be the obvious choice to replace him and return Russia to the “old
ways” (D. Wilson, 2009, p. 65). The second, and larger, of the two revolts required a
military response from those who remained in Russia during Peter’s absence and were
loyal to the Czar. Voltaire (1845) presents a general account of the revolt; however, that
account has be ignored by the study due to its obvious biased position against the
Strel’sty and its opinionated conclusions as to the reasons and intrigue that Voltaire
associated with the event.


Event Planned/coordinated/measured
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o The revolt was ill planned and was a spontaneous event resulting
from the Czar’s fortuitous absence from Moscow.
o With so many different elements involved in the coup attempt,
from the old guard military to the clergy to the traditionalist
aristocracy, beyond the desire of usurping the Czar there was little
coordination or control of the numerous factions of the event.
o Although the Strel’sty had legitimate grievances regarding arrears
of pay and unusual lengths of service (D. Wilson, 2009, p. 63), the
revolt took shape when combined with the traditionalist elements
of the aristocracy.


Offense Planned
o Once in Moscow, the mutineers had planned to overtake the
Voscrescziniskii monastery, thereby establishing an impregnable
base (D. Wilson, 2009, p. 64).
o This strategy was the extent of their military planning.
o However, following the revolt, the Strel’sty continued to be a thorn
in the Czar’s side.


“Cruel retribution was not enough to suppress the
musketeer’s disaffection. If anything, exasperated it,
especially as, after 1698, they were banned from Moscow
and spread discontent all over Russia” (Hughes, 1998, p.
454).



Defense Planned
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o There is no evidence that preparation was made for defensive
action if resistance occurred before their objective was obtained.
(D. Wilson, 2009).


Maintained Ideological Perspective
o The Strel’sty harbored resentment to the modernization proposed
by the Czar, as the new military order introduced German officers
designated to train and in many cases lead the new Russian
military.
o To the Germans, the Strel’sty was a unit that epitomized the
backwardness of the Russian society: outdated and inefficient.


The new order relegated the Strel’sty to simple guard duty
and little more than servitude to their new German masters.

o Like the aristocracy, this loss of prestige and social standing was a
major factor in the ideology of the revolts.


“During investigations it became clear that musketeers had
vague notions of driving out traders and foreigners,
establishing leaders sympathetic to them, and restoring the
old order under which they, had enjoyed a privileged
position” (Hughes, 1998, p. 454).

o The ideological perspective of the former musketeers would
continue.

157


In July 1705 (Hughes, 1998), a new revolt would emerge
from the same faction, with greater emphasis upon
religious orthodoxy.



Event Specific/targeted
o The goals of the coup, beyond the replacement of Peter, extended
only to the Strel’sty abandonment of their posts and marching upon
the capital.


“In their petitions to the authorities, vows to kill the
Germans who were destroying orthodoxy mingled with
threats to wipe out the new infantry regiments, their
perceived rivals” (Hughes, 1998, p. 454).

Table 4-7
Organized

Disorganized
Spontaneous
Disproportional
Coordinated Not across all Elements

Offense Planned
Defense Reactionary
Aggression
General Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Goal Orientated

From the historical data, the study concludes that the Strel’sty revolts of 1698
were spontaneous in nature, and therefore poorly coordinated and controlled. Although
limited offensive strategies were made, no consideration to defensive strategies existed
prior to the coup’s obtainment of their primary objective of securing the monastery. The
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event was specifically targeted at the reforms of the Czar and continued to maintain, for
the short duration of the revolt, its ideological perspective. From a scene profile
standpoint, this domestic conflict event would be classified as disorganized.

International Conflict the Great Northern War

For the study to focus on one single battle, or even year of the conflict, would
offer conclusions that might skew the evaluation toward an incorrect conclusion. As an
example of the study’s contention that becoming singularly focused upon an individual
event can lead to incorrect conclusions, the study presents the events of the battle of
Narva, as retold by Voltaire (1845). One of the consequences of the reforms to introduce
European ideologies to Russian culture was the Russian defeat at Narva. As was seen in
the domestic conflict, which involved the musketeer regiment revolts, the current Russian
army resented the introduction of European officers into their ranks. In many cases, these
more experienced European officers would be put in positions of authority above the
Russian counterparts. At Narva, with the Russian forces outnumbering the Swedes 10 to
1, this resentment became evident. Following the placement of his army, the Czar quit the
battlefield to attend a conference with allies, at which time shortly thereafter the small
Swedish forces attacked. Surprised by the attack, the Russian army turned on his German
officers and allies. “The duke de Croi attempted to give his orders, but prince Dolgorouki
would not receive them. The Russian officers rose upon the German officers… Every one
abandoned his post; and tumult, confusion, and a panic of terror, spread through the
whole army” (Voltaire, 1845, p. 121). The result of prince Dolgorouki’s insubordination,
coupled with the Russian resentment of their German allies, was a complete and total
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Swedish victory. According to Voltaire (1845), “The Swedish troops had nothing more to
do, but to cut in pieces those who were flying. Some threw themselves into the river
Narva, where great numbers were drowned; others threw down their arms, and fell upon
their knees before the conquering Swedes” (p. 121). This account of the battle, if being
the single focal point for the study’s conclusions, would represent a far different picture
than examination of the overall campaign presents.


Event Planned
o The conducting of the Great Northern War was a very organized
event, meticulously planned by both sides, which possessed
concrete goals and objectives.


Although the study concedes that over the period of a long
protracted conflict, such as the Great Northern War, some
periods existed that exhibited less organized behavior than
at other times, the consensus of historical data clearly
indicates that the Great Northern War, by virtue of its
length and military execution, was an organized affair.

o “Peter’s declaration of war against Sweden in 1700 was not
unheralded. In 1605, a British agent in Stockholm quoted a letter
from Lefort to the effect that two Russian armies were to be
dispatched” (Hughes, 1998, p. 27).


Event Measured
o From the Russian perspective, the entire conflict involved the
recapturing of territories once lost to Sweden that offered access to
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important ports that would further the Czars plan to create Russia’s
first formidable naval force.


“At this very time czar Peter entertained thoughts of seizing
upon Ingria and Carelia. These provinces had formerly
belonged to the Russians, but the Swedes had made
themselves masters of them by force of arms...” (Voltaire,
1845, p. 118).



Event Coordinated
o Throughout the period of the great Northern war, like all extended
conflicts, there are examples of victory and defeat, alliances and
betrayals, and the shifting of advantage which is inherent to all
extended conflicts.
o Due to the volatility of the conditions that were experienced
throughout the conflict period, the data evaluation must be made
and the conclusions drawn from the preponderance of historical
perspectives regarding the overall conducting of the conflict:
No European ruler was a free-agent; each had to take account of the
complex system of alliances and be alert to nuances and sudden changes.
Russia had to join in the concert of nations, come what may, and to that
end, in the course of his reign, Peter entered into diplomatic relations with
virtually all the countries of Europe and some Asian ones too. (Hughes,
1998, p. 27).



Offense/Defense/Aggression
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o According to Hughes (1998), “The bare-bones of the story from
the Russian point of view are condensed” (p. 26)


between the defeat in 1700 at Narva, as outlined above, and



the victory in 1704 at Narva four years later.



Between the battles of Narva came the founding of St.
Petersburg in 1703.



For the Russians, the turning point of the war was the
decisive battle of 1709 at Poltava and the capture of the
ports on the southeastern Baltic shore in 1710.



This followed by the Finnish campaign of 1713-1714 and



finally culminated with the treaty of Nystad in 1721 and the
subsequent end of the war. (Hughes, 1998; Bushkovitch,
2001).



In total, the hostilities of the great Northern war were
engaged in over a period of 18 years.



Event: Targeted
o Like in all long protracted conflicts, the entire conflict cannot be
judged through the lens of a single event, nor, for the purpose of
this study, can the conflict scene be evaluated from only one side
of the conflict.
o When the conclusions regarding a conflict or transition are
evaluated, the study looks at the conflict as an entire event, seeking
a preponderance of action from which conclusions can be drawn.
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One of the principal causes of all the revolutions which happened from
Ingria, as far as Dresden, and which laid waste so many countries for
the space of eighteen years, was the abuse of the supreme power, by
Charles XI. king of Sweden, father of Charles XII. (Voltaire, 1845, p.
118)


Maintained Ideological Perspective
o Hughes (1998) maintains that “The most viable service that Peter
performed for his country was to transform it from a maligned
nation…, engaged mainly in fending off the attacks of its
neighbors, to a world power with a proactive role in international
politics” (p. 21).
o The great Northern war was as much about the obtainment of
respect as it was about the strategic military goals of the conflict.


“Now Denmark, Holland… Saxony, two, and almost all the
German Empire, one spoke and thought ill of the Russian
realm, have changed your bad opinions for the better”
(Hughes, 1998, p. 21).



Event Specific
o “The catalyst for Peter’s decision to attack Sweden was the end of
the war with Turkey” (Hughes, 1998, p. 27).
o “The Austro-Ottoman peace of Karlowitz appeared to leave Russia
out in the cold with only a two year truce and none of the gains
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deemed essential for consolidating the capture of Azov” (Hughes,
1998, p. 27).
o Therefore, in a time of conflict, Russia’s opportunity to increase
her political and influential standing throughout the world was at
hand.


“The reasons given for Moscow’s declaration of war on 19
August 1700 where the insults suffered at Riga in 1697 and
the Swedish crowns illegal occupation of Russian territory”
(Hughes, 1998, p. 28).

o The insult to the Russian ambassadors was as much a reason for
the declaration of war as was Sweden’s conquering of territory and
subjugating the ethnic Russians within.


“We are avenging the insult dealt to us and our
ambassadors… For which, in response to a request to the
Swedish ambassadors, the king of Sweden refused to give
satisfaction” (Hughes, 1998, p. 28).

o All historic accounts lead to the conclusion that the Russian war
with Sweden was as much about respect as it was about territory.
o Using the territorial dispute and the perceived diplomatic
dishonoring of the Russian ambassadors, Peter was presented with
a vehicle in which to engage in alliances with the rest of Europe,
thereby increasing Russia’s position on the world stage.
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o In Sweden’s defense, King Charles of Sweden made great claims
that the Russian delegation had been treated with all possible
civility.


“He pointed out, reasonably enough, that it was not the
usual practice for diplomatic personnel to look around forts
with telescopes explore fortifications, and make sketches of
walls and buttresses” (Hughes, 1998).

Regardless of the validity of Russia’s claims regarding territory and diplomatic
slights, the conclusion that the conduction of the great Northern war was in fact an
organized affair is borne out by the miscalculations of the Russian leadership, as “Peter
was also taking on a more formidable enemy that he had imagined. Far from being an
easy target, Sweden’s boy king proved to be even more single-mindedly devoted to war
than Peter himself” (Hughes, 1998, p. 29).
Table 4-8
Organized
Planned
Measured
Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned

Disorganized

Aggressive
Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Goal Orientated

Therefore, with consideration for the specific rational for the conduction of the
war by both sides and the planned execution of the overall campaign, the study classifies
the Great Northern War as Organized.
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Engagement of the Transition and Conflict by the Secondary Elements

The comparative analysis continues with the evaluation of how the secondary
elements, head of state and governance structure, responded to the transitions and
conflicts presented to them. Since this is the first period of evaluation, this era serves as
the benchmark for determining homogony within the other evaluation periods. This is the
era where the data conclusions will be measured against the conclusions of the following
periods. The study has already made its conclusions regarding the behavioral
characteristics of the secondary elements and the organizational characteristics of the
event, as presented in the earlier sections. Now, the study will present its data regarding
the response of those secondary elements to the events. Evaluation of the conclusions
made in this chapter will be presented in chapter 5. The evaluation begins with the
reaction of Peter I to the reformation of Russian society.


Reaction Planned, Measured, and Coordinated
o As this transformation was planned and implemented by the Czar,
the conclusions of Peter’s reaction to the event are parallel to the
characteristics of the event.
o However, by all historical accounts, the Czar’s plan of reformation
was pre-planned and executed in a coordinated, controlled and
measured fashion, without the need for aggressive tactics.



Offense/Defense Planned, Aggression
o The only deviation is in the category of offense and defense.
o

Since the Czar enacted the transformation event, there was no
need for consideration of these two elements.
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Event: Targeted, Maintained Ideological Perspective
o The ideological perspective was maintained and specifically
targeted at the areas believed to be in need of reform.


“Inasmuch as the state is not a God-given but a human
creation, man himself may also perfect it, converted it into
an ideal instrument for the transformation of society
(Anisimov, 1993, pp. 144-145).

o The organized manner in which the Reformation was conducted is
illustrated in the length of time the policies endured.


“The grandiose, and all-encompassing nature of the Petrine
transformations was such that even after century and more
they had not become merely history but continued to be
something real and vital that affected everyday life”
(Anisimov, 1993, p. 3).

Table 4-9
Organized
Planned
Measured
Coordinated
Peaceful
Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Goal Orientated

Disorganized

The study therefore concludes that the head of states reaction to the transition of
Russian social and political reform was 100% organized. The same cannot be said of the
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reaction of the governance structure of the time. The government presented a confused
response, if any, due in part to the fact that the transition being enacted was targeted to
reform the government as well as the social structure (Anisimov, 1993). It should also be
noted that the reaction of the government was not universal. As was traditional in
Russian politics of the time, factions existed along family lines that divided the
aristocracy into supporters and detractors of the Czars reforms (Anisimov, 1993;
Bushkovitch, 2001; Voltaire, 1845). This division is illustrated in the classification of
“mixed” in the template and thereby strengthens a disorganized conclusion. Also of
consideration is the response of the Orthodox Church; although not traditionally
considered a part of a government, it was a faction that had significant influence over
social and political policy and was also a target of reformation (Anisimov, 1993).
Regardless of the source of the government response, there was no planning involved for
a course of action they did not have (Anisimov, 1993).
Table 4-10
Organized

Coordinated Czar Supporters Yes
Peaceful

Disorganized
Spontaneous
Disproportional as to effectiveness
Coordinated Czar Opposition No
General Response

Maintained Ideological Perspective Yes
Goal Orientated

The study can only conclude that due to the disarray displayed by the government
through its un-unified response and the use of ineffective attempts at slowing the progress
of the reforms, the government response was disorganized. The Czar’s response to the
Strel’sty rebellion shows the ability of Peter to react to totally unforeseen events.
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Although the mutiny by the old guard forces was unexpected and therefore spontaneous,
causing the Czar’s reaction to be also spontaneous, beyond the lack of restraint shown by
the Czar’s response, the quelling of the domestic conflict was swift and effective.

Table 4-11
Organized
Planned
Measured
Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Aggressive For this event aggression
organized
Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Goal Orientated

Disorganized
Reaction Spontaneous onset of conflict

Offense Reactionary onset of conflict
Defense Reactionary onset of conflict

For evaluation purposes regarding the Czar’s response to the musketeer mutiny,
commentary must be made regarding the conclusions. In the three areas of which the
behavioral characteristics are classified as disorganized, it should be noted that all three
of these areas were disorganized due to the onset of the conflict for which there was no
foreknowledge and therefore no planning was possible. Following the initial onset of the
conflict, these three areas transitioned into an organized response. Also of note in the
evaluation is that normally progressiveness is a sign of disorganization. However, in this
case, the aggressive actions taken were in fact an organized response to a violent
rebellion. The study therefore concludes that the czar’s overall response to the domestic
conflict was predominantly organized.
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The government response to domestic conflict followed exactly the head of state
response. Regardless of the fact that the transitions being enacted by the czar were
unpopular with the aristocracy, the musketeer mutiny presented a threat as much to the
position of the aristocracy as it did to that of the Czar. Although it has been noted that
some of the grievances of the Strel’sty were grounded in the old guard military’s desire to
return to the old ways, the concept of the military usurping the aristocracy was enough to
motivate the government to support the Czar during this conflict (Anisimov, 1993).

Table 4-12
Organized
Planned
Measured
Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Aggressive For this event aggression
organized
Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Goal Orientated

Disorganized
Spontaneous onset of conflict

Offense Reactionary onset of conflict
Defense Reactionary onset of conflict

As was the case with the head of state response to the domestic conflict, since the
government is presented in full support, thereby mirroring the actions of the czar, the
study concludes that the government’s response to the domestic conflict was organized.
In the case with the domestic conflict, the response of the head of state and the response
of the government were parallel. The actions of both secondary elements organized
response to a nationwide conflict. Divisions created by the czar’s social transformation
policies did not play a part in the cooperation of the government during wartime. It is also
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of note that the great Northern war which took place over the course of 18 years was
conducted during times in which the Reformation of the government was fully
established and many the old guards had already been replaced. However even during the
beginning of the conflict, the besieged old guard of the government, maintained full
support of the war effort, from a nationalistic standpoint.
As mentioned during the evaluation of the conducting of the great Northern war
during the 18 years of its engagement the actions of the Czar and the government were
not always consistently organized, as would be expected during a long protected conflict.
The inclusion of the study of both elements exhibiting an organized response to the
international conflict is based upon the overall actions exhibited by both. As was the case
with the domestic conflict in the category of aggression, the aggressiveness shown is
classified as organized since it is a natural element of wartime.
Table 4-13
Organized
Planned
Measured
Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Aggressive For this event aggression
organized
Reaction: Targeted Yes
Maintained Ideological Perspective Yes
Reaction Specific Yes

Disorganized

171
Table 4-14
Organized
Reaction Planned
Reaction Spontaneous
Reaction Measured
Reaction Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Reaction: Aggression
Reaction: Targeted
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Reaction Specific

Disorganized

Characteristic Charts
Table 4-15
Trait
Char.

Peter I

Openness to Conscientiousness Extraversion
experience
Inventive
curious vs.
consistent
cautious

Inventive
Curious
Governance Consistent

Agreeableness

Efficient
organized vs.
easy-going
careless

Outgoing
energetic vs.
solitary
reserved

Friendly
compassionate
vs.
analytical
detached

Careless

Outgoing
Energetic
Reserved

Analytical

Careless

Detached

Neuroticism
Sensitive
nervous vs.
secure
confident

Secure
Confident
Nervous
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Table 4-16
Subject Element

Characteristic Option 1

Leadership Biography

Organized

Characteristic Option 2

Disorganized

Governance Structure
Transition

Organized

Leadership Response
to Transition
Government Response
to Transition
Conflict Domestic

Organized

Leadership Response
to Domestic Conflict
Government Response
to Domestic Conflict
Conflict International

Organized

Leadership Response
to International
Conflict
Government Response
to International
Conflict

Organized

Disorganized
Disorganized

Organized
Organized

Organized

The Post- Soviet Period (Vladimir Putin 2000 – Present)
Profile of the Period
Sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya presented a view of Russians in an interview
with CNN in 2013, as “She’s an expert on Russia’s elites and its political system”
(Dougherty, 2013). Her views, unlike the views of much of the literature originating
outside of Russian boarders by non-Russian scholars, gives a stark evaluation of Russian
mentality today.
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“It’s not that Russians want Communism back, although some do, but the whole
structure of life and secure social programs fell apart along with the USSR” (Dougherty,
2013). Although totalitarian, the old Soviet regime presented social advantages, and
albeit far from the extravagant standards of Western norms, there did exist a social order,
which Russians could count on. This is evident in their opinion of the United States:
“Russians who lived during the Soviet Union grew up with government-inspired antiAmericanism. It’s one of the pillars of our country’s ideology” (Dougherty, 2013). This
ideology, perpetuated by the state, was the go-to excuse for communism failures. “It was
formed a long time ago and was carefully instilled in people by the Soviet leaders. Why
are there problems? ‘It’s those people, the evil Americans, who are at fault, who make
things worse for us.’ It’s an ideological cliché.” (Dougherty, 2013).
“But today’s Russians, this sociologist says, are split down the middle. We have
an ideological war in Russia, the opposition, and Putin’s people; they are two different
fronts’ (Dougherty, 2013). While almost reminiscent of the split in society during the
referendums of Peter the Great, in this instance, the nation’s leader is the one proposing a
return to the ‘old ways’. The split in Russian social ideology is clearly demarked. “We
want democracy and everything should be the way it is in the West. They are the
‘Westerners.’ People who are for Putin – they once were called ‘Slavophiles’ – they say
‘No, we are a separate civilization. We have our own special path, for us the West is not
the way’ (Dougherty, 2013).
However, the prevalent action is to oppose the ideologies of the West. “Russian
presidents that Americans like are the ones Russians don’t like, Gorbachev, whom the
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whole world loved, Russians didn’t like. It’s the mentality” (Dougherty, 2013). From this
evaluation, the study makes the following conclusions using the Big 5 model:

Table 4-17
Trait

Char.

Openness to
experience
Inventive
curious vs.
consistent
cautious

Period
Consistent
Evaluation Cautious

Conscientiousness Extraversion

Agreeableness

Efficient
organized vs.
easy-going
careless

Outgoing
energetic vs.
solitary
reserved

Friendly
compassionate
vs.
analytical
detached

N/A

Solitary
Reserved

Detached

Neuroticism

Sensitive
nervous vs.
secure
confident

Nervous

Russia presents a divided society, not unlike the divisions along ideological and
political lines experienced here in the United States. The Russian society is nervous,
mainly due to the loss of the social structure protections of the old Soviet Union, which
are absent today. The uncertainty that dominates Russian society today and the Russian
people’s reaction to it expresses a great need for consistency, even when that consistency
may not present the most desirable conditions. The observation that the Russians
maintain the old ideologies regarding the West and the United States in particular suggest
a consistency in actions and a solitary and reserved manner as it pertains to the outside
world. Although not xenophobic, as was the case during Peter’s time, there remains a
distrust of outsiders and a general feeling of inferiority. This feeling of inferiority is an
important characteristic in the research findings, as it represents a homogony which
guides Russian opinion and action. The Russian people today have been indoctrinated
with the concept that Russia is not respected by the West in the manner it should be.
“Putin acts according to our traditional mentality which is to respect only strength. That
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one has to be quite aggressive, that you have to demonstrate crude power so that people
will respect you” (Dougherty, 2013). This mentality is epitomized by the statement “We
even have that expression – “when people fear you it means people respect you’
(Dougherty, 2013). This concept will be explored further in the discussion and conclusion
sections of chapter 5.

Bio Vladimir Putin
To say that Vladimir Putin rose to power from obscurity might be an
understatement. However, when we consider the potential for a relatively obscure former
KGB agent to rise to the office of the presidency to be attributed as much from the
missteps, mistakes, and politically suicidal actions of his potential opponents as his own
ambition and personal fortitude, in a country emerging from behind a wall of secrecy, this
makes the possibility more believable. Gessen (2012) paints a picture of a leader who is
as much illusion as reality:
Because Vladimir Putin was catapulted to power from obscurity, and
because he spent his entire adult life within the confines of a secret and
secretive institution, he’s been able to exercise greater control over what is
known about him than almost any other modern politician, certainly more
than any modern Western politician. He has created his own mythology.
This is a good thing, because, to a far greater extent than is usually
possible for any man, Vladimir Putin has communicated to the world
directly what he would like to be known about him and how he would like
to be seen. What has emerged is very much the mythology of a child of
post-siege Leningrad, a mean, hungry, impoverished place that bred mean,
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hungry, ferocious children. At least, they were the ones who survived.
(Gessen, 2012)
This evaluation of Putin would hark back to the behaviorist theories of Skinner
and Pavlov, who would argue that the situations we find ourselves in shape who we are
based upon a fundamental understanding of reward. Sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya
presented a view of Putin in an interview with CNN in 2013 because “She’s an expert on
Russia’s elites and its political system. For 23 years she headed the Department of Elite
Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences and now is director general of the research
center” (Dougherty, 2013). Her evaluation of Putin is from a centralist Russian
perspective. “In his first term, she recalls, Putin said the greatest geopolitical catastrophe
of the 20th century was the dissolution of the Soviet Union” (Dougherty, 2013). As
notated in the profile of the period, according to Kryshtanovskaya, Putin uses the antiAmerican sentiments left over from the cold war. “When Putin thinks of how he can
justify his policies, it’s faster to recall this old enemy than to create a new one. This
external enemy is a factor of the internal politics of Russia, as strange as that may seem.”
(Dougherty, 2013). Putin also uses condemnation of the old enemy as a method of
rallying support and boosting Russia’s profile in the eyes of the people. “‘If you think
that heaven on Earth is the United States, that everything is ideal and wonderful there –
No! It’s not that way. They have problems.’ So it was an attempt to lower America a bit
and boost yourself” (Dougherty, 2013). Being the counterbalance suggested in chapter 1
also presents the opportunity to elevate Russian self-confidence and perception of selfworth. “Putin also is an example of courage for Russians, Putin says ‘See? I’m not afraid
to speak the truth, even to the most powerful country in the world. We are a very
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influential country. Look at our proposal on Syria, which is being welcomed”
(Dougherty, 2013)
If the framework for destroying Syria’s chemical weapons, proposed by
Russia, works out, Kryshtanovskaya says, Russia will jump on it as a PR
opportunity. “’We are great! Hooray! We are geniuses! We found a way
out. We are an influential country,’ she says. “That is, to strengthen the
position of Putin and the government.” If it doesn’t work out, it it’s not a
tragedy, she says. “We can say ‘Those bad Americans. How terrible they
are. Wherever they go, war follows. They’re starting a new war. We tried.
We did everything we could. We were the power of good, but the power
of evil didn’t listen to us.’” Putin, she is convinced, “is going to play on
the fact that we are great – and Americans are the enemy.” (Dougherty,
2013).

Table 4-18
Trait

Openness to
experience

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Neuroticism

Char.

Inventive
curious vs.
consistent
cautious

Efficient organized
vs.
easy-going careless

Outgoing
energetic vs.
solitary
reserved

Friendly
compassionate
vs.
analytical
detached

Sensitive
nervous vs.
secure
confident

Vladimir
Putin

Consistent
Cautious

Organized

Solitary
Reserved

Analytical
Detached

Secure
Confident

The homogony found in the profile of the period is echoed in Kryshtanovskaya’s
evaluation regarding the motivations of the Russian president. “Putin’s way of behaving,
she says, is an attempt to say ‘We are a great power, you have to fear us, we have nuclear
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weapons, etc.’ That is our mentality.” (Dougherty, 2013). It would appear that the United
States is to Russia today as Sweden was during the late 16th and early 17th century.


Existent and adhered to hierarchy
o To claim that Vladimir Putin adhered to an existing hierarchy is a
question that depends upon how adherence is defined; a better concept
would be entered and then created.


“On May 7, 2000 Vladimir Putin was inaugurated as president
of Russia. Strictly speaking this was the first such ceremony in
history” (Gessen, 2012, p. 151).

o Although Russia had previously had a president in the personage of
Boris Yeltsin, at that time Russia was still a member of the now
defunct Soviet Union, the experiment of democracy having just begun
for the tumultuous Russia state (Gessen, 2012).
o The hierarchy of the new federal republic of Russia was, for the most
part, Putin’s to shape.
o He began with the inauguration ceremony, taking a page from the days
of the Monarchy.


“Putin had the opportunity to shape a ritual. The ceremony,
originally planned for the modernist State Palace…was moved
to the Historic Great Palace, where the Czar’s once lived”
(Gessen, 2012, p. 151).
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o This was a visual reminder of the importance Putin was placing within
the new hierarchy of the office of the presidency, as an undisputed
leader of the new nation, democracy or not.
During an interview regarding the Russian constitution, Putin put forth numerous
comments that strengthened the conclusion that the new democracy was his to shape.
When asked if the law was immutable, Putin responded “The law must be observed, if it
becomes outdated, it must be altered. One of the postulates of legal theory is that the law
always lags behind real life” (Putin, Gevorkyan, Timakova, & Kolenikov, 2000, p. 185).
The interviewer further pressed about the constitution and the powers of the president,
questioning the comment regarding the constitution lagging and the term limits of the
president. “The constitution should enshrine the most general principles… But
amendments can be made” (Putin, Gevorkyan, Timakova, & Kolenikov, 2000, p. 185).
And specifically regarding the powers of the president: “From the very beginning, Russia
was created as a supercentralized state…practically laid down in its genetic code, its
traditions, and the mentality of its people. Under certain conditions…monarchy has
played and continues to this day to play a positive role” (Putin et al., 2000, p. 186).
Whether this is a signal of the philosophy of the need for Russia to return to the days of
monarchal rule, or a generalized comment regarding the virtues of centralized power
within government, there is little doubt of Putin’s understanding of the hierarchy as he
was creating it.


Planned economic policy
o Jack (2004) states that, “For most of Putin’s initiatives, it is too early
to tell what the effects will be” (p. 251).
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o The reforms of Russia’s economy to a more market-based system
spans almost the entirety of Russian society.
o Land reforms are replacing the old communist system,


“But the social consequences for those existing farmers were
displaced, and the risks that the purchasers are dominated by a
few oligarchs, are considerable” (Jack, 2004, p. 251).

o There also exists a restructuring of the electrical sector.


“Greater liberalization is attractive and theory, if it encourages
competition, investment and cheaper electricity for consumers.
But the current plan risks creating a series of regional near
monopolies which may do little to improve or even worsen the
status quo” (Jack, 2004, p. 251).

o However, the most often cited success of Putin’s era in office points
not to economic policies, but rather to consistency.


“It is not the detailed economic reforms for the minutiae of any
particular law, so much as the general climate of political
stability” (Jack, 2004, p. 251).



Planned foreign policy
o As specifically outlined earlier, the main goal of Putin’s foreign policy
is to return Russia to its former place of influence.


“In the months following the signing of the Treaty of Moscow
cutting nuclear arsenals, Russians came to resent what they saw
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as the one side relationship with Washington” (Baker &
Glasser, 2005, p. 219).
o The consensus is that in many areas, Russia had succumbed to the will
of the United States in hopes of American help in rebuilding the
Russian economy.


“Putin’s most important priority was rebuilding of his
economy, and Bush did nothing to help him with that” (Baker
& Glasser, 2005, p. 219).

o Disenchanted with relations with United States, a new foreign policy
emerged.


“Putin demonstrated a neo-Imperial streak, throwing his weight
around in former Soviet republics, but typically used economic
rather than military pressure to keep neighbors in line, such as
cutting off natural gas” (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 222).

o For Russia, economics was the new driver of foreign policy.


“Rather than building a new Army to flex his muscles abroad,
Putin believed that the key to restoring Russia is great power
was economic” (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 222).

o Putin’s foreign policy would abandon the string of concessions made
to the Americans.
o His new theater of foreign operations would involve anyone he felt
could better promote his economic goals.


Planned social policy
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o Like Russia’s foreign policy, the social policy is linked to the
rebuilding of the country’s economy.
o During an interview, a question regarding the legalization of
prostitution was raised.


Putin, who purports to be against the legalization of
prostitution, made a comment which gives insight to his overall
vison of social policy for Russia:


“If you live a normal life, if the country develops, if the
standard of living rises” (Putin, Gevorkyan, Timakova,
& Kolenikov, 2000, p. 199).

o Social stability, therefore, is linked to the ability to “live normally”,
which in turn is linked to economic stability.


As exampled by Putin’s pension reforms,


“Pension reform has given Russians greater freedom to
choose how to invest funds for their retirement, but
within the system where they risk losing everything to
private managers with high costs and little experience”
(Jack, 2004, p. 251).



Adherence to economic, foreign, and social policy
o

Although there has been an adjustment in the economic policies,
namely Russia’s disengagement with America and engagement with
other avenues and partners for economic growth, the foreign and social
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policies that are a direct reflection of the desire to promote greater
economic influence are consistently adhered to.
o The examples presented in the study are but a fraction of the consistent
application of policy.
o The study recognizes that it is the preponderance of adherence which
is observed, and not a 100% adherence to policy that always meets the
goal.
o Nevertheless, Russia is presenting policy and ideological shifts in
social and foreign relations reform that is designed to promote and
advance its economic goals.


Internal harmony
o As a centralist political structure, the harmony between the president
and the government is positive.
o Although there is always opposition in any government, in the case of
Russia this is limited, whether due to fear of reprisal or political
maneuvering by avoiding conflict with a popular and politically
powerful president, the opposition is divided and in this case moot.
o At present, Russia presents as a united governance structure, firmly on
board with the direction of a future Russia as envisioned by its
president.



Positive Diplomatic Relations
o Although Russian language can be considered antagonistic at times,
the new conciliatory counterbalanced approach seems successful.
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o Even with those nations with which Russian relations are strained,
dialog remains open and potentials for diplomatic compromise exist.


Positive constituency opinion
o As shown in the overall profile, the Russian people are split in their
opinion of Putin.
o However, this split would seem to be more along ideological lines than
policy, as Russia as a nation continues to observe the centralist
ideology of their government and generally support the leader who is
in power at the time.

As indicated in the chart below, Russia’s Vladimir Putin presents as a very
calculated organized leader with a full understanding of the position his country holds in
the international arena. He is also cognizant of the limitations of Russia regarding her
military and is accepting of the social order of the world that rewards economic power
with influence. Rather than attempting to shape the world to his specifications, he shows
a perceptive understanding of politics in the 21st century. Unlike his predecessors, he
shows a willingness to use soft power as an alternative to military action in international
conflict.
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Table 4-19
Organized

Disorganized

Existent and Adhered to hierarchy
Planned economic policy
Planned foreign policy
Planned social policy
Adherence to economic policy
Adherence to foreign policy
Adherence to social policy
Internal harmony
Positive Diplomatic Relations
Positive constituency opinion

Governance
In a centralist governance structure, it is difficult to separate the government from
its head of state, especially in those cases where the nation’s leader exhibits confidence
and strong authority, as does Vladimir Putin. The current Russian government presents
no differently. Although there are strong communist elements within the Putin
government, they exhibit limited ability to influence the direction of the nation. Rather,
the communist element, simply by its existence and public support by those who would
prefer to see Russia return to the totalitarian communist regime, present an impetus for
consistent decision making by the president and progression of the economic, political,
and social goals, which are designed to promote increased Russian influence. For these
reasons, the Big 5 Chart for the government is the same as that of its leader. Likewise,
the characteristic chart is parallel to that of Putin’s, as is the assessment of the elements
that drive the conclusions.
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Table 4-20
Trait

Char.

Openness
to
experience

Conscientiousness Extraversion

Agreeableness

Inventive
curious vs.
consistent
cautious

Efficient
organized vs.
easy-going
careless

Outgoing
energetic vs.
solitary
reserved

Friendly
compassionate
vs.
analytical
detached

Organized

Reserved

Analytical

Government Consistent



Neuroticism

Sensitive
nervous vs.
secure
confident

Confident

Existent and adhered to hierarchy
o The government accepts the centralist structure of Russian politics,
and whether by design or political maneuvering, adheres to this
concept.
o Although there are opposition parties within the government, as a
centralist state with a politically adept leader, the opposition is limited.



Planned and Adherence to economic, foreign, and social policy
o There is no indication that the social policies of the president are
directly opposed in any meaningful way by the government at large.



Internal harmony
o The acceptance of the centralist system promotes the harmony
described in the Putin evaluation.



Positive Diplomatic Relations
o As the foreign office of Russia works under the direction of the
president, the diplomatic relations of the government mirror that of
Putin.



Positive constituency opinion
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o

As a centralist system, the opinion of the government cannot be
directly divided from the opinion of the president, so long as the
government supports presidential policies, which in this case they do.

Table 4-21
Organized

Disorganized

Existent and Adhered to hierarchy
Planned economic policy
Planned foreign policy
Planned social policy
Adherence to economic policy
Adherence to foreign policy
Adherence to social policy
Internal harmony
Positive Diplomatic Relations
Positive constituency opinion

Transition the Move toward Democracy?
The transition toward a more democratic social structure began before the election
of Vladimir Putin. However, the question of the transition toward democracy is a concept
clouded by perception. Democracy is a concept that in western terms equates directly to
the concept of freedom. Once again, the term freedom is a subjective concept, which can
have different levels in which it is measured. For the purpose of this study, the researcher
will eliminate the concept of freedom as a definitive requirement and instead consider the
simple dictionary definition: “A form of government in which people choose leaders by
voting” (Merriam Webster, 2013). Under this definition, the transition in Russia meets
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the criteria. It should be noted that if the political structure of the United States were
measured against all the potential definitions of democracy presented in the dictionary,
America would not meet all those definitions. “When Putin and President Bush met… In
Santiago, Chile… The American leader came in for a lecture on the uniqueness of Russia
and its need to have a style of government that was consistent with Russian history”
(Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 377). Therefore, rather than chronicling the transition event,
the study will focus upon the ideology of the transition itself as it relates to the
characteristics model. The important concept to consider is that the “democratic
transition” of Russia must be viewed by the criteria with which Russians understand and
accept the concept, rather than a western view of democratization.


Event Planned, Measured, and Coordinated
o The level of planning that Putin’s government put into the
democratization of Russia was as much a product of the failure of
Putin’s predecessor Boris Yeltsin as the organizational efforts of Putin
himself.


“Putin disavowed any aspirations to restore Soviet-style
dictatorship…his favorite theme, the need to preserve Russia
from the sort of democracy that sprung from the Soviet
collapse” (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 378).

o Yet the majority of Russians, although not the democracy desired by
the west, accepted the transition.


“The president was popular precisely because he had reinstalled Russia’s traditional model of government; an
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autocratic state in which citizens were relieved of responsibility
for politics… and foreign enemies are invoked to forge an
artificial unity” (Pipes, 2004; Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 376).
o

The consensus is that Putin understood the Russia in which he was
transitioning:


“Putin had long since abandoned the label, no longer bothering
with fiction of preserving the fragile emerging democracy the
Boris Yeltsin and bequeathed to him and promising only to
avoid a return to totalitarianism” (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p.
376).

o Rather than offering the Russian people Western-style democracy,
Putin offered stability. From this, one question remained: “was Russia
under Putin a soft authoritarian regime or something more menacing”
(Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 376).
o To their critics, they presented this argument “advanced by Putin
himself and his political allies. Russia, they now proclaimed openly,
was neither ready for democracy or are historically suited for it”
(Baker & Glasser, 2005, pp. 376-377).
It is therefore difficult to classify the transition in Russia in terms of one ideology.
The idea of democracy started with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under the chaotic
leadership of Boris Yeltsin, Russians’ first taste of Western democracy had not been
positive. Putin thus returned to a more autocratic system with the centralist power
structure emanating from the Kremlin. However, this continues to be a transition of
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significance. “The new system built by the Kremlin offered what political analyst Lilia
Shevtsova called ‘imitation democracy’, democracy without its inconveniences” (Baker
& Glasser, 2005, p. 376). Whatever label is placed upon the new political structure within
Russia, the event was a transition from both the old Soviet dictatorships of Stalin and his
predecessors and the dismal chaos created by the ineffective Yeltsin and his reformers.


Event: Aggression
o The reforms did not necessitate aggression; however, the aggression
experienced during this period is examined in the domestic conflict
historiography of this study: the Chechen Revolts.
o Therefore, in the characteristic chart for this section, the elements of
offense and defense have been excluded.



Event: Targeted
o The transition in Russia, once under the control of Putin, evolved into
a targeted event.
o Unlike the chaotic attempts at reforms by the Yeltsin period, the Putin
regime instituted what Russians generally referred to as Putinism.
Stability was Putin’s slogan and focus (Baker & Glasser, 2005).
o Abandoning western ideals of democracy for a more functional and
historically acceptable autocracy, Putin and his government focused
upon what it saw as the new highway to international influence and
recognition, the economy.
o The transition was less about democracy and more about returning
Russia to international prominence.
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o When the old Soviet Union had collapsed under its own economic
isolationism (Baker & Glasser, 2005), and Yeltsin had tried to
introduce too much reformation too quickly, Russian influence had
slipped in international circles.
o Whatever governance structure emerged from the ashes of the Soviet
Union and the Yeltsin debacle, Putin’s Russia would emerge again as a
world power, regardless of the opinions of the western democracies.


Maintained Ideological Perspective
o This perspective, to reclaim world influence, is and remains a
cornerstone of the evolving Russian society today.
o Long gone are the appearances of embracing democratic principles as
defined by the west.


A former Yeltsin supporter and former Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov summed up the new regimes attitudes: “Russia does
not support, does not follow, and does not respect any
democratic principles” (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 374).

o Although this could be considered a case of sour grapes, coming from
a Prime Minister fired by Putin on the eve of his reelection, Russian
officials only commented that the former Prime Minister was a puppet
of the United States (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 374), and there was
never a solid denial of the assessment.
o The ideology of returning Russia to an autocratic system, as a means
to an end, remained consistently applied.
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Event Specific
o The specificity of the maintained ideology was the return of Russian
influence through economic strength and a political ideology of
compromise and diplomacy.
o The goal was to re-achieve influence and to do so without the threat of
military force.

Table 4-22
Organized
Event Planned
Event Measured
Event Coordinated

Disorganized

Event: Peaceful
Event: Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Event Goal Orientated

As indicated in the text, the chart reflects a well-organized transition. However,
this transition presents with a paradox. The transition was as much a transition of the
transition as it was a social ideology. What began as an answer to a collapse of a decades
long political system was to first turn to western principles as an answer to recovery.
Following the failure of to introduce western democracy as a viable alternative to the
historically autocratic Russian political society, the transition then transitioned again into
what exists today, an autocratic government based upon centralism; however, it is a
system that is cognizant of public and international opinion, while abandoning the
flaunting of military superiority for a business-like approach to economic superiority.
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Domestic Conflict: The Chechen Revolts
The fighting in Chechnya began before the election of Vladimir Putin. However,
the conflict with the Chechen republic has endured through centuries. The purpose of the
study is not present a detailed history of the Russian -Chechen conflicts. Rather, the study
looks to determine the characteristics of the conflict from which conclusions regarding
the Russian reaction to the conflict can be measured. Briefly, “Chechens and Russians
have clashed viciously almost ever since the contact began at the start of the 18th century”
(Jack, 2004, p. 91). Much of the negative perception of Chechens is generated from the
activities in which they engage. “The long involvement of some Chechens in organized
crime in Russian cities has not helped the reputation” (Jack, 2004, p. 91). As a Muslim
culture, Chechens have always been looked upon with suspicion by the Christian Russian
Orthodox Church. “Chechens tend to be more rural and less integrated into Russian
society than Russians and other ethnic groups. They received little positive
encouragement and plenty of discrimination to maintain the status quo” (Jack, 2004, p.
92). However, Chechnya is rich in oil deposits, which have historically been easily
exploited by the Russians. During the Stalin era mass deportations were conducted;
generally these deportations included and were directed at the intelligentsia of Chechen
society. The vacuum created by the removal of the elite of society opened the door for
those that remained in Chechnya to engage in more illicit activities. “The Republic
became a center for drugs production and trafficking, oil theft and illegal refining,
counterfeiting, diamond smuggling and contraband alcohol” (Jack, 2004, p. 93). The
chaos of the Yeltsin government precipitated the beginning of the 1994 Chechen war.
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“The military campaign partly employing the intensive bombardment tactics that had
been used in Afghanistan on behalf of Soviet forces a few years before poison public
opinion” (Jack, 2004, p. 94).
When we evaluate the characteristics of the Chechen conflict, the study must
consider the Chechen revolt in the same light as did the Russians, who regarded the
Chechens as terrorists. This is not to say that the study has made a judgment regarding
the Chechen fighters as revolutionaries or terrorists. Rather, to evaluate the Russian
response to the conflict, the study must do so from the perspective of the Russians who
would respond.


Event planned, measured, coordinated
o Like any conflict, even one considered terroristic in nature, there is
some level of planning involved. The Chechen conflict was no
exception.
o Lead by guerilla leaders such as Shamil Basayev, Chechen fighters
coordinated incursions into Russian territory, taking hostages and
creating chaos for the Russian government.
o However, the methods and targets of the Chechen violence included
schools and hospitals, which enraged the Russians and cultivated
negative international opinion. (Jack, 2004).
o The Chechen violence, which indiscriminately killed Russian civilians
as well as military personnel, was unrestrained and disproportional.
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o So disproportional was the Chechen violence that the result was
positive Russian opinion regarding the heavy-handed response by the
Putin government.
o The Chechen tactics became so brutal that they weakened the original
sympathy they garnered from their years of oppression, and instead
strengthened the government they desired to weaken.


Offense/defense Planned
o As in all military operations, be they by a standing army or guerilla
forces, targets were selected in an attempt to break the Russian will to
fight.



Event: Aggression
o All historic accounts of the Chechen revolt chronical brutal violence,
not only against military targets but also civilian populations.



Event: Targeted
o The Chechen targets were determined to weaken the resolve of the
Russian government, though they were distracted by its own internal
transition issues.
o The civilian targets were selected to promote the highest shock value.



Maintained Ideological Perspective
o Although it is hard to equate an ideological perspective to the violence
seen in the Chechen revolts, independence from Russian rule was the
major driver.



Event Specific
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o All events were specific to the goal of Chechen independence.
Table 4-23
Organized
Event Planned

Disorganized
Event Disproportional

Event Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Event: Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Event Goal Orientated

Event: Aggressive
Event: General Response

The Chechen revolt was an organized event, or as much as any rebel revolt could
be considered organized. The fact that the out matched Chechens maintained the revolt
for over a decade against a superior Russian force is a testament to the overall
organization of the event. It should be noted that the Chechen revolt, to this day, is still
ongoing and has yet to be resolved.

International Conflict Terrorism of 9/11

The international conflict selected by the study was not one in which Russia was
directly involved at the onset. Nonetheless, the attacks upon the United States did bring
the “war on terrorism” to all nations, including Russia. What the study will evaluate is
how the Russian government engaged this conflict. However, before any conclusions
regarding the actions of Russia in regards to this world affair can be reached, the conflict
itself must be evaluated. As previously noted, this is not a detailed history of the events
of 9/11, but rather a brief examination of the characteristics of the original attack. The
conclusions are a compilation of the widely accepted characteristics assigned to the
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attack, and the resulting ideology expressed by the nations of the world as to the required
response. Of greater interest to the study is the response Russia engaged in, both
internally and with the greater global community. Although not directly involved, the
nations suspected of complicity with the terrorist organizations that conducted the attacks
are regional neighbors and historical enemies and, in some cases, historical allies of the
Russian republic.


Event planned, measured, coordinated
o It is universally agreed that the attacks upon the World Trade Center,
the Pentagon, and the failed attack that ended in Pennsylvania, were
planned, coordinated, and measured for their maximum impact upon
the United States and the world at large.
o It is also agreed that the attack on a civilian target, like the World
Trade Center, was disproportional to any ideological cause.



Offense Planned
o The coordination of the attacks on 9/11, and the subsequent attacks on
civilian targets throughout the world, demonstrate a planning of
offense.
o Specific targets are selected to generate the maximum civil disruption
possible.



Defense Planned
o The planning of a defensive strategy would arguably be difficult,
considering that the terrorist organization could not anticipate the
world’s response.
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o Likewise, with the terrorist organization being a collection of
individual cells and separate fundamental groups sharing the same
ideology, coordination of defense would necessarily be difficult to
coordinate and would be dependent upon the specific situation of the
individual groups.


Event: Aggression
o There is no question as to the aggressive nature of the attacks or the
subsequent attacks worldwide.



Event: Targeted
o The majority of the attacks are civilian.
o However, military targets have been engaged. (For the purpose of the
evaluation, suicide bombings, the preferred method of inflicting
damage, is considered an engagement).



Maintained Ideological Perspective
o The ideological perspectives of the terrorist organizations are the
driving motivation of, and continue to be, Islamic fundamentalism and
the destruction of western culture.



Event Specific
o Although it could be argued that each attack is a culmination toward
an overall goal of the terrorist organizations to destroy western
civilization and the perceived repression of the Islamic faith, it is
difficult to assign a specific goal to each specific attack, beyond the
disruption of civil society.
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o General demands are made and ideological rhetoric regarding the
ideology behind the attack are reported; however, the obtainment of a
specific objective is unclear.

Table 4-24
Organized
Event Planned

Disorganized
Event Disproportional

Event Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Reactionary
Event: Aggressive
Event: Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Event Lack of Goal

The conclusion regarding the organizational characteristics of the terrorist conflict
is split between organized and disorganized. The study concludes that the division in the
chart is representative of the failure to comprehend an overall objective sought by the
terrorist organization beyond the dissemination of chaos.

Engagement of the Transition and Conflicts by the Secondary Elements


Reaction planned, measured, and coordinated
o Although the onset of the transition was underway before the Putin
presidency began, the president implemented the redirecting of the
transition away from democracy and toward a more familiar autocratic
centralist governance structure.
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o As indicated in the Putin Bio, this redirection was well planned,
measured, and implemented by the Putin government.


Offense, defense planned
o The transition was not military in nature and therefore had no
offensive or defensive components of interest to the study.



Reaction: Aggression
o The implementation of the plan was through policy and restructuring
and therefore had no aggressive components.



Reaction: Targeted
o The reaction was targeted in support of the new autocratic centralist
governance structure.



Maintained Ideological Perspective
o The ideological perspective of abandonment of western democratic
principle for the more familiar autocratic system, for the purpose of
better increasing Russian influence was maintained.



Reaction Specific
o The reactions of the government were specific to the implementation
and support of the transition.
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Table 4-25
Organized
Reaction Planned
Reaction Measured
Reaction Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Reaction: Peaceful
Reaction: Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Reaction Goal Orientated

Disorganized

The evaluation of the government’s response to the transition is parallel to the
conclusions of the head of state response. Considering that the new governmental system
is centralist and autocratic and lacking any documented coordinated deviation from the
head of state response, the study concludes that both responses are the same.
Table 4-26
Organized
Reaction Planned
Reaction Measured
Reaction Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Reaction: Peaceful
Reaction: Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Reaction Goal Orientated

Disorganized

The reaction to the domestic conflict presents a different picture to that of the
transition. However, as in the transition model, Putin and his government exhibited
similar reaction characterisitics.


Reaction planned, measured, coordinated
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o The literature is clear: when dealing with the Chechen revolts, the
Russians took a hard line stance (Baker & Glasser, 2005) (Jack, 2004).
o In regards to Vladimir Putin,


“His hard line approach to Chechnya undoubtable raised his
profile, turning what looked like another short-lived hapless
Yeltsin nominee into an unchallengeable presidential successor
within weeks” (Jack, 2004, p. 103).

o Although personal advancement was not Putin’s only consideration
when considering a plan for dealing with the Chechen rebels, the fact
remains that Chechens were bombing civilian targets in Moscow, and
the terrorist attacks were getting out of hand (Jack, 2004).
o Following the September 13 bombing in Moscow, Putin addressed the
parliament.


“Putin was measured…stressing that there was a Chechen
connection…but also the need to distinguish ordinary
Chechens from terrorists…arguing there was no need to
extinguish the Chechen people” (Jack, 2004, p. 102).

o The coordination of Russian military efforts were made with
consideration of the poor results experienced during the first Chechen
revolts of 1994-1996.
o One thing was clear; Russia could not handle such a public opinion
disaster again.


Offense/defense planned
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o Although from a political standpoint the reaction of the Russian
government was a coordinated implant affair, for the military this was
quite different.
o In fact, many within the Russian military believed that military force
was not the answer to the Chechen problem.
o In 199,8 General Kulikov, former head of the Russian Armed Forces
and interior minister,


“argued strongly that a renewed attempt to solve the Chechen
problem through military force is out of the question.



Instead he stressed a more dovish line of the need for Moscow
to participate in the reconstruction of Chechnya” (Jack, 2004,
p. 110).

o Putin was also split regarding his decision on the appropriate way to
handle the Chechen problem.


“In early 2000, he claimed that he only decided to invade the
Republic after the apartment blasts” (Jack, 2004, p. 111).

o It is clear, however, that the offensive and defensive measures against
the Chechen rebellion centered on protection of Russian targets and
containment of the Chechen forces within Chechnya.


“The idea of a cordon sanitaire around Chechnya had long been
discussed by policymakers. By securing the northern part of the
Republic… They believe that they could create a
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demonstration zone, showing to the Chechens in the South
attraction of Moscow rule” (Jack, 2004, p. 112).


Reaction: Aggression
o All historical accounts agree that the response to the Chechen rebellion
was one of aggression.



Reaction: Targeted
o When considering a conclusion regarding whether or not the response
was targeted, we must consider that the Russian military was not
dealing with a standing army of another nation-state.
o Rather, as was the case with the Americans in Afghanistan, they were
dealing with a terrorist organization by all Russian accounts, which
used real warfare and terrorist bombings of civilian targets as their
method of promoting aggression.
o Therefore, the chart concludes that the targeting of the government and
the leadership of Russia during the Chechen revolts was mixed.
Specific targets were identified in an effort to contain the Chechen
violence against civilian targets.
o Likewise, when civilian targets were successfully attacked by the
Chechens, the response was more general in nature.



Maintained Ideological Perspective
o The ideological perspective of Vladimir Putin and his government was
simply to find an answer to the Chechen problem.
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o As indicated earlier Putin had no desire to commit genocide against
the Chechen people; however, the terrorist activities employed by the
Chechen rebels made targeting specifics a difficult endeavor.
o Further complicating this was the growing deep distrust and hatred of
the Chechen people by not only the military, but also the public in
general.


Reaction Specific
o The reactions by Vladimir Putin and his government were specific to
the events of the revolt.
o The general goal was the end the hostilities and to place the Chechen
Republic firmly under Moscow rule.
o However, it should also be noted that the disproportionality of the
response by the Russian military in many cases further complicated the
obtainment of this goal.

Table 4-27
Organized
Reaction Planned

Disorganized
Reaction Disproportional

Reaction Coordinated

Reaction: Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Reaction/Event Goal Orientated

Offense Reactionary
Defense Reactionary
Reaction: Aggressive
Reaction: General Response
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As with the case of the transition response, the evaluation of the government
response to the domestic conflict is parallel to the conclusions of the head of state
response. Considering that the new governmental system is centralist and autocratic, and
lacking any documented coordinated deviation from the head of state response, the study
concludes that both responses are the same.
Table 4-28
Organized
Reaction Planned

Disorganized
Reaction Spontaneous
Reaction Disproportional

Reaction Coordinated
Offense Planned

Reaction: Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Reaction/Event Goal Orientated

Offense Reactionary
Defense Reactionary
Reaction: Aggressive
Reaction: General Response

More in line with the implementation of the social/political transition, the Russian
reaction to the international conflict produces similar conclusions.


Reaction planned, measured, coordinated
o The Russian responses to the attacks on 9/11 are a study in adept
diplomacy.
o With terrorism firmly at the forefront of Putin’s mind with the
Chechen conflict, the terrorist attacks upon the United States and 9/11
presented an opportunity for Russia to advance its political
international goals:
The Russian president had much more in mind during his September
phone call to Bush that mere personal expression of sympathy. Yet ideas
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for wide-ranging cooperation that would stretch beyond the public
statements of concern of other four leaders in which would help transform
the relationship between the nations. (Jack, 2004, p. 256)
This concept of turning the 9/11 attacks upon the United States into an advantage
for Russia to advance her political and economic goals would be the cornerstone to the
assistance Russia would lend to the coalition of nations who would actively fight
terrorism.


Offense, defense planned
o For Russia, the reactions were supportive to the coalition of nations,
since the conducting of the war on terror was being held well within
their sphere of influence.
o Active engagement militarily by the Russians with the coalition was
avoided. Through support concessions, the Russians indirectly
supported coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
o Russia was seen as an important regional support partner with
intelligence capabilities important to the success of the coalition.


By September 24, Putin made his decision: “He pledged to
work with the Central Asian states in favor of the US
operation, establish humanitarian corridors in Russian airspace,
and continue weapon support for opponents of the Taliban”
(Jack, 2004, p. 257).



Reaction: Aggression
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o By taking a stance is a regional support partner, Russia was able to
avoid direct aggression in military action within the coalition.


Reaction: Targeted
o Although the Taliban represented a threat to Russian interest in
Afghanistan, the target of the support efforts for the coalition were
designed to elicit good relations with the west and thereby advance the
economic policies and desires of the Russian Federation.



Maintained Ideological Perspective
o Russia maintained this ideology of support for the war on terror in
exchange for positive considerations and better relations with the
international community, which would further her economic goals.
o Russia calculated that their indirect essential support of the coalition
against the war on terror would lead the international community to
forget that Russian had returned to an autocratic centralist political
structure abandoning the concepts of Western democracy (Baker &
Glasser, 2005; Jack, 2004).



Reaction Specific
o The Russian reaction, although specifically tailored to support the
coalition efforts, was inherently general in its response.
o With the unrest in Chechnya still presenting disruptive influences upon
the Russian people and the Russian government, maintaining a general
stance on the conflicts emerging in Afghanistan and Iraq preserved the
appearance of Russian involvement without taxing Russian resources.
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Table 4-29
Organized
Reaction Planned
Reaction Measured
Reaction Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Reaction: Peaceful

Disorganized

Reaction: General Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Reaction Goal Orientated

As with the case of the transition response, the evaluation of the government
response to the international conflict is parallel to the conclusions of the head of state
response. Considering that the new governmental system is centralist and autocratic and
lacking any documented coordinated deviation from the head of state response, the study
concludes that both responses are the same.
Table 4-30
Organized
Reaction Planned
Reaction Measured
Reaction Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Reaction/Event: Peaceful

Disorganized

Reaction: General Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Reaction Goal Orientated
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Characteristic Charts
Table 4-31
Trait

Characteristics

Vladimir
Putin
Governance

Openness
to
experience

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Efficient
organized vs.
easy-going
careless

Outgoing
energetic vs.
solitary
reserved

Friendly
compassionate
vs.
analytical
detached

Consistent

Organized

Reserved

Analytical

Consistent

Organized

Reserved

Analytical

Inventive
curious vs.
consistent
cautious

Neuroticism

Sensitive
nervous vs.
secure
confident

Secure
Confident
Secure

Table 4-32
Subject Element

Characteristic Option 1

Characteristic Option 2

Leadership Biography

Organized

Governance Structure

Organized

Transition

Organized

Leadership Response to
Transition
Government Response to
Transition
Conflict Domestic

Organized

Leadership Response to
Domestic Conflict
Government Response to
Domestic Conflict
Conflict International

Mixed

Mixed

Mixed

Mixed

Mixed

Mixed

Leadership Response to
International Conflict
Government Response to
International Conflict

Organized

Organized
Organized

Organized
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Chapter 5: Discussion/Comparison of Period Data
The following is a review of the data contained in Chapter 4. The study compares
each element from one period against the similar element of the second. The study
assigned the Period of Peter I as the benchmark data set from which to compare the data
from the Post-Soviet period. To comprehensively evaluate the data, the study, conducted
as a historiography, adheres to the chronology of eras, hypothesizing the existence of the
behavioral traits theorized for nation-states.
The data comparison presented here is not a historiography of the elements. The
limited historiography conducted and presented in chapter 4 detailed data significant to
the research. The review of the data section also does not attempt to draw conclusions
from the comparisons. All conclusions regarding the comparisons and general data will
follow in the next section.

Comparison of the Periods
Table 4-1
Trait

Openness to Conscientiousness Extraversion
experience

Agreeableness

Neuroticism

Characteristic

Inventive
curious vs.
consistent
cautious

Efficient
organized vs.
easy-going
careless

Outgoing
energetic vs.
solitary
reserved

Friendly
compassionate
vs.
analytical
detached

Sensitive
nervous vs.
secure
confident

Period 1

Cautious

N/A

Detached

Nervous

Period 2

Consistent
Cautious

N/A

Solitary
Reserved
Solitary
Reserved

Detached

Nervous
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When we examine the Big 5 model comparison chart for both periods, the data
conclusions are very similar. However, the similarities are even starker when we
consider the underlining data from which these conclusions were drawn. When
contemplating the conditions facing the populace during the period prior to the reign of
Peter I, Russia, as reported by Voltaire, was a backward nation with little influence on the
rest of the world. Militarily weak, technologically behind the great powers of Europe,
while socially entrenched in old customs and traditions, fostered by the myopic liturgical
control of the Russian Orthodox Church. As a nation, Russia was a loose confederation of
regional powers, controlled by an aristocracy, who elected a Czar with limited power
over the subject regions. The majority of the populace lived in servitude to the
aristocracy, more concerned about daily survival than affairs of state. Militarily, Russia
presented an easy target for constant invasion and exploitation of their resources from
both external and internal enemies. From the European perspective, Russians were
backward, brutish, uneducated farmers without art, literature, culture, or a viable
economic system. In all ways deemed appropriate to measure a nation and people at the
time, Russia was inferior and insignificant. The reign of Peter I would be the turning
point for changing European opinion.
Russian Republic at the turn of the 21st century presents a similar picture. The
once mighty Soviet Union has collapsed. Russian attempts at forging a Western-style
democracy have failed. The former communist system has left the nation economically
unprepared for the new challenges of the global economy. The Russian military’s
inability to effectively deal with the Chechen rebellion has exposed deficiencies. Russia,
once a formidable adversary for the Americans in regards to technological advancements
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such as the space race of the late 1950s and 1960s and the decades old arms race, no
longer possesses the veil of secrecy afforded by the Iron Curtain and is now exposed as a
flawed technical giant. The cost of being an adversary of the American capitalistic
system, the largest economy in the world, proved financially unsustainable by the
communist system. The weight of the financial resources necessary to maintain an arms
race and propaganda induced space race proved too much for the system to bear.
From the ashes of the old communist system, oligarchs appeared, becoming the
new Russian aristocracy to which the government and the people become subservient.
The rest of the world sees the poor state of Russian affairs. They looked on with the
disbelief in the chaos of Boris Yeltsin’s attempts at Western democracy. The world
concludes that Russia is no longer a superpower and begins to dismiss Russia, decreasing
Russian influence in international circles. Behind the Iron Curtain created by
communism, Russia was able to effectively hide these deficiencies and present to the
world the illusion of a nation more powerful than it actually was. However, in the year
2000, Vladimir Putin would rise to power and create a second turning point in changing
world opinion.
When comparing the two societies, separated by almost 300 years, there exist
significant correlations. In both examples, the previous social structure, or the “old
ways”, contribute to social decline, and more importantly, a negative opinion of the world
powers at the time. Feudalism and orthodoxy had stifled social growth before the time of
Peter the great, whereas communism had done the same throughout the 20th century. It is
significant to note that regardless of the social stagnation identified in hindsight, the “old
ways” retained support. Even following the emplacement of the two leaders who would
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be responsible for guiding their country out of the stagnation through policies of
transition, at the onset of both, transitional policies faced significant opposition to leaving
behind a way of life the people had always known existed. More importantly, the opinion
of the rest of the civilized world was similar: both times, Russia was labeled as
backwards and behind the times. In the 16th and early 17th century, Russia was almost
totally disregarded as insignificant, while late 20th century Russia only maintained some
veiled respect due to their nuclear arsenal.

Comparison of Heads of State
Table 5-2
Trait

Openness to
experience

Conscientiousness

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Neuroticism

Characteristic

Inventive
curious vs.
consistent
cautious

Efficient
organized vs.
easy-going
careless

Outgoing
energetic vs.
solitary
reserved

Friendly
compassionate
vs.
analytical
detached

Sensitive
nervous vs.
secure
confident

Peter I

Inventive
Curious
Consistent
Cautious

Careless

Outgoing
Energetic
Solitary
Reserved

Analytical

Secure
Confident
Secure
Confident

Vladimir
Putin

Organized

Analytical
Detached

The Big 5 Model shows two very different men. Only in the characteristic of
judging neuroticism do they show a parallel personality. Many of the differences are
attributable to the different upbringing both experienced. Peter I, an aristocrat born to
privilege and wealth, grew up in the privileged environment that wealth afforded at the
time. Putin, the son of a former sailor and subsequent laborer, growing up on the streets
of Leningrad with the hardships that existence entailed. The uneducated Czar compared
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to the well-educated public servant. Even their physical characteristics are a picture of
great diversity, with Peter I standing well over six and a half feet tall, compared to the
diminutive five foot five Putin. In almost all personal aspects, these two leaders of
Russia, separated by almost three hundred years, could present no more stark a different
picture.
However, the difference in the personality characteristics of the two men does not
translate into behavioral characteristics regarding their actions in conflict situations or
periods of transition. When we consider the accomplishments of the two leaders and the
considerable parallel circumstances in which they achieved their goals, the question
naturally rises, how could two so different individuals accomplish, or endeavor to
accomplish, almost the same objectives while separated by centuries?
Table 5-3
Peter I

Vladimir Putin

Existent and Adhered to hierarchy
Planned economic policy
Planned foreign policy
Planned social policy
Adherence to economic policy
Adherence to foreign policy
Adherence to social policy
Internal Conflict
Diplomatic Relations Mixed
Positive constituency opinion

Existent and Adhered to hierarchy
Planned economic policy
Planned foreign policy
Planned social policy
Adherence to economic policy
Adherence to foreign policy
Adherence to social policy
Internal harmony
Positive Diplomatic Relations
Positive constituency opinion

The parallels, although illustrating similarities in the two leaders, does not fully
show the level of parity demonstrated in each characteristic conclusion. Regarding
hierarchy, although the conclusions are positive, noting that both leaders accepted and
adhered to the hierarchal structure, the historiography shows that in both instances the
two men themselves created the hierarchal structure accepted. In the case of Peter I, a
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strong centralist monarchy was formed, whereas with Putin a strong centralist autocracy
was created. Both, however, embraced a centralist system, with themselves at the center.
There does exist a slight deviation when examining closer the planning and
adhering to policy. The historiography clearly indicates that during both periods, the
approach by both leaders focused upon one ‘driving’ policy, which the other policies
were tailored around; this is a parallel. However, in the case of Peter I, the social policy
of reformation and Europeanism is the foundation for the associated foreign and
economic policies, whereas in the case of Putin, economics is the focus and from which
the foreign and social policies are dependent. The approach of focusing upon one aspect
or policy ideology from which to guide and tailor other policy aspects is a meaningful
parallel.
Internally, both leaders experienced an overall positive opinion from the
constituencies under their rule. Like in all politics, this positive opinion ebbed and flowed
throughout the leader’s tenure; nevertheless, once the transitions proposed finally gained
general acceptance, opinions remain generally positive. There does exist a disparity in the
categories of international relations and internal harmony within the government.
Regarding international relations, the mixed conclusion for Peter I is a result of the 18
year war with Sweden, which dominated the period. The internal harmony disparity is a
product of the aristocracy’s initial opposition to the social reforms, which decreased their
power, whereas in the case of Putin, the centralist autocracy he promoted was generally
considered a better alternative to the chaotic democratic experiment recently abandoned
following the Yeltsin presidency.
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The conclusion of the research finds two leaders of starkly differing backgrounds
and characteristics, working within different governance structures, yet promoting similar
ideologies of governance. Both leaders promoted transformative initiatives, based upon a
single goal of increasing Russian international influence and promoting international
respect.

Comparison Governance
Table 5-4
Peter I Monarchal Aristocracy

Vladimir Putin Centralist Autocracy

Existent and Adhered to hierarchy Mixed
Planned economic policy
Planned foreign policy
Planned social policy
Abandoned economic policy
Adherence to foreign policy
Abandoned social policy
Internal Conflict
Diplomatic Relations Mixed
Negative constituency opinion

Existent and Adhered to hierarchy
Planned economic policy
Planned foreign policy
Planned social policy
Adherence to economic policy
Adherence to foreign policy
Adherence to social policy
Internal harmony
Positive Diplomatic Relations
Positive constituency opinion

The resistance to the social reforms of Peter I present as the main reason for the
disparities found in the characteristic chart of the governance structures. The initial and
ongoing resistance by the aristocracy to maintain their political power, over the course of
the transition and hence to the abandonment of their social and economic policies, shows
a weak governance structure unable to stem the tide of reform, thereby eventually
succumbing to the reforms. The Putin era government, parallel to the characteristics of
the head of state, illustrates an acceptance of the centralist autocracy. The research
attributes this characteristic analogy to the previous president’s poor execution of
democracy and the centralist ideology being a comfortable throwback to the communist
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era, which represents stability. However, for all their differences, both government
structures are centralist and autocratic, which presents its own parallel.

Comparison of Transition
Table 5-5
Social Reformation Peter I
Planned
Measured
Coordinated

Democracy/Autocracy Vladimir Putin
Planned
Measured
Coordinated

Generally Peaceful
Targeted
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Goal Orientated
Organized

Peaceful
Targeted
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Goal Orientated
Organized

Both transitions present the exact same characteristic models: well planned and
coordinated, targeted and measured in their approach, conducted generally peacefully,
while remaining goal orientated from similar ideological approaches. Upon closer
examination of the historiography, both transitions had a single parallel goal of increasing
and/or returning Russian influence on the world stage. The reforms of Peter I created
modern Russia and a sense of world power, whereas the political reforms of Putin
attempt to regain political world influence, and maintain modern Russia.
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Comparison of Domestic Conflict
Table 5-6
Strel’sty Revolt
Spontaneous
Disproportional
Coordinated Mixed
Offense Planned
Defense Reactionary
Aggression
General Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Goal Orientated
Disorganized

Chechen Revolt
Planned
Disproportional
Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Event: Aggressive
Mixed Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Goal Orientated
Mixed

The domestic conflicts during the periods present very different models, some of
which is attributable to the length of each being different, as was the implementation
manner. These two domestic conflicts are significantly divergent in their scope, goals,
and method of conduction. The Strel’sty revolts were short-lived engagements, usually
spontaneous and reactionary to the perceived social status demotion of members of the
Russian military. Although goal orientated and maintaining their ideological
perspectives, their coordination, and methods of implementation, mostly due to the
spontaneity of the revolts, were considerably disorganized. The Strel’sty desire was to
turn back the transition of Europeanism and return to the former system, whereas the
Chechen revolts, being more a cultural resistance to Russian rule and conducted as a
guerrilla form of engagement, shows better planning of the implementation.
Both domestic conflicts, however, are a product of the transitions of the period.
The Strel’sty revolts are a direct response to the transitions enacted by Peter I, and
directly tied to the opposition to the transitions goals. The modernization of Russia the
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transition proposed directly conflicted with the desires of the Strel’sty. In the case of the
Chechen revolts, the transition, first in the 1990’s during the failed democratization of
Russia, and then again in the beginning of the 21st century following the Putin election,
provided an opportunity for the continuation of the revolt to achieve autonomy. In spite
of this, in both cases, the transition experienced during both periods was either the
catalyst or the creator of a window of opportunity for the domestic conflict to arise.

Comparison of International Conflict
Table 5-7
Great Northern War
Planned
Measured
Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Planned
Aggressive
Targeted Response
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Goal Orientated
Organized

Disorganized
Planned
Disproportional
Coordinated
Offense Planned
Defense Reactionary
Aggressive
Targeted
Maintained Ideological Perspective
Lack of Identifiable Goal
Mixed

The international conflicts of both periods, like the domestic versions, were also
fundamentally different in almost all manners for consideration. One was a war against a
world power by its neighbors, conducted over an extended period, in an effort, from the
Russian perspective, to promote the goals of the transition and increase the influence of
the Russian nation through military recognition, an acceptable method of garnering world
influence at the time. The other was an exercise in civil disruption and destruction,
designed to promote a religious fundamental ideology not condoned by the mainstream
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Islamic faith, against the fabric of civil society, to achieve vague goals of social and civil
restructuring world order. The Great Northern War was a conflict of nations, with
specific agendas and goals, utilizing traditional armies, and with directed violence against
an identified opponent. The War on Terror, in contrast, is against a network of radical
fundamentalists, engaging civilian targets with no identifiable goal beyond the crippling
of society by introduction of fear promoted by feelings of insecurity.
As indicated in the table, the Great Northern War was an organized conflict, or as
organized as wars could be considered, whereas the Terrorism campaigns against society,
although in implementation has aspects of organization, in ideology and goals lack these
characteristics.

Comparison of Element Engagement of Conflict and Transition
Table 5-8
Subject Element

Characteristic Option 1

Leadership Response
to Transition
Government Response
to Transition
Leadership Response
to Domestic Conflict
Government Response
to Domestic Conflict
Leadership Response
to International
Conflict
Government Response
to International
Conflict

Organized

Characteristic Option 2

Disorganized
Organized
Organized
Organized

Organized

The response to conflicts and transition in Russia during both eras show
considerable continuity. Only when we consider the transition’s response during the
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period of Peter I do we see any divergence from the overall propensity for organized
response and reaction, regardless of the type, organizational level, or extent of the event
addressed. The one disparity, the transition during the reign of Peter I, as indicated in the
evaluation of the period, is a direct result of the effects the transition had upon the
governance of the time. The disorganization was a result of a split response by those
willing to embrace the transition due to the potential for consideration of retaining some
political power through their assent, and by those who rejected the transition in its
entirety in an effort to maintain the status quo.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions

The conclusions drawn from any historical account will represent an exercise in
subjective reasoning. Rather than presenting empirical proof of the theoretical concept,
historiographies only present conclusions drawn by the researcher, although those
conclusions are drawn from the historical evidence provided. This valid point deserves
serious consideration, and is the foundation of the methodology employed during the
research. This study does not represent a traditional qualitative research design. Knowing
that the conclusions would necessarily be of a subjective nature, the research approached
the problem from the perspective of legal research methodology. To promote the
theoretical hypothesis, rather than engaging in the traditional qualitative research models
of phenomenology, narrative, or participatory action, the research design engaged in a
methodology similar to case building. In the legal disciplines, a side proposes a
conclusion; that conclusion is then supported by a preponderance of evidence, both
factual and circumstantial, with the intent to build a consensus that leads to the proposed
conclusion being the logical end.
The research approached the inherent subjectivity of its conclusion by engaging a
similar ideology. Within the scholarship of the social sciences, many conclusions
regarding theoretical principles are arguably subjective. Psychology, sociology, political
science, and anthropology are all areas of scholarship which accept subjective
conclusions as legitimate positions from which theories are developed. Unlike the hard
science of physics, which utilizes mathematics as a foundation of proof, the social
sciences must rely upon subjective conclusions from which to acquire answers. This
study is presented in a qualitative format rather than quantitative, and therefore lacks the
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empirical numeric data that attributes to the “reproducibility’ of results”. This does not
diminish the conclusions postulated herein; rather the lack numerical statistics becomes a
focal point in which the study sought to build a case in which the preponderance of
historical evidence produced logical conclusions.
The first question of the research proposes, do nation-states have an individual
personality, which creates behavioral characteristics? The research concludes that the
preponderance of evidence in Russian actions point to a conclusion of yes. This
conclusion is a product of understanding the underlining motivations to Russian actions
in conflict, as exhibited by the examples and the coloration of the data from the separate
periods.
Before the reign of Peter I, it is clear from the historical accounts that Russia was
a disregarded nation, socially, economically, and technologically behind the great powers
of Europe. The focus of the transition of Europeanism enacted by Peter I was a direct
plan to address this national issue. Following the reform’s implementation, Russia’s
status within the world community increased. From this point, the need to belong became
a fundamental motivation for Russian actions. This is a basic human characteristic,
commonly labeled belongingness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The principle of
belongingness exists within Maslow’s Hierarchy of needs or motives, under the category
of social needs (Coon, 1977, p. 467). Arguably, all nations maintain some level of desire
for belonging and recognition. However, the level of which this desire influences a nation
is different within each nation-state. The level of which belongingness plays a role in
national motivations and actions also varies from nation to nation. In some nations,
belongingness is a minor drive exhibiting an almost introvert personality, only emerging
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into the affairs of the international community when necessary for the protection of their
interests. Other nations become so obsessed to belong that all their motivations and
actions are driven by this personality characteristic.
However, the Russian psychology was not limited to simple belongingness. The
need to belong extended to the next level of the hierarchy, the need for achievement,
attention, recognition, and reputation. These characteristics are another human behavioral
motivation found in Maslow’s Hierarchy at the level of esteem and self-esteem (Coon,
1977, p. 467). This concept of Russia’s need for self-esteem was measured not only by
Russia’s perception of their place in the world, but also by the perception of the rest of
the world regarding Russian importance in international affairs. The transition during the
period of Peter I could have simply been conducted to move Russia into the present;
however, the intent of the actions beyond the social reforms enacted provide historical
proof that the ultimate goal was not to address the need for simple belongingness, but to
address a higher need on Maslow’s hierarchy, self-esteem.
Peter I did not limit his reformation to transforming Russian society into
something modeled after the European powers. His engagement into the international
conflict and harsh repression of the domestic Strel’tsy revolt are indicators of the level of
motivation. The need to be recognized was not only as an equal member of the world
community, but also as a power which the world needed to respect. The engagement in
the Great Northern War, against the world power of the time Sweden, a war for which
initially Russia was ill prepared to engage, points to the drive to address this level of need
for status recognition being tantamount to narcissism, as the term relates to the need for
power and prestige. The conducting of a war of the magnitude displayed in the Great
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Northern War, while in the process of transitioning the nation into a modern social
construct that was under resistance from important elements of the society, against a
superior opponent demonstrates the level of obsession Peter I exhibited to address this
need.
The continuation of this need for recognition is evident in the second period of the
research’s construct, the Putin era. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia,
now exposed as a nation with significantly less power than was presented from behind
the Iron Curtain, began to lose its significant place in international affairs. Although the
Soviet Union continued to present a face of power and success, another example of the
continuation of the personality traits described, once the deficiencies were exposed, the
first priority of the Putin era Russia was to retain it. The Putin plan to restoring
recognition displayed a significantly different path than the original design of Peter I,
although one that was no less driven. Whereas in the time of Peter I, the level of power
was measured by military might as much as any other political indicator, the path to
power for Russia in the late 20th and early 21st century had diverged. Economic might
had become as significant an indicator of world influence as military abilities. Putin
recognized that Russia, although still a nuclear state, possessed a military that lagged
behind technologically; this became evident during the Russian-Afghan war and the
Chechen revolts, which displayed the Russian inability to overwhelm her opponents with
military superiority.
Putin therefore enacted a policy that would seek economic recognition through
the building of a strong Russian economy, thereby presenting an opportunity to improve
the military capabilities. So important was the motivation for the resurrection of Russian
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self-esteem that Russia abandoned any pretense of democratization. Russia entered into
alliances with former ideological and cold war enemies against global terrorism, their
international conflict, in the hopes of garnering economic favors for their efforts. This
leads to the next question proposed by the research, do these characteristics regardless of
transitions in political, economic, or social structures, consistently exhibit influence on
Russian conflict and foreign policy?
The data and historical information conclusively indicate that, not only do these
characteristics influence policy during transitions and conflicts, they are the underlining
motivator for those transitions and conflicts. The reformation of Russian society by Peter
I, and the return to centralist autocracy by Putin, exhibit two transitions not only
influenced by the characteristics, but also a direct response to achieving the characteristic,
with each designed to increase Russian international influence. During both periods, the
international conflicts engaged in, the Great Northern War and the War on Terror, are
also direct actions formulated and conducted to be a means to this end. Both were
specifically engaged in to produce increased Russian esteem through clearly narcissistic
actions.
The next question was, is the behavioral characteristics observed and identified a
product of the leaders personality or an inherent condition within the nation-state itself?
Does the personality characteristic exist within the nation-state, as the driver being
responsible for the actions of the society, or is does the characteristic which drives action
reside within an element of society, specifically the head of state or governance structure,
which is then responsible for the nations actions? The research has considered this
question. Are the observed characteristics actually imbedded into the personality of the
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nation? For this, we return to the question of if there does exist a common Russian
foreign policy ideological phenomenon, which occurs regardless of the social/political
structure of the Russian government and the historic period in which the study examines.
Since the study concludes the characteristic exists and is observable in both periods, and
is not dependent upon social, political structure or the personage of the head of state, the
characteristic therefore resides within the personality of the nation.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, as demonstrated by the research
data, the social, political structure, and leadership changed without having any effect
upon the behavioral characteristics observed. The research data specifically outlined the
diversity of the periods to demonstrate whether any element or combinations of elements
within society could affect the personality characteristic. The findings were negative. The
behavioral and personality characteristic is concluded to exist within the nation-state as
an element separate of the influences of the actors and environment. The nation-state is
the constant, and since the actors and environment in which the nation-state resides is
fluid, if the characteristic remains, it therefore must be an embedded element of the
nation-state.
The research concludes that Russia has historically exhibited the behavioral
characteristics of the need for belongingness and self-esteem as a counter to an inferiority
complex common when the motivations for these two needs are high (Coon, 1977). The
drive to satisfy these needs is of sufficient strength to cause the nation-state to engage in
narcissistic behaviors to meet these needs. The study further concludes that regarding
behavioral characteristics in nation-states, homogeny exists and is identifiable as a factor
through the historical examination of Russian actions, both domestic and international,

229
and that a method of inquiry traditionally employed in the study of humans is valid if
employed as a method of inquiry for nations. Since the research has concluded that
behavioral characteristics exist, nation-state behavioral profiling in this instance is valid
in determining national behavioral homogony within conflict.
The study also examined the effects of transition upon nation-state actions as they
relate to the behavioral characteristics. The study originally hypothesized that major
social/political transitions should disrupt measurably existing characteristic homogenies,
and that political and social transition should affect how Russia deals with international
and domestic conflict. The study concluded that social/political transitions in the case of
Russia had no disruptive effect upon the behavioral characteristic, but in fact were the
approach for achieving satisfaction for the characteristic. Furthermore, the characteristic
identified is a prime motivation in the methods and strategies employed for dealing with
domestic and international conflict. Finally, periods of transition did not affect the
national behavioral homogony toward conflict. Russia, unlike other nations that have
experienced disruption of their ideological homogenies during transitional periods,
exhibited no lasting influence on their behavioral homogeny. Russia has exhibited no
parallel impact to the examples provided in chapter 1. Conflict does not alter Russia’s
behavioral homogeny.
In regards to the methodology, the research concludes that nation-state behavioral
profiling is a valid methodology, and when employed, creates a deeper understanding of
the conflict and/or conflicts elements. The identification of these behavioral
characteristics can contribute to a more detailed model with which to predict future
Russian actions, and this new information, when used, could create proactive conflict
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mitigation. Understanding that Russia will consistently strive to satisfy its internal need
for not only belonging but also the elevation of self-esteem, and will exhibit narcissistic
behavior in which to obtain that satisfaction, signals a potential for Russia to engage in
any activity in which to satisfy that need. This conclusion regarding Russia’s willingness
to engage in extreme behaviors is supported by the research historical data.
The final conclusion of the study is that historically, examining nation-states for
the existence of human parallel behavioral characteristics by comparing historical periods
and the conflicts, transitions, and elements of the society which made up the nation-state
at the time, is not only valid and produces logical conclusions, but by its discovery and
identification of behavioral characteristic, is a necessary component to fully
understanding the motivations of nation-state actions.

The Study and its Relation to Conflict Resolution
Many might ask the question, what does this dissertation have to do with conflict
analysis and resolution? This is a valid question. Some might consider this study more
appropriate within the disciplines of political science or history, rather than that of
conflict studies. This study, not presented from a traditional conflict analysis and
resolution approach, does not seek to examine a specific conflict situation, analyze it, and
then offer resolution options. It does not focus upon a single incident, nor does it attempt
to quantify the effects of any one conflict. The shelves of the libraries are full of research
which engages in that type of scholarship. Instead, this dissertation is an example of the
potential which exists within the discipline of conflict analysis and resolution, which
might better be labeled conflict science. The study engaged conflict through theoretical
development. Engagement techniques such as mediation, facilitation, negotiation, all
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honed in the disciplines of law, or social sciences and each a valuable tool, do not need to
be the limit of our arsenal. As a discipline, we can propose our own theoretical models,
so long as we maintain the focus of those models on conflict. This dissertation is not a
product of a political scientist, but a conflict scholar, and therefore regardless of its
similarity of approach and focus to that of the political sciences, it belongs entirely to
conflict science.
The research believes that the ultimate goal of conflict analysis and resolution should
be the elimination of conflict. We should challenge ourselves to expand our efforts to
conflict elimination. We ought to focus more on producing theoretical foundations and
models usable throughout the discipline to better mitigate existing conflict and engage
conflict before it happens. There will always be cases when conflict engagement will
necessarily be reactive, as some conflict, regardless of preparation, is unavoidable. Yet
this inevitability should not present a barrier to realizing that the potential exists for
expanding the skills of conflict analysis and resolution to a more proactive endeavor.
Conflict science can be proactive. Efforts to better understand and mitigate those
dynamics with the greatest potential of influencing the events that can lead to conflict is
an essential component of a proactive effort. Conflict analysis should endeavor to
identify those conditions that signal the need for the engagement of conflict mitigation
prior to the need for resolution.
The major consequence to the current reactionary model is that conflict, when
allowed to come to fruition, has detrimental effects to those involved. Mitigating conflict
when the direct participants are already engaged in conflict is difficult. When a conflict
comes to fruition, the concentration and focus of the participants is on the conducting of
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the conflict, rather than its resolution. Successful engagement strategies must include an
understanding of the motivations and drivers that influence conflicts. Understanding
motivations creates potentials before a conflict begins, as is the goal of this study, which
examines the roots of conflict and society from a behaviorist perspective. The study’s
intent is to identify these motivations and drivers, from this unique perspective, thereby
offering a theoretical foundation from which further scholarship of conflict studies can
build.
However, creating theory is not the only avenue of scholarship in which conflict
science should further engage. Conflict analysis scholars must examine present day postconflict strategies to determine success potentials and thereby offer new and enlightened
strategies which break the cycle of continuous conflict. We must treat each region,
culture, and nation-state as a unique entity with its own personality traits, which requires
acknowledgement and then factoring into any conflict mitigation strategies. This is the
foundation of this researches goal. Conflict scholars must not only apply theoretical
models, but must also engage in new empirical methodologies that address every
potential avenue of epistemology, not limiting themselves to the parameters preset in
traditional qualitative and quantitative research methods.
We therefore finally return to the original question postulated at the beginning of this
section, what does this dissertation have to do with conflict analysis and resolution? The
one word answer is, everything.

Areas for Further Research
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Whenever we are offering new theoretical principles, the potentials for further
research present themselves. This is especially true when those theories look at a problem
from a different perspective than is traditionally accepted. While conducting this
research, one of the most difficult aspects is resisting the desire to addressing those
further research ideas while in the process. This project was no different. While
conducting this dissertation, numerous areas that would require further development
presented themselves. What follows are just a couple of those areas for which further
research regarding behavioral characteristics in nation-states exists.
Of primary importance is the development of a language in which to classify the
results of the behavioral characteristics found. As I look back at the terms, narcissism
and inferiority complex are insufficient to describe the characteristics found.
Unfortunately, their use was necessary, as they represented the closest correlating
classification found within behavioral science. The inferiority complex, as described in
the conclusions, is deeper, and in many ways a characteristic with different dynamics
than the term traditionally implies. Likewise, classifying Russia’s actions as examples of
narcissism, although fundamentally correct, in this case they are also of a different
dynamic from the traditional presentation of the narcissist. However, since the study was
conducted from the lens of the behaviorist, the researcher deemed labeling the findings in
a context which is appropriate to that field necessary. If this theoretical principle is
accepted and further developed, new classification language, terms and labels, which
define human behavioral characteristics as applied to social constructs such as nationstates, would be a first step necessary for the coordinated development of the founding
concepts.
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The need for new language is further evident when considering the stigmas
associated with the traditional labels and classifications of human behavior presently
used. Humanity places a considerable value upon language and its connotations.
Political correctness plays an important role in society. Any theory that classifies a
nation’s personality as having behavioral characteristics likened to paranoia, psychosis,
or narcissism, as examples, however valid, might lose support from the offense they
create. Many human behavior classifications maintain a negative connotation within
society. We should remember that one hundred and fifty years ago, the terms retard and
moron were valid medical diagnoses that were widely used, until their use extended
beyond medicine and became synonymous with insults and derogatory name-calling.
The same caution must be exercised here; using a classification which although may be
technically correct, yet has derogatory connotations or perception by those using it, could
create a resistance to an otherwise valid theoretical principle, simply due to the inability
to express its findings in an acceptable manner. Creating new language, terms, and
definitions, which not only define the findings accurately and with only those
characteristics identified by the research, but also possessing no historical perceptions as
to their connotation, is necessary.
Other further areas of research exist in the application of the theoretical principle
to social constructs beyond the nation-state. Every event, organization, or conflict has the
potential for examination from the behaviorist perspective. However, not all necessarily
would enlist the same model of research employed in this study. Taking the concept of
behavioral characteristics existing within all social, political, and organizational
dynamics and applying it to characteristics not determined solely by the humans directly
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responsible for the construct, but characteristics inherent to the construct itself, allows for
a new perspective in which to examine the dynamics of the society, and the components
of that society in which we live. As conflict scientist, we cannot limit ourselves to simply
examining the conflict alone. Our focus cannot be rigid and dictated by tunnel vision.
We must look outside the conflict to the elements and actors directly and indirectly
involved, to “see the big picture” and thereby create a more comprehensive
understanding of the conflict we desire to resolve. Because conflict is a dynamic event,
with many facets that make up that dynamic, we should discount nothing.
Finally, it is important to remember that this research study is but the beginning of
the process. Herein is contained only the foundation, the presentation of an idea, and a
conceptual framework in which to argue its validity. As with all beginnings, it is
incomplete in its infancy. However, like all new ideas, the potential of the idea exists far
beyond the simple application presented here. If nothing else, this theory proposed here
may become a catalyst for discourse in which other ideas or theories are born. Within
scholarship, even those theories that are discounted become topics from which the
argument against it becomes the foundation of new and better theory. This is how human
knowledge advances as every improvement of our knowledge begins with an idea. With
the question: what if? There is no shame when the answer is no. However, regarding this
study, I would conclude the answer is closer to maybe, and that until the principle has had
the opportunity to advance beyond its infancy, we cannot render a final judgment upon its
validity or potential for practical application. This theoretical principle presented, through
time and development, may someday produce an understanding that advances the goals
of conflict science.
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